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Introduction
Between 1960 and 2000 real GDP per capita increased by more than the factor of two in
the US.1 The standard economic growth model of Robert Solow traces growth to either
more capital, more labor input or to an increase in productivity. According to empirical
growth accounting exercises the latter factor is the most important: For example, Aghion
and Howitt (2007) argue that in the same time period between 30% and 70% of growth
in the OECD countries came from productivity increases and the remaining share is due
to physical capital accumulation.
The determinants of productivity are of the greatest interest to the public and an active
area of economic research. Two frequently named sources of productivity growth are the
introduction of new goods and corporate governance (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000 and
Syverson, 2011). New products are important for consumers as they often embed new
technologies with superior performance. New products increase the offered varieties which
is generally assumed to increase consumers’ utility (Krugman, 1979). In addition, product
entry intensifies competition, reducing the market power of incumbents and therefore the
average price for consumers. Thus, the gains from the introduction of new products
may be immense. For example, Petrin (2002) estimated the total welfare gains from
the minivan introduction to be US$ 2.9 billion during the first five years (1984 - 1988).
Hausman et al. (1997) estimated that the introduction of the cellular phone results in a
yearly consumer welfare gain of around US$ 50 billion.
New products not only benefit the consumer, but also the innovators as the examples of
early investors and founder of companies like Facebook, Google or Apple show. Despite
the large gains through the new products, we can observe a large failure rates of pioneer
1Google Data Explorer: http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z66q6n8n9alqcc_
&ctype=l&met_y=gnp_pc_ch, online, accessed: 14.12.2011.
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companies. This is likely caused by the high level of risk involved in the development
and marketing of such products. After the product has been developed, one of the most
important tasks for the innovator is to explain the new and often complex product to
the consumers since they are only willing to pay a high price for it if they understand its
features and potential.
As this marketing effort requires a high initial investment, not only start-ups (but also
established firms) are often unable or unwilling to finance it alone. Manufacturers of in-
novative products often sell their product exclusively to one retailer. The most prominent
example is the distribution of Apple Inc.’s ‘iPhone´.2 The first chapter of this disserta-
tion examines such exclusive arrangements. In particular, we study firms’ incentives to
voluntarily restrict their distribution channel to a single retailer as well as the impacts of
such behavior on the welfare.
After the introduction of a new product, both the innovator and established firms are
often unsure if the new product substitutes or complements to existing products. This
is an important question for every innovator and for welfare considerations, because sub-
stitutes increase product market competition and drive down prices while complements
increase the demand and the utility of existing goods. The second chapter of this dis-
sertation takes a closer look at the market entry of a highly successful new product, the
free commuter newspaper in Switzerland. In the years 1999-2008 the circulation of free
newspaper increased by almost 200%. We examine empirically if free daily newspapers
are substitutes or complements to the traditional daily press.
After a new product is successfully introduced, other firms often follow suit and estab-
lish - in the best of all cases - a competitive market. Although this is the theoretical
hope, Syverson (2011) found that even in the most narrow markets, a firm on the 90th
percentile of the productivity distribution produces up to two times more output with
the same inputs than a firm on the 10th quantile. However, it is still an open question
what causes such a large dispersion. One obvious candidate is corporate governance, the
second source of productivity growth mentioned earlier. Gompers et al. (2003) show that
better governed firms achieve a higher market return. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)
2A similar strategy is adopted, for example, by Oracle: Oracle’s Exadata storage server is available
exclusively on HP’s hardware. Another example is the exclusive distribution of the first touchscreen
Blackberry via Verizon or the distribution of the first Blackberry Pearl via T-Mobile.
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argue that better management practices lead to higher productivity. Some firms are just
better managed than others and practices differ significantly across countries.
But why do not all firms implement good governance and superior management tech-
niques? This might be due to the ownership structure of the companies. Large block-
holder might have more influence on the manager to induce them to act in their interest.
Foreign owners might be able to transfer production and process technology to improve
the performance of companies. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we therefore
change our focus to consider the effect of different ownership types on the efficiency of
Czech firms from 1998 to 2007.
In the remainder of this introduction, we briefly summarize the main contributions of the
three chapters in this thesis. All chapters are self-contained and can be read separately.
As we noted above, many manufacturers of innovative products sell their product exclu-
sively to one retailer, at least for a limited time span. Both the rationale of manufacturers
to adopt this behavior and to abandon it as well as such a behavior’s impact on welfare are
still not completely understood. Moreover, a crucial factor of such a retailing strategy’s
impact in vertically related markets is the presence/absence of competition at the different
market segments. However, most models of vertically related markets abstract from the
presence of multiple buyers and multiple sellers, that is, either the downstream segment
or the upstream segment is represented by a single firm, and hence, derive simplified con-
clusions. According to Whinston (2008), developing models that consider competition on
both segments is a high priority.
The first chapter of this dissertation directly addresses both issues mentioned above.3 We
provide a rationale for an exclusive retailing (ER) arrangement and advance the litera-
ture by considering competition among companies at both, the upstream as well as the
downstream market.
We develop a four-stage game where two upstream manufacturers produce differentiated
brands and sell them to two non-differentiated downstream retailers. At the first stage
the manufacturers choose to sell their products to all retailers or to limit themselves to
a single ‘exclusive’ retailer. At the second stage upstream firms simultaneously choose
3This chapter is based on the article “Exclusive Retailing” which is joint work with Dominik Ruderer
from the University of Munich.
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their wholesale prices. At stage 3 retail companies can undertake brand specific demand
enhancing marketing investments and at stage 4 retail competition in prices takes place.
On the one hand, the adoption of ER is costly for the manufacturer as it results in a
unilateral retail price increase (double markup effect). On the other hand, it comes with
two profit enhancing effects. First, the positive retail margin enhances incentives to invest
in brand specific marketing (investment effect). Second, due to strategic complementarity
the competing manufacturer reacts to the price increase of the retailer also with a price
increase. This weakens interbrand competition (competition softening effect). While the
investment effect is procompetitive, the two other effects are clearly anti-competitive.
According to our model, a higher degree of exclusivity leads to higher prices (at the
wholesale as well as the retail stage) and to higher retail profits. Moreover, marketing
investment also increases. We show that three types of equilibria exist and that the equi-
librium selection depends on the cost of investment and the degree of substitutability of
brands: (i) If marketing is not efficient or brands are rather distinct from each other, both
manufacturers sell to all retailers. (ii) If efficiency of marketing has an intermediate value
and brands are not too similar, only one manufacturer adopts ER. (iii) Both manufactur-
ers adopt ER if marketing is highly efficient or brands are similar. Finally, we find that a
manufacturer’s interest in adopting ER is not aligned with a social welfare maximization.
In particular, ER should only be allowed by competition authorities if retail investment
is sufficiently efficient or interbrand competition is tough.
In the second chapter we consider the impact of entry of a new product on the demand
for existing products in media markets using an example of free commuter newspapers in
Switzerland.4 We are interested in whether free commuter newspapers are substitutes or
complements to the paid-for daily press. As we noted above, to examine this question is
important due to welfare assessment of the innovative products. Moreover, in a context of
the media markets, there is an ongoing discussion whether media competition is beneficial
or not: On the one hand, consumers might value socially valuable “hard” political news
less than a social planner would. As a result, a higher level of competition might cause
crowding out of high quality news. On the other hand, increasing competition might
4This chapter is based on the article “Free commuter newspapers and the market for pad-for daily
newspapers”.
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limit the bias stemming from the supply side of the media market, e.g. weakening the
politicians’ influence on media (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008).
The first effect rests on the assumption that “hard” and “soft” news outlets are substi-
tutes. In order to shed more light on this rarely tested assumption, this chapter quantifies
the impact of the successive expansion of free commuter newspapers on the readership
and circulation of the traditional daily press in the Swiss newspaper market, controlling
for market and year fixed effects. Moreover, we employ a novel identification strategy
using the distribution via the transport system, a special characteristic of free daily news-
papers. Throughout our analysis we allow for multihoming, i.e. that each consumer can
buy more than one newspaper. This is an important but up to now neglected feature of
the media market. We proceed in two steps: We first estimate the relationship between
the circulation of free commuter newspapers and the circulation of traditional daily news-
papers. Then, we analyze whether free newspaper penetration changes the structure of
the audience of traditional newspapers.
We find that the expansion of free daily newspaper has a small negative impact on the
circulation and readership of the traditional daily press. However, commuter newspapers
only withdraw readership from low quality newspapers, such as local and national tabloids.
Our results indicate that the behavior of multihomers constitutes an important driving
force in this substitution pattern. Furthermore, we show that free commuter newspapers
especially draw younger and less educated individuals away from daily newspapers. Fi-
nally, we find that free newspaper penetration expands the size of the market, meaning
that a larger fraction of the population is informed. This effect is more pronounced among
young and less educated readers. All this suggests that “hard” and “soft” news media
outlets are distinct markets.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, as far as we know, this
is the first work investigating the competitive effects of the introduction of free commuter
newspapers which have become an important player in the media markets in many coun-
tries worldwide. Second, we collect a novel data set by merging data about newspaper
circulation with data about readership characteristics and Census data. This data set
could be used in future research to answer other economic question, such as the impact
5
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of media competition on electoral participation and outcomes. Third, while the previous
studies abstract from multihoming among readers, we explicitly consider it in our analy-
sis.5 We show that assuming that all readers only read one newspaper may lead to a bias
in the estimation.
The third chapter of this dissertation empirically analyzes the evolution of firm efficiency
in the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2007.6 Using a large panel of more than 190,000
firm-years we study which firms fully utilize their resources, how firm efficiency evolves
over time, and how efficiency is related to the ownership structure of firms.
One key idea shaping policies during the privatization wave in Central and Eastern Europe
in the 1990s was that ownership structure is an important determinant of firm performance
(Estrin et al. 2009). Policy makers and economists expected that privately held companies
would be more efficient than the formerly state-owned companies, because they had an
incentive to maximize profits and therefore utilize input more efficiently. In addition,
if the new owner is from another country, he would possibly transfer technology and
management practices improving the efficiency of the acquired firm. However, there is
still a lack of reliable empirical evidence how the type of ownership influenced the medium-
and long-term efficiency of firms in Central and Eastern Europe after the privatization
was completed.
This chapter fills this gap in the literature by estimating the firm efficiency in the Czech
Republic with a stochastic frontier model and then relating this efficiency to different
ownership types. The ownership categories are defined by the concentration of the owner-
ship shares and the domicile of the owner. We therefore consider separately the effect of
majority and minority ownership as well as the effect of foreign and domestic owners. Our
results suggest that the possibility that owners can control a firm is consistently beneficial
for its efficiency. In addition, foreign ownership is positively related to firm efficiency. If
we split our sample according to the technology intensity of the firm’s sector, we find
that firms using high and low technology are influenced more by the type of ownership
5To the best of our knowledge, the only study that specifically controls for multihoming is Gentzkow
(2007).
6This chapter is based on the article “Efficiency and the Ownership of Czech Firms” which is joint work
with Jan Hanousek and Evžen Kočenda from the Center for Economic Research & Graduate Education
- Economics Institute in Prague.
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than firms with an intermediate technology level. In the final part of our study we trace
the effect of ownership over time and find that ownership effects mattered most at the
beginning of our sample period, but converge towards the end.
For our analysis we construct a unique firm-level panel data combining detailed ownership
data and financial performance from three different data sources. Our data set contains
a representative sample of privatized and newly established firms from the Amadeus
database, representing the bulk of the economic activity in the Czech Republic. From
the Aspekt and Čekia databases we collect detailed ownership data, which allows us to
construct more fine-grained ownership categories than typically used in the literature.
Thus, we are able to develop a more systematic analytical framework for evaluating the
efficiency effect of domestic versus foreign ownership, as well as the effect of various
degrees of ownership concentration. Another advantage of our study compared to the
prior literature is that we cover a time period when accounting rules conforming to the
international standard (IAP) were already in place. This is important since we - just as
the majority of studies examining productivity - make use of balance sheet data, which
is sensitive to a change in the accounting rules.
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Exclusive Retailing
1.1 Introduction
The introduction of the ‘iPhone´ by Apple Inc. in 2007 came with an announcement that
marketing efforts for this mobile handset would be undertaken exclusively via one mobile
carrier per country. In Germany this exclusive carrier became T-Mobile, while in the US
the ‘iPhone´ was marketed via AT&T. Though at that time Apple Inc. was well known
for its personal computers, music players (the ‘iPod’) and online music store (‘iTunes’), it
was unknown for mobile handsets. In 2010 the exclusivity arrangement was abandoned
in most national markets. Both the rationale of Apple Inc. to adopt this behavior and to
drop it as well as the effect on competition and welfare are still not completely understood.
In this chapter, we provide a rationale for such an exclusive retailing (ER) arrangement.
ER eliminates the disciplining effect of intrabrand competition between retailers, giving
the exclusive retailer market power and hence, a higher retail margin. While creating
such a double markup effect is costly for the manufacturer, it also comes with two profit-
enhancing effects. First, it can serve as a mechanism to enhance brand-specific marketing
investments by retailers (investment effect). This can be profitable for the manufacturer
if the retailer owns a relatively more efficient marketing investment technology.1 Second,
1In the ‘iPhone´ context, this would mean that the ER arrangement enhances marketing investments
by T-Mobile resp. AT&T into Apple’s iPhone. Apple was not well known for mobile handsets at that
time and the mobile carriers had a much better distribution network as well as access to their customer
data. Hence, mobile carriers had a relatively better technology in marketing the iPhone. A similar
argument can be made for a lot of other products, in particular when the manufacturer does not have
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ER might serve as a commitment device for reduced interbrand competition among manu-
facturers. In other words, the elimination of intrabrand competition by one manufacturer
leads to a unilateral price increase, incentivizing the competing manufacturer to increase
prices (competition softening effect). While the investment effect can be interpreted as
procompetitive, the two other effects are clearly anticompetitive.
Our model analyzes a vertically related industry where two upstream manufacturers pro-
duce differentiated brands and sell them to two downstream retailers at linear wholesale
prices. The downstream retailers resell the upstream goods to consumers. Producing
as well as reselling the brand is associated with constant production/resale costs which
are set to zero for simplicity. While consumers have different preferences regarding the
brands, they are indifferent between retailers. The manufacturers can choose to sell their
brands via both retailers or exclusively via one of the retailers.2 Thus, three different
settings can arise: (i) Both manufacturers sell to both retailers. (ii) One manufacturer
sells to both retailers, while the other manufacturer sells to only one retailer. (iii) Each
manufacturer sells to only one retailer.3
Besides reselling brands, retailers can also conduct brand specific marketing. Investment
into marketing raises the perceived relative quality of a brand and enhances demand for
the brand regardless of which retailer resells the good. We assume that the different
parties cannot contract on a specific level of marketing effort.
When manufacturers sell their brand non-exclusively, intrabrand competition at the retail
stage drives down prices to the retailers’ marginal cost, which consists of the wholesale
price being paid for the brand. Retailers could invest into brand specific marketing. But
as intrabrand competition eliminates any retail margin, retailers would never gain from
such an investment and hence, will not invest.
If a manufacturer adopts ER, intrabrand competition at the retail stage does not exist
anymore. Hence, the retailer can gain a positive margin on the sale of the brand. More-
direct contact to its final customers. For example, the microchip producer Intel partly relies on marketing
by its downstream retailers.
2In other words, they can choose if they want to have intrabrand competition or not at the retail stage
for their brand.
3Here, we rule out the case where both manufacturers exclusively sell to the same retailer and hence,
foreclose the second retailer from the market. Though it turns out that this setting would maximize
industry profits, we believe that such foreclosure would never be allowed by competition authorities.
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over, the brand specific investment becomes now retailer specific, investment becomes
lucrative for the retailer and positive investment levels can be observed. In addition, the
possibility of the retailer to gain a positive margin results in a double markup problem.
This leads to a unilateral retail price increase of the exclusively sold brand and thus,
weakens interbrand competition.
Using this model, we can derive the following results. First, we find that prices (at the
wholesale as well as at the retail level), investment and retail profits are higher when
one or both manufacturers adopt exclusivity relative to a situation where none of the
manufacturers chooses exclusivity. However, more exclusivity in the market does not nec-
essarily mean higher equilibrium values.4
Second, with competition among upstream brands, we show that three types of equilibria
exist, depending on the cost of investment as well as the degree of substitutability among
brands: (i) Both manufacturers adopt non-exclusive retailing (NER). (ii) One manufac-
turer adopts NER, while the other manufacturer adopts ER. (iii) Both manufacturers
adopt ER. When adopting ER, manufacturers trade off the cost (double markup effect)
and the benefits (investment effect and competition softening effect) of such behavior.
Equilibrium (i) occurs when the investment cost is large and brands are rather distinct
from each other. Equilibrium (ii) occurs when both, investment cost as well as the simi-
larity among brands, attain intermediate values. Equilibrium (iii) occurs for either very
similar brands, very low investment costs or both.
Third, when upstream brands are asymmetric with respect to the investment cost in
marketing their brand, the occurrence of equilibrium (i) is not affected. Moreover, the
asymmetric equilibrium (ii) will occur for a larger parameter space, while equilibrium
(iii) will occur for a smaller parameter space. In particular, for rather asymmetric brands
the symmetric ER (iii) equilibrium will only occur for highly competitive markets.
Finally, we find that the incentive for a manufacturer to adopt ER contradicts with a
welfare maximizing regulator’s view of ER. This gives scope for regulatory intervention.
In particular, ER should only be allowed if retail investment is sufficiently efficient or
interbrand competition is rather tough.
4E.g., wholesale prices might be lower when both brands are distributed exclusively compared to a
situation when only one brand is distributed exclusively.
10
Exclusive Retailing
This chapter contributes to two streams of literature, vertical restraints and exclusive
contracting. Both analyze restrictions which are put on one trading party by another
trading party. While in most of these articles the selling party restricts the buying party
in establishing alternative trading relationships, in our work the selling party commits
itself to trade only with one of the buyers.
The literature on vertical restraints considers different kinds of restrictions such as ex-
clusive dealing, resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, franchise fees and quantity
forcing. Similar to our work, this literature models the vertical structure of an industry
explicitly.
Besanko and Perry (1993, 1994) model the equilibrium incentives to adopt exclusivity
when interbrand competition exists. Though we also consider interbrand competition,
they look at exclusive arrangements where a retailer is allowed to deal with only one
manufacturer, while we look at situations where a manufacturer only deals with one re-
tailer. While the former is most often described as exclusive dealing, we characterize the
latter as exclusive retailing. Moreover, Besanko and Perry (1993) investigate the situation
when a manufacturer can conduct retailer-specific investment. We, in contrast, investigate
the case when the retailer can conduct manufacturer-specific investment. Besanko and
Perry (1994) do not consider investments at all, but foreclosure of retailers. We explicitly
rule out any foreclosure.
Similar to our work, Mathewson and Winter (1984) analyze the role of vertical restraints
for inducing retail advertising efforts. They investigate the effect of different kinds of
vertical restraints, but do not consider ER. Moreover, they do not consider interbrand
competition, as we do. In Winter (1993) similar policies are considered, but in a different
framework with spatial competition. Among others, Rey and Stiglitz (1995) discuss ver-
tical restraints as a measure to weaken upstream competition.5 They consider a similar
setting to ours, but restrict their analysis to symmetric outcomes only where either none
or both manufacturers choose exclusivity, while we also analyze potential asymmetric
outcomes. Moreover, they do not consider retail investment.
Armstrong (1999) and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) analyze the link between the type
of payment within a contract (lump-sum vs. linear payment) and the manufacturer’s
5Similar contributions, but with a different objective, Telser (1960) and Jullien and Rey (2007).
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decision to adopt exclusivity. They find that downstream competition as well as the pos-
sibility of resale among retailers plays an important role on the optimality of exclusivity.
However, they neither consider investments nor upstream competition.
The literature on exclusive contracting considers only exclusive dealing arrangements and
no other forms of restraints. In contrast to our work, this literature uses an incomplete
contracting framework. Two different views of exclusivity arrangements can be found.
The anticompetitive view (Bolton and Aghion (1987), Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley
(1991), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Segal and Whinston (2000)) argues that exclu-
sivity serves to foreclose potential rivals from the market and hence hinders competition.
The procompetitive view (Klein (1988), Frasco (1991), Marvel (1982), Masten and Snyder
(1993), Areeda and Kaplow (1988)) argues that exclusivity is needed in order to protect
the return on non-contractible asset-specific investments. Without exclusivity, investment
incentives would be reduced. Such contracting arrangements can therefore be welfare en-
hancing, even when these lead to the foreclosure of potential rivals (Fumagalli et al.
(2009)). Although we use a different methodology, we incorporate both the pro- as well
as the anticompetitive view of exclusivity. Finally, de Fontenay et al. (2010) analyze the
equilibrium incentives to adopt exclusivity in a modified Nash bargaining framework and
apply the results to our main example, the ‘iPhone-case’. However, they do not consider
any anticompetitive elements of exclusivity.
In the next Section we present our model. In Section 1.3 we derive the outcomes for all
different regimes of ER and in Section 1.4 the equilibrium incentives of firms to adopt
exclusivity. In Section 1.5 we analyze the incentives of manufacturers to adopt ER in case
of asymmetric manufacturers. In Section 1.6 we derive welfare results and in Section 1.7
we conclude.
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1.2 The Model
Our model consists of three types of agents: Manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
Manufacturers. Consider two manufacturers, denoted by i = 1, 2, who produce dif-
ferentiated brands at a constant marginal cost equal to zero. The manufacturers need
retailers in order to sell their goods to consumers. Manufacturers simultaneously choose
whether to adopt exclusive retailing (ER) or non-exclusive retailing (NER). We define ER
as selling exclusively to one retailer, while NER means that the manufacturer sells to all
retailers. After choosing the specific distribution system, the manufacturers are assumed
to set a linear wholesale price wi.6, 7
Four different distribution systems can potentially arise:8 (i) Both manufacturers choose
NER, (N/N). (ii) One of the manufacturers chooses NER, while the other manufacturer
chooses ER, (E/N). (iii) Both manufacturers choose ER (E/E) and both manufacturers
choose different retailers. Hence, both retailers are active on the market, each reselling
one brand. (iv) Both manufacturers choose ER and both manufacturers sell their brand
via the same retailer. As a result, the other retailer is foreclosed from the market, while
the first retailer has monopoly power over the whole market. The fourth case is excluded
from our subsequent analysis, as we believe that such a monopolization of the market
(which in fact yields the highest industry profits) would always be banned by competition
authorities.9
6The use of linear wholesale prices can be justified by our focus on ‘innovative’ industries. Such
industries are usually associated with high degrees of uncertainty. Linear prices can serve as a tool to
share the risk among trading parties. Moreover, linear wholesale prices are widely used in the literature,
e.g. Arya et al. (2008), Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) as well as Inderst and Valletti (2009).
7Note that though our analysis focuses on linear wholesale prices, our results are robust to the in-
troduction of two-part tariffs, if the two parts of the tariffs are not chosen at the same point in time.
The manufacturer could auction off the ER-right ex ante to one of the retailers. If the retail price is set
after the auction our results still hold. However, if the retail price is set within the auction, any double
markup and competition softening effect would vanish.
8Figures, illustrating all of the distribution systems, can be found in appendix A.1.
9In principle, we can achieve the same results in a n × m model, where n is the number of manu-
facturers and m is the number of retailers. However, in an equilibrium where all manufacturers adopt
exclusivity, m > n implies that some of the retailers are foreclosed from the market. Moreover, in the
same equilibrium, n > m implies that at least one retailer has to sell two brands exclusively. This elimi-
nates any competition between the two respective brands, which is equivalent to distribution system (iv).
For this reason, we excluded this scenario.
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Retailers. There are two retailers, denoted by j = A, B, who are active on the retail
market with a constant marginal cost of reselling equal to zero. Hence, their marginal cost
consists only of the wholesale price wi. The retailers are assumed to be undifferentiated.
I.e. consumers are indifferent between retailers, but they differentiate among brands. We
assume retailers to compete in prices. Retailers can undertake brand-specific demand-
enhancing investments. The investment raises the consumers valuation for a specific
brand regardless of which retailer conducts the investment. θij denotes investment by
retailer j in brand i and θi is the sum of investments in brand i by both retailers. The
investment is not contractible. Following our example from above, the investment can
be thought of as marketing effort undertaken by mobile service providers (MSP) into a
specific handset/brand. Marketing for specific handsets by a MSP can be more efficient
than by the handset manufacturer herself, depending on the brand value in the mobile
service sector as well as the available marketing technologies. Marketing effort is hard
to contract on as the actual value of a marketing campaign depends on many factors.
The investment cost is assumed to be retailer- as well as brand-specific and given by
C(θij) = Ki/2 · θ2ij. Ki expresses the slope of the marginal cost of investment and might
differ among brands, but not among retailers. For example, manufacturers having a high
brand value in the mobile service sector are associated with a relatively high Ki, while
manufacturers with a low brand value within the sector are associated with a relatively
small Ki. In other words, retail investment is more efficient for manufacturers with just a
weak brand value. For most of the analysis we analyze the case with (K1 = K2 ≡ K), i.e.,
symmetric brands. In Section 1.5 we consider a case with asymmetric brands (K1 6= K2).10
Consumers. We assume the following linear demand system that can be derived from
a quadratic utility function as it is used in Singh and Vives (1984). Demand for brand 1
is given by q1(p1, p2) and demand for brand 2 by q2(p2, p1), with
q1(p1, p2) = α− βp1 + γp2 + θ1 and q2(p2, p1) = α− βp2 + γp1 + θ2,
where α = 1−d/1−d2, β = 1/1−d2, γ = d/1−d2 and θi = θiA + θiB. The parameter d ε(0, 1)
represents the degree of product homogeneity. As d approaches 0, the brands of the two
10We assume K not to be too small in order to ensure that the model is well defined (K >
(4−4d2)/(8−4d−2d2+d3)).
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manufacturers become independent. As d approaches 1, the brands become completely
homogeneous. When both retailers sell the same brand and set the same price, demand is
divided equally between both retailers. The investment θ1 can be thought of as increasing
the relative valuation for brand 1 relative to brand 2. This means that raising θ1 has no
direct effect on the demand for brand 2.
Timing. At stage 1 both manufacturers choose simultaneously their distribution chan-
nel(s). At stage 2 manufacturers set wholesale prices to one or both of the retailers,
depending on the choice at stage 1. At stage 3 retail companies undertake the demand
enhancing marketing investments. At stage 4 retail companies compete.
1.3 Characterization of distribution systems
As we will show below, all the distribution systems mentioned above can occur as an equi-
librium outcome in our model: N/N, E/N and E/E. In this section, we will characterize
these equilibria with respect to prices, quantities, retail investment as well as profits.
Before we do so, we introduce a framework in order to disentangle the different effects
stemming from the exclusivity decision. Superscripts E/E and N/N describe the equilib-
rium values in the E/E resp. N/N equilibrium. E/N describes the equilibrium values of
a brand which has adopted ER, while the competing manufacturer sells her brands non-
exclusively. In contrast, N/E describes the equilibrium values of the brand not having
adopted ER, while the competing has done so. All equilibrium values and results can be
found in the Appendix.
Framework. We identify three subeffects stemming from the introduction of ER: The
double markup effect captures the unilateral price responses to the exclusivity decision.
The competition softening effect takes into account the competitive responses to the double
markup effect due to the strategic complementarity of prices. Finally, the investment
effect captures the impact from retail investment which is linked to the introduction of
ER. We characterize the three effects using the case where only one manufacturer adopts
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ER relative to the situation without exclusivity (N/N → E/N). However, the effects
from the introduction of ER by the second brand (N/N → E/E) are derived in the same
way. Note, that the effects are always derived relative to the N/N regime which serves as
our benchmark case.
1. Double Markup Effect
Exclusivity grants the downstream retailer a monopoly in retailing the brand. This
allows the retailer to increase the retail price above the wholesale price and earn an
additional markup. The double markup effect captures the unilateral effect stem-
ming from this retail market power. Conceptionally, we define the double markup
effect as the unilateral effect stemming from the introduction of exclusivity, ne-
glecting the investment possibility and holding all the competitor’s choice variables
constant. This allows us to abstract from any effect resulting from the competi-
tion among manufacturers and to focus solely on the price increase of the exclusive
brand. Technically, we take the difference of the variable of interest in equilib-
rium with and without exclusivity, fixing all the choice variables of the competing
brand at the level without exclusivity and setting the investment level to zero,
fi(E/N | w−i = wN/N−i , p−i = p
N/N
−i , θi = 0) − fi(N/N), where fi(·) denotes the
variable of interest.
2. Competition Softening Effect
The competition softening effect captures the effect from exclusivity which stems
from the existence of interbrand competition, neglecting any investment opportu-
nities. In other words, while the double markup effect is capturing the unilateral
effect from exclusivity, the competition softening effect captures the additional bi-
lateral effect (or the competitive responses) to the double markup effect (neglecting
the investment possibility). Technically, the competition softening effect is given by
fi(E/N | θi = 0)− fi(E/N | w−i = wN/N−i , p−i = p
N/N
−i , θi = 0).
As the firms’ choice variables are strategic complements, the unilateral price increase
due to the double markup effect is followed by a price increase by the competing
firm. Hence, the competition softening effect captures the anticompetitive element
of ER.
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3. Investment Effect
The investment effect captures the effect from investment (induced by the exclusivity
choice) on all the variables, taking into account the unilateral as well as the bilateral
effect from retail market power. Technically, we derive the investment effect as the
residual effect (total effect net of the double markup as well as the competition
softening effect), which is given by fi(E/N)− fi(E/N | θi = 0).
This effect captures the procompetitive element of ER.
We can now characterize the different equilibrium distribution systems.
Both manufacturers choose NER - (N/N). Under N/N, the outcome of the mar-
ket game coincides with a standard differentiated Bertrand game: When both manu-
facturers distribute their brand non-exclusively, intrabrand competition exists for both
brands. Retail firms are undifferentiated and compete in prices. Hence, competition
drives down retail prices to the retailers’ marginal cost, which consists of the wholesale
price (p1 = w1, p2 = w2). I.e. retail companies do not make any profit (πA = πB = 0).
Retail investment is brand-specific, i.e. regardless of which retailer undertakes the invest-
ment, the demand enhancing effect from investment affects all retailers to the same extent.
As retail companies do not earn a positive retail margin, they do not have any incentive
to invest and, hence no investment will take place (θ1 = θ2 = 0). Consequently, manufac-
turers set their wholesale prices just as retail firms would not exist and the outcome of
the market game coincides with a standard differentiated Bertrand game.
One manufacturer chooses ER and the other manufacturer chooses NER -
(E/N). When one of the manufacturers chooses exclusivity, intrabrand competition for
this brand is broken and a retail monopoly is created. While this changes the analysis
of the exclusive brand completely, the analysis of the retail and investment stage of the
non-exclusive brand remains identical to the N/N-case. We denote the exclusive brand
by 1 and the non-exclusive brand by 2.
The adoption of ER by one retailer induces an increase of wholesale and retail prices of
both brands relative to the N/N-equilibrium as well as a positive retail investment level
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and retail profit for the exclusive brand. The effects in detail are:
The monopoly right on the sale of brand 1 allows the exclusive retailer to raise the retail
price above the wholesale price and to gain a positive retail margin, while the wholesale
price stays constant (double markup effect). As for brand 2 intrabrand competition still
exists, so no extra retail margin can be gained here.
Retail prices are strategic complements. Hence, the non-exclusive brand can raise its
retail as well as its wholesale price.11 The price increase of the non-exclusive brand
softens interbrand competition in the market and gives the exclusive retailer as well as
the manufacturer scope to set higher prices (competition softening effect).
As investments became retailer-specific, the exclusive retailer can recoup some of the
benefit from investment and faces an increased incentive to invest. A positive investment
level in brand 1 can be observed, while no investment is undertaken in brand 2 (θ∗1 >
0, θ∗2 = 0). Investment increases the consumers’ valuation of the brand, which in turn
makes a higher retail and wholesale price of the exclusive brand optimal. Due to the
strategic complementarity of retail prices, the non-exclusive brand’s prices will increase,
too (investment effect).
As all three effects have a positive impact on prices and no intrabrand competition exists
for brand 1 anymore, the profit of the exclusive retailer increases. As for brand 2 intra-
brand competition still exists, no retail profits can be made on the sale of this brand.
Moreover, the profit of manufacturer 2 increases due to the higher price level and hence,
weaker interbrand competition. However, the effect on the profit of manufacturer 1 is am-
biguous as the double markup effect decreases profits, while the other two effects increase
manufacturers’ profit.
Both manufacturers choose ER - (E/E). When both manufacturers choose ex-
clusivity in selling their brands, they break intrabrand competition for both brands and
create monopolies on the downstream market for selling the particular brand. Accord-
ing to the same reasoning from above this means higher prices, investments and retail
profits for both brands relative to the N/N regime. However, this is not necessarily true
11As intrabrand competition for brand 2 still exists, pE/N2 = p
N/E
2 = w
E/N
2 . Hence, when manufacturer
2 raises the wholesale price, the retail price increases by the same amount, ∂pN/E2 /∂wN/E2 = 1.
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relative to the E/N regime as the three effects of exclusivity partly change when both
manufacturers adopt ER.
Both retailers have a monopoly right on the sale of the two brands. Consequently, both
retailers can raise the retail price above the wholesale price and gain a positive retail
margin, while both wholesale prices stay constant. As this double markup effect is con-
structed as a unilateral effect, the impact is exactly the same as under the E/N regime.
But this time, both retail prices increase and not only one of them (double markup effect).
The competition softening effect is stronger on all prices (wholesale and retail) compared
to the E/N-equilibrium. Due to the reciprocal adoption of ER both retail prices are higher
and hence, the competitive price adjustment is stronger (competition softening effect).
Investment has become retailer-specific for both retailers. I.e. both retailers invest in
‘their’ respective brand. Individual investment levels will be higher relative to when only
one retailer undertakes the investment: The demand enhancing investment increases the
quantity which consumers are willing to purchase at a given price. In the E/E regime
the price level is already higher relative to the E/N regime (both without investment).
So is the retail margin and investment is more lucrative. Moreover, higher investment
levels also lead to a price increase, which again increases the retail margin and hence,
investment incentives. The higher investment level has a positive impact on all prices
relative to the N/N regime.
However, the impact relative to the E/N regime is ambiguous: For a very efficient in-
vestment technology (very low values of K), it becomes lucrative for the manufacturer to
decrease the wholesale price in order to increase the retail margin and hence, incentivize
investment. In other words, the effect of an additional investment on a manufacturer’s
sales are so high that it overcompensates the wholesale price decrease. If this downward
pressure on the wholesale price is large enough, also the retail prices might be affected.
Nevertheless, this effect is not strong enough to overcompensate the positive impact on
prices through the double markup and competition softening effect (investment effect) as
shown in Proposition 1.3.1.
In sum, all equilibrium values under the E/E regime are higher than in the N/N regime.
Moreover, the retail prices, investments and profits under the E/E regime are also higher
compared to the E/N regime. However, this is not necessarily true for the wholesale
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prices as will be shown in the next section. In addition, we can say that the adoption
of exclusivity by the manufacturer of a non-exclusive brand has a positive impact on the
profit of a manufacturer who has already had adopted ER.
Equilibrium comparison. The following Proposition compares the equilibrium values
of retail as well as wholesale prices, investment levels and retail profits for the three
different equilibria and summarizes the results we have described above. The comparison
of wholesale profits can be found in Section 1.4.
Proposition 1.3.1 Retail as well as wholesale prices, retail profits and investment levels
are highest when both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing and lowest when both firms
do not adopt exclusive retailing. In the asymmetric distribution regime, the retail price,
the investment level and the retail profit of the exclusive brand are higher relative to the
non-exclusive brand. In contrast, the wholesale price of the exclusive brand is lower relative
to the non-exclusive brand. That is
pi : pE/Ei > p
E/N
i > p
N/E
i > p
N/N
i
wi : wE/Ei >(∗) w
N/E
i > w
E/N
i > w
N/N
i
θi : θE/Ei > θ
E/N
i > θ
N/E
i = θ
N/N
i
πRetaili : π
E/E
Retail > π
E/N
Retail > π
N/E
Retail = π
N/N
Retail.
(∗) If and only if K > K̄ = (d4+2d3−5d2−2d+4)/(4−d2).
Proof See Appendix.
Generally, we can say that a higher degree of exclusivity leads to higher prices at the
wholesale and at the retail stage as well as to higher retail profits. In addition, also the
investment level increases.
All three effects stemming from ER affect the retail price positively. Hence, it is not
surprising that the retail price is increasing with exclusivity. But it should be noted that
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the retail price of the exclusive brand in the asymmetric equilibrium will be higher than
the retail price of the non-exclusive brand. This is because the double markup and the
investment effect affect the retail price of the exclusive brand directly while the retail
price of the non-exclusive brand is affected only indirectly via the competition softening
as well as the investment effect due to the strategic complementarity of retail prices.
The opposite result can be observed for the wholesale prices. As described above, the
double markup effect does not affect any of the wholesale prices, but both wholesale
prices are affected by the competition softening and the investment effect. However, the
sum of these effects is stronger on the wholesale price of the non-exclusive brand than
on the wholesale price of the exclusive brand. As for the former no retail margin exists,
the price responses by the manufacturer are always more extreme and hence, the effects
are stronger.12 However, the wholesale price under the E/E regime is only higher relative
to the N/E regime, whenever K is not extremely small (K > K̄). If this was the case,
retail investment is so efficient that it is optimal for the manufacturer to give the retail
company additional incentives to invest by lowering the wholesale price and hence, leave
the retail company a larger share of the joint profit. This effect is stronger under the E/E
regime as investment incentives are higher relative to the E/N regime.13
Investment in a brand is zero whenever the manufacturer has not adopted exclusivity,
while the investment level is positive when exclusivity has been adopted. Moreover, the
investment level in a brand increases when also the competing brand adopts exclusivity
as investment levels are strategic complements. The adoption of exclusivity by the com-
peting manufacturer increases the price level and retail margin in the market and hence,
softens competition. A higher retail margin makes investment more lucrative, as invest-
ment increases sales (for a given price) which are associated with a higher retail margin
now. Hence, investment incentives and eventually, investment levels will be higher.
Finally, the retail profit is zero whenever the retailer does not have an exclusive distri-
bution right, and positive when he has one. Moreover, the retail profit is higher when
12The exclusive manufacturer faces a trade-off when he increases wE/N . On the one hand, it allows the
manufacturer to extract more of the joint profit. On the other hand, it exaggerates the double markup
problem (∂pE/N/∂wE/N > 0) and decreases the investment activity of the retailer.
13Note that this additional constraint (K̄) is just slightly stronger than the SOCs. So, this case only
appears for extremely efficient retail investment technologies. Moreover, it should be noted that for these
values the E/E-regime would arise endogenously.
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both manufacturers have adopted ER relative to when only one manufacturer has done
so (πE/Ei > π
E/N
i ): Interbrand competition is weakest when both manufacturers have
adopted ER due to the double markup as well as competition softening effect. Weaker
competition allows retail firms to increase their retail price and hence, they can earn a
higher margin and profit.
1.4 Endogenous choice of distribution system
The preceding analysis has taken the distribution system as given. In this section, we
show that all the contractual solutions we described in the last section can arise as the
equilibrium outcome of this game. As mentioned above, the manufacturers choose nonco-
operatively whether they sell their brand exclusively or non-exclusively at the beginning
of this game. The Nash equilibrium in this stage depends on the relative size of the
manufacturers’ equilibrium profits, πE/Ei , π
N/N
i , π
E/N
i and π
N/E
i . Figure 1.1 illustrates the
normal form of the game.
The following proposition states our main result regarding the existence of the different
first stage equilibria.
Proposition 1.4.1 There exist three different equilibria in pure strategies in this game,
given different combinations of d and K: (i) Both manufacturers do not adopt exclusive
retailing in equilibrium. (ii) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other
manufacturer does not adopt exclusive retailing in equilibrium. (iii) Both manufacturers
adopt exclusive retailing in equilibrium.
In addition, multiple equilibria of type (i) and (iii) exist for some parameter combinations.
Proof See Appendix.
In Figure 1.2, we can observe that all three equilibria emerge for a rather substantial
parameter space. Their occurrence can be explained quite intuitively using the manufac-
turers rationale for ER and how it is affected by the intensity of competition d and the
investment cost K.
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Figure 1.1: Choice of distribution system
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If the retail investment technology is very efficient (low K), the benefit for the manufac-
turer from ER through the investment effect is larger than the cost from ER through the
double markup effect. But if the investment becomes more expensive (K increases), retail
investment becomes less important and hence, ER becomes less profitable or unprofitable.
Hence, for a low K ER is more profitable than for a high K and hence, more firms adopt
ER.14
Moreover, if interbrand competition is rather weak (low d), the retail markup under ER
is quite large as the competitive pressure on the exclusive retailer from the competing
brand is rather weak. Hence, the double markup effect is quite large and ER costly for
the manufacturer. However, if d is large, the competitive pressure on the retailer under
ER from the competing brand will be quite high, so that the retail markup is rather small
and ER becomes more lucrative. When d is very high, ER will be optimal for both man-
ufacturers even when retail investment is not feasible at all (e.g. K → ∞). With a very
high d the double markup effect vanishes, but the competition softening effect prevails.
Hence, manufacturers adopt ER even without the possibility of retail investment.
It remains to explain, when and why only one and not the other manufacturer adopts
exclusivity for some parameter combinations and not for others.15 As can be seen in
Figure 1.2, for intermediate values of d and K one manufacturer has the incentive
to adopt exclusivity, given the competing manufacturer does not do so. When the
14Note that the double markup as well as the competition softening effect are not dependent on K by
construction.
15In more formal terms, we can say that for the parameter constellations leading to one of the symmetric
equilibria, the manufacturers’ incentive to (not) adopt exclusivity is a dominant strategy regardless of
what the competing manufacturer is doing. In contrast, for the parameter constellations leading to
the asymmetric equilibrium, the manufacturer’s decision to (not) adopt exclusivity is dependent on the
belief what the other manufacturer is doing. Hence, the competing manufacturer’s choice alters the own
optimality condition in such a way that a different decision becomes optimal. We are interested in how
the respective optimality conditions are altered.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium distribution systems
first manufacturer chooses ER, the retail prices will increase and interbrand competi-
tion in the market becomes softer. This raises the non-exclusive manufacturer’s profit
(πN/EManufacturer > π
N/N
Manufacturer). Hence, the effect from ER on the second manufacturer’s
profit has to be stronger than for the first manufacturer, so that she actually adopts ER.
The adoption of ER is more profitable, when d is relatively higher or/and K is relatively
lower as then the cost/benefit of ER would be lower/higher (see above). Consequently,
combinations of d and K exist, so that one manufacturer adopts ER and the other one
does not do so.
1.5 Asymmetric Brands
In this section, we explore the case of asymmetric manufacturers, i.e., the efficiency of
retail investment is different among brands (K2 = K1 + ∆, ∆ > 0).
The parameter Ki can be interpreted as the relative efficiency of retail marketing (to
manufacturer marketing) in a certain brand. Efficiency of retail marketing usually depends
on a manufacturer’s brand reputation as well as the marketing skills/technology of the
retailer. If a firm’s brand reputation is well established in the market, retail investment
might be inefficiently costly (relative to marketing by the manufacturer herself) and hence
the respective cost parameter Ki should be rather high. In contrast, if a manufacturer has
recently entered a new market and retail companies are well-established in the market,
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Ki should be rather low. Moreover, manufacturers not having any direct contact to their
final customers and selling their products via retailers should be associated with a low
Ki.16, 17 Different retail marketing efficiencies can appear, if an established brand exists
in the market (high Ki), while another brand is a new entrant which is dependent on
marketing investment by established retail companies (low Ki). This reflects our iPhone
example quite well. While a number of well established mobile phone producers (e.g.
Nokia, Samsung, SonyEricsson) already existed, Apple was a newcomer in this market.
This also means that the ‘old’ producers already had established marketing channels,
while Apple had to arrange new channels. For Apple it was relatively more efficient to
rely on marketing by a third party already active in the mobile phone market.
Our main result for asymmetric brands is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.5.1 Suppose upstream manufacturers are asymmetric with respect to the
brand specific investment technology parameter, K1 6= K2, then:
(i) The parameter space of the N/N-equilibrium and the parameter space where either the
E/N- or the E/E-equilibrium occur does not change.
(ii) The parameter space where the E/N-eq. occurs increases to the expense of the pa-
rameter space of the E/E-eq.
Proof See Appendix.
Introducing asymmetric brands does not alter the parameter space of the N/N-
equilibrium. The value of Ki only matters for a firm actually adopting ER, as otherwise
no investment is undertaken. Hence, there is no change in the occurrence of the N/N-
equilibrium.
The introduction of asymmetric brands keeps the parameter space where either the E/N-
or the E/E-equilibrium occurs constant. This result follows immediately from the first
result. But the introduction of asymmetric brands increases the space where the E/N-
equilibrium occurs and decreases the space of the E/E-equilibrium. In other words, the
16As already mentioned above, the microchip producer Intel largely relies on marketing by its down-
stream retailers.
17Note, that we abstract from marketing skills differing among retailers and assume both retailers as
equally efficient.
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asymmetric equilibrium occurs more often and the E/E-equilibrium less often, the larger
the asymmetry among brands. The intuition for this is quite straightforward: Suppose,
we observe the E/E-equilibrium and increase the difference K2 − K1 by increasing K2:
For manufacturer 1′s decision, whether or not to adopt ER, nothing changes. But if the
increase of K2 is sufficiently large, exclusivity might not be worthwhile for manufacturer
2 anymore and she will choose not to adopt ER. Hence, the larger the difference K2−K1,
the larger will be the ‘E/N space’ to the expense of the ‘E/E space’. Moreover, intro-
ducing only a very small asymmetry, the multiplicity of equilibria disappears.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the changes in the different parameter spaces for different values of
∆ = K2−K1. This equation is for illustrational purposes redefined in the following way:
∆ = K2 −K.
Figure 1.3: Asymmetric Brands
In the context of our ‘iPhone’ example, this could be interpreted as follows. Apple Inc.
was a new market entrant in 2007, while the other manufacturers of mobile handsets
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were already established in the market. Hence, the relative efficiency of retail marketing
was higher for Apple than for its competitors (KApple < KCompetitor). While Apple Inc.
adopted ER arrangements, most of its competitors refrained from such arrangements. As
can be seen in Figure 1.3, the larger the difference in the retail marketing efficiency, the
larger is the parameter space where the asymmetric equilibrium occurs. In other words,
the observed asymmetric equilibrium in the Apple case, could be a result for quite a
large set of parameters. However, the iPhone’s success on the market for mobile handsets
led to a decrease of Apple’s retail marketing efficiency. In other words, as Apple itself
has become better known for its mobile handsets, it no longer had to rely on marketing
investments by its retailer anymore. This means, while ER was a profitable strategy just
after market entry, it is not profitable anymore. In our model, this would mean that the
difference in retail market efficiencies became smaller (KCompetitor −KApple) ↓ and so has
the parameter space in which the asymmetric equilibrium occurs. In 2010, Apple Inc.
abandoned its ER arrangements in most countries.
1.6 Welfare Implications
As has been shown in the preceding analysis, a manufacturer trades off the cost (double
markup effect) against the benefits from ER (investment effect and the strategic effect)
when adopting ER. In contrast to this rationale, a welfare maximizing regulator trades
off the procompetitive effect of ER (investment effect) against the anticompetitive effect
of ER (double markup effect and the strategic effect).
Figure 1.4: Manufacturer vs. Regulator
doublemarkup
effect
competition softening
effect
investment
effect
Manufacturer − + +
Regulator − − +
This simple comparison already suggests that a manufacturer’s interest in adopting ER
is not aligned with a regulator’s interest, rationalizing government intervention. In this
section, we will analyze this issue in more depth using the case of symmetric manufactur-
ers.
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The first part of our welfare result is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1.6.1 Suppose manufacturers are symmetric and the retail investment tech-
nology is sufficiently efficient: Consumer surplus is increasing with exclusive retailing if
and only if both manufacturers adopt ER. Moreover, consumer surplus is decreasing with
exclusive retailing when only one manufacturer adopts ER and the other manufacturer
does not adopt ER.
Proof See Appendix.
The Proposition states that ER benefits consumers if and only if the retail investment
technology is sufficiently efficient and both manufacturers adopt ER.
First, a more efficient retail investment technology results in a higher investment effect,
which unambiguously increases consumer surplus. This effect has to be strong enough to
counter the price increase from the double markup as well as the competition softening
effect, which unambiguously decrease consumer surplus.
Second, as was shown in Proposition 1.3.1, (individual and total) retail investment is
higher under the E/E regime compared to the E/N regime and so the investment effect is.
This smaller investment effect under E/N turns out to be insufficient to counter the two
other effects which decrease CS. Hence, as shown in Proposition 1.3.1, the adoption of ER
by one manufacturer is always harming consumers, while it might benefit consumers when
it is adopted by both. The left hand side of Figure 1.5 illustrates when ER is positive
for consumers and when not. In the meshed area consumers lose from ER, while in the
remaining area consumers benefit from ER (given the manufacturer(s) adopt ER). The
second part of our welfare result is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1.6.2 Suppose manufacturers are symmetric and the retail investment tech-
nology is sufficiently efficient: In contrast to Proposition 1.3.1, welfare is also increasing
with exclusive retailing, if only one manufacturer adopts ER. Moreover, for exclusive re-
tailing to be welfare enhancing, retail investment must be more cost efficient the weaker
the competition is.
Proof See Appendix.
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In line with the preceding result, welfare increases with ER, whenever the retail invest-
ment technology is sufficiently efficient. In order to fully understand this result, it is
helpful to disentangle the separate effects on consumer and producer surplus: The in-
vestment effect unambiguously increases consumer and producer surplus. The impact of
the double markup and the competition softening effect on consumers’ welfare is clearly
negative, while it is sometimes positive on producers. The overall harm by these two
effects is decreasing with the intensity of competition. Therefore, in addition to the result
above, welfare is also increasing in exclusivity for rather high investment costs given the
competition is sufficiently tough.
In other words, ER increases welfare even for a relatively smaller investment effect and
a higher cost of investment compared to consumer surplus. This can be easily seen by
comparing the meshed areas in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Consumer surplus (left) and welfare (right)
Note: The meshed areas illustrate situations when exclusive retailing decreases consumer surplus (left)
and welfare (right), respectively. Moreover, the figure depicts all three equilibria described above: (i)
N/N equilibrium, (ii) E/N equilibrium and (iii) N/N equilibrium.
Using this analysis, we can make two observations, which are in contrast to Proposition
1.3.1: First, ER can also have a positive effect on welfare under E/N , as the benefit from
investment for producers outweighs the harm caused by the double markup as well as the
competition softening effect, if competition is not too weak.
Second, a negative relationship between the cost of investment and the intensity of com-
petition exists for ER to be welfare enhancing. While the (positive) investment effect
decreases with the investment cost, the adverse impact from the double markup and the
competition softening effect decrease with tougher competition. Hence, ER even turns
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out to be welfare enhancing for a rather inefficient investment technology as long as com-
petition is tough enough. The right hand side of Figure 1.5 illustrates when ER is welfare
enhancing and when not. In the meshed area, ER decreases welfare. In the remaining
area, ER enhances welfare (given the manufacturer(s) adopt ER).
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has identified a rationale for exclusive retailing agreements, combining a
pro- and an anticompetitive view of ER. ER comes at a cost for the manufacturer as it
distorts downstream competition, gives retail firms a margin and creates a double markup
problem. However, it is this retail margin which incentivizes downstream retailers to
invest in (procompetitive) brand-specific marketing which benefits the manufacturer of
the brand. Moreover, the additional margin for the retail firm is a (anticompetitive)
commitment device for higher prices in the market and softer interbrand competition.
We analyze the equilibrium incentives for a manufacturer to adopt ER when inter- as
well as intrabrand competition exist. Therefore, we derive conditions under which no
manufacturer, one manufacturer and both manufacturers adopt ER. We find the more
efficient the retail investment technology and the tougher interbrand competition, the
more often ER arrangements can be observed. In addition, we analyze the market conduct
for each of these equilibria.
We find that manufacturers adopt ER too often from a welfare point of view. ER is usually
welfare enhancing, whenever retail investment is rather efficient and/or brands are rather
similar. But if brands are sufficiently differentiated and manufacturers do not depend on
retail marketing, such arrangements should be forbidden by competition authorities.
In our model, firms compete in prices. However, ER would also occur in a setup where
firms compete in quantities, but any competition softening effect would vanish. More-
over, our model turns out to be robust to changes in the timing. So, the basic mechanism
goes through when the manufacturer cannot commit to a wholesale price before the re-
tail investment is undertaken. In addition, we have only considered demand enhancing
investments, increasing consumers’ perceived quality of a brand. This kind of investment
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has always a positive effect on the competing firm’s profit. An interesting case would
be to consider cost decreasing investments as this would always have a negative effect
on the competitor’s profit. Another interesting project for future research would be to
explicitly include upstream market entry in our framework. New market entrants should
be particularly dependent on third party marketing investment. As we have shown, ER
serves as an instrument to incentivize such investment and hence, might have an entry
promoting effect.
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Chapter 2
Free commuter newspapers and the
market for paid-for daily newspapers
2.1 Introduction
Ideally, the free daily tabloids that are popping up in the Bay Area and elsewhere like
mushrooms after a rain would complement rather than substitute for relatively high-
quality paid newspapers[...] Commuters and shoppers would pick up the free daily
tabs to learn what the city council was up to, and still subscribe to a broadsheet for
regional and world news. Young people would enjoy the brevity of the free papers,
then "graduate" to more substantive broadsheets. People who won’t pay to read
would still be informed.
Michael Stoll, Grade the News1
The welfare assessment of new goods depends on whether they are substitutes,
complements or independent of existing products. They are clearly welfare en-
hancing if the new good complements existing goods or is independent of them,
i.e. creates a new market. If new goods are substitutes, they may replace existing
products with positive externalities and therefore potentially reduce welfare. For
example, there is an ongoing discussion in media markets about whether new media
outlets provide less socially valuable “hard” political news than the social planner
would. Instead of informing the public about matters of public interest, they rely
1http://www.gradethenews.org/2005/freepapers3.htm, online, accessed: 03.12.2011.
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on “soft news” about car chases and celebrity scandals to satisfy consumers’ de-
mands. Due to increased competition, traditional media outlets which provide
quality information about political issues are deprived of readers and revenues.
Eventually, they might even be forced to exit the market. Then, without political
information, citizens are unable to cast informed votes and large social gains from
participatory democracy might not be internalized (Downs (1957); Coase (1974)
and Posner (1986)). This argument provides a rationale for why policymakers limit
competition in media markets all over the world (Djankov et al. (2003)).
Although compelling, this reasoning rests on the implicit and untested assumption
that “hard” and “soft” news outlets are substitutes. Many consumers might not be
at the margin between consuming hard news or soft news but between consuming
any news or no news at all (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008)). Consequently, new
boulevard style media outlets might even increase the share of politically informed
citizens.
To help assess the impact of entry in the media market on consumer surplus, this
chapter investigates the substitution pattern between the free commuter newspa-
pers and traditional daily newspapers.2 To this end, we quantify the impact of
penetration of free commuter newspapers on the readership and circulation of the
paid-for daily press in the Swiss newspaper market, controlling for market and time
fixed effects. In addition, we apply an instrumental variable approach to properly
identify the effect to be examined. We use a special characteristic of free newspa-
pers (their distribution via the transport system) to create a valid instrument. We
find that free newspapers are weak substitutes to traditional daily press. However,
they do not take away readers from high quality broadsheet newspapers. They
only capture market share from the incumbent yellow press. This suggests that
“hard” and “soft” news media outlets are active in different markets. Moreover,
we find that this substitution effect is largely driven by multihomers’ substitution
behavior. This simply means that people who read more than one daily newspaper
replace their second/third paper with the new product. We also find no significant
effect on readership among highly educated people and among older readers. Fi-
nally, we find that free newspapers create new readers in the market for daily print
newspapers, meaning that a larger fraction of the population is informed.
2Moreover, determining the degree of substitutability is important for many competition policy debates
(e.g. merger control). This measure is pivotal in defining relevant market as well as in merger simulation
(Motta (2004); FCC (2001)).
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The penetration of free commuter newspapers in Switzerland is especially well
suited to test the substitution pattern between “hard” and “soft” news. First, the
entry of free newspapers in Switzerland was massive. Since 1999, the circulation
of free daily newspapers has increased from 346,000 to almost 1,000,000. During
the same period, paid-for newspaper sales dropped by almost 15%. This provides
us ample variation to test our hypothesis. Second, free commuter newspapers
entered sequentially in different markets. They first entered in Zurich and then
gradually spread to more than 130 out of 155 counties (regional markets). This
allows us to control for market and time fixed effects. Third, the commuter papers
were distributed free of charge in the transportation system. This gives us the
possibility of creating a valid instrument.
The empirical analysis relies on three different data sets. The first data set con-
tains a municipal-level panel of free newspaper readership in more than 150 regional
markets from 1999 to 2008. Moreover, this data also includes population character-
istics for each of these single markets, as well as information about the newspaper
readership structure. This data set is based on an annual survey conducted by
the Swiss Research Media Institute (WEMF). The second data set contains in-
formation about newspaper circulation on the municipal level and is provided by
Publicitas. Both these data sets are matched with Census data from the year 2000
that provides information about population characteristics at the municipal level.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work using this data set to conduct
an economic study as detailed as ours.
Our empirical strategy is based on George (2008) and George and Waldfogel (2006)
and consists of two different steps: In the first step, we explore whether free dailies
take readers away from the traditional daily press.3 In order to mitigate potential
endogeneity concerns, we exploit the panel structure of the data and a special
feature of free newspapers (i.e. distribution via the transport system). To construct
valid instruments we employ commuter data. In addition, we examine in this step
whether free newspapers create a new market.
In the second step, we analyze whether free newspaper penetration changes the
structure of the audience of traditional newspapers. Unlike in George (2008),
the richness of our data makes it possible to estimate the change in readership
3There are two different theories considering the free paper as a direct competitor (substitute) as well
as a promoter for traditional press (a complement). See, for example, Mahoney and Collins (2005).
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separately for each “reader group”. Examining this question is important because
in differentiated product markets the distribution of individuals’ preferences affects
the product options available to consumers.4 In other words, if free newspapers
reduce or change the composition of the readership for paid-for newspapers, the
incumbent may reduce the size of its product or cease to operate. Alternatively,
the incumbent may change its product in order to gain new readers who are not
attracted by commuter newspapers.
To the best of our knowledge, only little work has been done on the substitution pat-
terns of boulevard style and broadsheet media. Prat and Strömberg (2005) provide
evidence that the introduction of private television in Sweden increased political
information and political participation relative to a public television monopoly. So
far, the effects of commuter newspapers have only been examined by communica-
tion scientists. Bakker (2007) and Mahoney and Collins (2005) descriptively show
that there is only a weak substitution.
In the economic literature, studies examining product substitutability on the mar-
ket for news have so far focused on the relationship between online and print media.
Kaiser (2006) analyzed the effect of website provision on the demand for German
women’s magazines. The results from a logit and a nested logit model on mar-
ket level data suggest that website provision significantly cannibalized magazines.
Significant and negative effect of online presence on the demand for print media
is also found by Filistrucchi (2005). He examines the demand for Italian national
daily newspapers by using a logit-type demand model.
However, as pointed out in Gentzkow (2007), the use of discrete choice models in
studies examining newspaper markets is more than doubtful. The reason is that
the starting point of these demand models is that the consumers choose exactly
one product from the available set. Since multihoming plays an important role
in the relationship between free and paid-for newspapers, we do not use discrete
choice demand models.5
Despite the evidence that new media draw readers from print media, only little
work has examined how new products alter the consumer structure of old products.
4The fact that consumers affect each other through product markets has been documented especially
in media markets. See George and Waldfogel (2003) for evidence on daily newspapers, Waldfogel (2003)
and Waldfogel (2004) for evidence on radio and television markets, respectively.
5Gentzkow (2007) developed a model dealing with this problem. Unfortunately, we cannot use it as
we have no data on readers at micro level.
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While George and Waldfogel (2006) examine the effect of the New York Times
expansion on the audience for local newspapers, the Internet’s impact on traditional
newspaper readership is a subject of George (2008). She finds that the readership
of daily newspapers changes because younger, highly educated urban whites are
more attracted by the Internet.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 documents
aggregate trends in free and paid-for newspaper coverage. Section 2.3 summarizes
the data. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy and presents the results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Trends in Traditional and Free Paper Circulation
2.2.1 Free daily penetration
We are interested in identifying the effect of free daily newspapers’ penetration
on the circulation and readership of traditional daily newspapers.6 Since 1995,
free newspapers have been a new player in the market for the daily press. There
are three important differences from the traditional newspapers. First, the small
format makes it very convenient to read these newspapers on any means of public
transport. This suggests that free commuter newspapers may not be in direct
competition with traditional dailies and so their introduction may lead to a market
expansion. Second, in contrast to the traditional daily press, they are distributed
via a transport system. This feature plays an important role for the identification
of the effect examined. Third, the pricing strategy of free newspapers reflects
the two-sided character of the newspaper market. Free newspapers generate their
revenues only from the advertiser side of the market.7
Besides these characteristics, there are further features connected with free news-
papers’ expansion, making a study examining their effect on the daily press in-
6While a newspaper’s circulation is the number of newspapers distributed on an average day, a newspa-
per’s readership corresponds with the number of newspapers read on an average day. Unlike the previous
studies, we are interested in both variables as these may be different from each other and may provide
us with interesting insights with respect to multihomers’ behavior in the newspaper market.
7In order to properly examine welfare consequences one should consider both sides of the market
(Evans (2003)). Since we are primarily interested in the impact on readers, we do not consider the
competition in the advertising markets. Moreover, the available data do not allow us to make such a
comprehensive study.
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teresting and suitable. Free commuter daily newspapers constitute a new product
in the market for news, which has experienced a considerable increase in circula-
tion and readership during the last decade. Table B.1 shows the increase in free
daily circulation by continent, along with a measure of the supply expansion (i.e.
the number of countries where free newspapers entered the market) between 1995
and 2009. This table generally reflects the increasing importance of free commuter
newspapers worldwide. Free commuter dailies were first introduced in 1995 in Swe-
den. Ever since, publishers around the whole world have launched free dailies and
today we can find them in almost 60 countries.
This pattern is reflected in our data set, even though our data refers to one country
only. As noted above, to investigate the relationship between free and paid-for
newspapers, we utilize the successive expansion of free dailies in Switzerland. The
first free commuter paper in Switzerland was “20 Minuten”. It was launched in
Zurich on 13 December 1999 by the Norwegian publisher Schibsted, UK investor
Apax and Ernst Müller-Möhl. After entering the Zurich market, it moved to Berne
and Basel in October 2000. The Swiss publisher Tamedia took “20 Minuten” over
after threatening to launch the competing free daily “Express” in 2003. In 2004,
“20 Minuten” started an edition in Luzern and in 2005 in St. Gallen. Until 2005,
there was no free paper in the French part of Switzerland. A year later, in March
2006, the first free French written newspapers (i.e. “20 Minutes”) were launched
in Geneva and Lausanne. In January 2007, these newspapers also entered the
Neuenburg and Jura cantons. Coverage increased to 2.2 million readers from more
than 130 Swiss counties in 2008. Thus, it can be seen that the Swiss market for
free daily newspapers is really large and fits the worldwide development of free
newspapers very well. In addition, there was a lot of entry into and exit out of this
market. Only the owners of “20 Minuten” have already reported to have reached
their break even. Metro, called “Metropol” in Switzerland, started soon after “20
Minuten” in January 2000, but closed down in 2002. Free daily “.ch” started in 2007
and was available for less than two years, Tamedia’s own “NEWS” was dropped
in December 2009. In the French part of Switzerland, “Le Matin Bleu” vanished
after the merger with the French edition of “20 Minuten”.8
Table B.2 illustrates this successive expansion. It shows increases in free newspaper
8The closing down of many free papers in 2008 and 2009 was caused by the bad situation on the
advertising side of the media market connected with the financial crisis.
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readership by region, along with the number of counties which the free papers
entered between 1999 and 2004 and between 2005 and 2008. This table provides
us with the following useful insights. Regions in which the free newspapers were
more active experienced a greater growth of the total readership. Moreover, even
though free newspapers were physically distributed only in seven markets, they
have affected market structure in more than 130 markets until 2008. This point
indicates the important role of commuters for the expansion of free newspapers
and helps us to identify their impact on paid-for newspapers. Third, there are
still markets without free newspapers (e.g. in the Italian part of Switzerland). The
development of free newspaper readership in Switzerland can also be seen in Figure
B.1. The fraction of individuals reading or paging through at least one of the free
commuter papers rose from 9% in 2000 to 43% in 2008.
The last feature that makes our study suitable is that free commuter newspapers
address a distinct audience. Targeting can help us identify the effect of free dailies
on paid-for newspaper consumption. This effect may be identified from the dif-
ferences between the target and non-target group. Free newspapers target readers
with preferences for boulevard, short and simple written articles - a set of prefer-
ences for which age (i.e. younger readers) or education (i.e. low education) seems
to be a reasonable proxy. The support for this targeting can be found in many
communication science studies and press releases of free newspaper publishers. Ta-
ble 2.1 shows free daily papers coverage for different user types in 1999, 2002, 2005
and 2008. The left columns describe the fraction of each sociodemographic group
in the population older than 14, while the right columns show the fraction of each
group among all free newspaper readers. All figures are taken fromWEMF’s survey
MACH Basic.
The biggest difference between both fractions can be seen for young people (ages
14-29). Young people comprised about 28% of the respondents in 2002, but 44%
of those who read free newspapers. Even with the rapid expansion of free dailies,
young people made up a larger fraction of the free paper audience than the general
population in 2008. The corresponding numbers are 23% and 33%, respectively.
Commuters are also more likely than others to read or page through free news-
papers, making 43-45% of the population and 55% of free paper readers. The
reason may be that they have direct access to this new product. In addition,
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highly educated people are slightly under-represented among free paper readers.9
Finally, income does not seem to play an important role for the decision to read
free commuter newspapers or not.
Table 2.1: Free Newspaper Coverage by Group, 1999, 2002, 2005 & 2008
All individuals Free paper readers
1999 2002 2005 2008 1999 2002 2005 2008
All individuals 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 13% 19% 40%
High Education 24% 26% 30% 34% 0% 22% 24% 31%
Age 14-29 28% 28% 23% 23% 0% 44% 36% 33%
Age 60+ 21% 21% 23% 23% 0% 8% 9% 12%
Commuter 43% 44% 44% 45% 0% 56% 57% 55%
HH Income > 8000 SFR 28% 34% 34% 38% 0% 40% 38% 39%
HH Income < 6000 SFR 49% 43% 43% 39% 0% 34% 37% 35%
Source: WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2 - Own computation
2.2.2 Paid-for daily newspapers
The circulation of daily paid-for newspapers has been declining in Switzerland
since the mid-1980s. Figure B.2 illustrates traditional paper circulation from 1990
to 2008. A small decline during the 1990s was followed by a steeper decline since
2000 (entry of commuter newspapers in the market). This trend may suggest a
potential role for the commuter papers in circulation declines.
With clear differences in free newspaper readership across demographic groups, it
is therefore reasonable to expect differential trends in the readership of traditional
newspapers across different types of individuals. Figure B.3 shows daily newspaper
readership for two age categories. Readership among younger individuals (aged
14-29) declines throughout the whole period, though the trend constantly steepens
after 2002. Readership in the oldest group (60+) is more or less stable over the
examined period. Hence, the gap in readership between older and younger readers
becomes larger: while in 1999 this gap constituted only 10 percentage points, the
2008-data indicated more than 20 percentage points difference. Figure B.4 plots
differential trends for individuals with high and low education. Readership among
highly educated individuals is higher throughout the whole period. However, it
9The division into highly and less educated people is made according to the Swiss Statistical Of-
fice. People with higher schooling than A-level (i.e. Maturitätsschule, Lehrkräfte-Seminar, Höhere
Fach/Berufsausbildung, Höhere Fachschule & Universität) belong to the highly educated group.
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declines in a very similar way to the readership among less educated individuals.
Figure B.5 plots readership trends by commuter status. We can observe successive
declines in both groups since 2002-2003. However, the decline in the fraction of
commuters is a little steeper. Readership by income is depicted in Figure B.6, in
which we can observe very similar patterns to those in Figure B.4.
To sum up, the simultaneous increase in readership of free newspapers and decrease
in readership of traditional dailies indicates a potential substitutability of those two
types of dailies. Moreover, differences in free paper reading across demographic
groups combined with changing traditional newspaper readership patterns suggest
that the free dailies might have contributed to changes in the audience for paid-for
daily newspapers. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 develop formal tests for these effects.
2.3 Data
The empirical work relies on three panel datasets constructed from longitudinal in-
formation on: (i) daily newspaper circulation, (ii) daily newspaper readership and
(iii) sociodemographic factors. The data spans the period from 1999 to 2008. Both
circulation and readership data have been collected by an impartial non-profit pub-
lic utility institution - the Swiss research media institute (AG für Medienforschung
WEMF) which is the Swiss equivalent to the US Audit Bureau of Circulation.
WEMF ascertains, monitors and publishes circulation, newspaper and magazine
dissemination and coverage information with the aim of facilitating open compe-
tition between the suppliers of advertising space. The data on sociodemographic
factors are taken from the 2000 Census as well as from the MACH Basic 2000 to
2009/2 surveys provided by WEMF.
Newspaper circulation is measured as the residual between the number of newspa-
per copies produced and the number of newspapers returned to the publisher. This
data is a municipal-level panel of per-capita newspaper circulation. Unfortunately,
the data for the year 2005 is not available due to a measurement change of the
circulation in Switzerland.
The readership variable is based on the answers of respondents from the MACH
Basic survey. Each respondent is asked if she read or scanned through a particular
newspaper in its last occurrence interval. If the answer is positive, the respondent is
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counted as a reader of this particular newspaper. Summing up all readers provides
the readership data for a particular newspaper. The newspaper readership data is
a county-level panel of per-capita readership. This survey allows us to construct
two different readership variables. The first one is defined as the share of people
who read at least one daily paper (hereafter extensive readership). The second
one is defined as the average number of newspapers read by one person (hereafter
intensive readership). The only difference between these two readership measures
is that the latter one directly controls for multihoming.
The sociodemographic factors are collected at two different geographical levels.
The county demographics are provided by the MACH Basic survey. MACH Basic
supplements record newspaper coverage along with demographic characteristics for
approximately 23,000 individuals a year. The municipal demographics are drawn
from the 2000 Census. Demographic characteristics follow Census definitions, with
“highly educated” corresponding to the fraction of individuals in a municipality
with at least an A level. The category for youth covers ages 14-29 and older
ages 60 and higher. “Commuter” corresponds to the fraction of commuters in the
municipality.
We analyze the impact of free commuter newspaper penetration on per capita cir-
culation and per capita readership of about 60 paid-for daily newspapers in more
than 2,300 municipalities covering more than 90 counties.10 The number of news-
papers corresponds with almost 80% of the Swiss daily newspaper population. We
aggregate newspaper circulation data as well as readership data to create munic-
ipality and county totals each year, respectively. We link the paid-for newspaper
circulation and readership data to county-level data on free newspaper readership
data in these years, as well as demographics on municipal or county level drawn
either from the 2000 Census or MACH Basic, respectively.
Tables 2.2 and B.3 report summary statistics for circulation, extensive and intensive
readership as well as sociodemographic data. There is a considerable variation in
free paper penetration across markets, with per capita readership ranging from
0 at the fifth percentile to 0.825 at the ninety-fifth percentile. Moreover, there
is also a considerable variation across counties. Both the extensive and intensive
readership of paid-for dailies also vary across markets and over time, although the
10We restrict our sample to markets with at least 99 respondents in the MACH Basic survey in order
to ensure the representativeness of the sample.
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later variation is small.
Large variation across municipalities as well as over time can also be seen by
per capita paid-for paper sales. This ranges from 3% at the fifth percentile to
52 % at the ninety-fifth percentile. The bottom of Table 2.2 reports descriptive
statistics of sociodemographic factors at municipal level. Table B.3 summarizes
sociodemographic data at county level stemming from the MACH Basic survey.
We can observe similar trends to those in the Census data.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Intensive
paid readership year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
Aggregate county 2002 94 1.000 0.232 0.429 0.897 1.034 1.141 1.280
Aggregate county 2005 94 0.956 0.210 0.400 0.869 0.971 1.083 1.243
Aggregate county 2008 94 0.858 0.182 0.413 0.781 0.851 0.948 1.133
Source: WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2
Extensive
paid readership year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
Aggregate county 2002 94 0.715 0.120 0.393 0.695 0.740 0.772 0.852
Aggregate county 2005 94 0.673 0.133 0.311 0.647 0.706 0.756 0.833
Aggregate county 2008 94 0.649 0.109 0.360 0.600 0.667 0.714 0.793
Source: WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2
Intensive
free readership year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
Aggregate county 2002 94 0.102 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.182 0.321
Aggregate county 2005 94 0.171 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.274 0.387
Aggregate county 2008 94 0.467 0.223 0.000 0.368 0.494 0.618 0.825
Source: WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2
Per capita paid sales year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
Aggregate municipal 2002 2368 0.305 0.122 0.083 0.242 0.303 0.368 0.493
Aggregate municipal 2006 2368 0.303 0.141 0.041 0.243 0.301 0.360 0.505
Aggregate municipal 2008 2368 0.296 0.140 0.034 0.235 0.298 0.355 0.516
Source: WEMF MA Performance 00-09 (Publicitas)
Municipal
demographics year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
Fraction age 14-29 all 21312 0.221 0.037 0.160 0.199 0.223 0.244 0.274
Fraction age 60+ all 21312 0.237 0.055 0.159 0.200 0.233 0.267 0.336
Fraction at least
A-level all 21312 0.207 0.081 0.104 0.151 0.191 0.249 0.365
Fraction commuter all 21312 0.558 0.100 0.399 0.496 0.562 0.621 0.718
Source: 2000 Census
Notes: Intensive readership is defined as the average number of newspapers read by one person. Extensive paid
readership is defined as the share of people reading at least one paid-for newspaper. All variables used in this table are
described in Table B.4.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
We employ two approaches to examine the effect of free commuter newspaper pen-
etration on paid-for newspaper readership and sales. First, we estimate the overall
relationship between commuter newspaper penetration and traditional newspaper
readership at both the extensive and the intensive margin in a county. Moreover,
we examine whether free commuter newspapers bring new readers to the print
media.
As we have stated before, different sociodemographic groups might be attracted
in different ways by free commuter newspapers. Our second empirical approach
therefore asks whether penetration of free dailies reduces paid-for newspaper cir-
culation among its target audience (e.g. young people), while possibly increasing
traditional newspaper circulation among non-targeted consumers (e.g. old peo-
ple). To do this, we estimate the relationship between free newspaper readership
and paid-for newspaper readership for each sociodemographic group separately and
then compare the coefficients of interest.
2.4.1 Relationship between free and paid-for newspapers
In a first step, we estimate the overall effect of free papers on traditional newspaper
sales and readership, respectively. To this end, we estimate the following cross-
sectional relationship:
PPm
Popm
= β0 + β1
FPm
Popm
+ β2Xm + εm (2.1)
where PPm/Popm stands for per capita readership of paid-for papers and
FPm/Popm is the per capita free paper readership in the marketm. Xm are market
characteristics (e.g. fraction of highly educated people). We use two different de-
pendent variables: the average number of newspapers read by one person and the
share of people who read at least one newspaper. While the intensive readership
(i.e. the average number of newspapers read by one person) specifically controls for
multihoming, the extensive readership (i.e. the share of people who read at least
one newspaper) does not. To construct the first one we simply aggregate all read-
ers of paid-for newspapers in a market m and divide it by the population in that
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market. The only difference from the construction of the latter is that we count
the multihomers only once by the aggregation over all paid-for newspapers.11 In
this simple model, β1 shows the relationship between free newspaper penetration
and traditional newspaper circulation and readership, respectively.
Table 2.3 presents the results. The only difference between the first two columns
and the last two columns is the dependent variable. The first two columns show
the cross-sectional relationship between free and paid-for newspaper readership in
a county for 2002 and 2006 if we do not allow for multihoming. The main co-
efficient of interest is not significant, indicating that free commuter newspapers
have no significant impact on traditional daily newspapers. However, these purely
cross-sectional estimates are vulnerable to an omitted variable bias: free news-
paper penetration might be correlated with some unobservable determinants of
traditional newspaper readership, as for example, the impact of other media out-
lets, the demand for information and many more.
Further, the results indicate that the only control variable which affects the read-
ership in the market is the fraction of highly educated people. The other con-
trols are not significantly different from zero on conventional levels. However, this
result should not be overinterpreted, as there is not enough variation in sociode-
mographic group fractions across counties. To better examine the effect of the
sociodemographic group readership, we estimate the alternative equation 2.1 on
the municipal level. The results are provided in the Table B.5. In addition to the
previous findings, these results show a negative correlation between the readership
of paid-for newspapers and the fraction of young people.
In the next regression, we are able to control for market and time fixed effects by
using longitudinal data. We estimate
PPmt
Popmt
= β0 + β1
FPmt
Popmt
+ φt + µm + εmt (2.2)
where µm is a market fixed effect and φt are time dummies. The time dummies
control for common factors in all markets, which vary over time. They capture,
for example, the effects of subscription prices, prices paid at the newsstand, the
11To make this clearer, let us assume that we have only two paid-for newspapers A and B in the market
with two people. While newspaper A is read only by the first person, both individuals read newspaper
B. In this case, our intensive (extensive) readership would be equal to 3 (2).
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Readership by Year
Extensive paid-for readership Intensive paid-for readership
2002 2006 2002 2006
Intensive free paper 0.033 -0.045 0.158 -0.123
readership (0.126) (0.099) (0.259) (0.198)
Fraction age -0.152 0.035 -0.137 0.107
14-29 (0.344) (0.315) (0.624) (0.558)
Fraction age -0.190 0.262 -0.523 0.567
60+ (0.277) (0.344) (0.591) (0.570)
Fraction high 0.223 0.374* 0.650* 0.775**
education (0.198) (0.206) (0.369) (0.343)
Fraction HH -0.204 -0.007 -0.298 -0.219
Income<4000 SFR (0.213) (0.179) (0.406) (0.434)
Constant 0.831*** 0.520*** 1.109*** 0.677**
(0.198) (0.152) (0.374) (0.302)
Counties 94 94 94 94
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. To assure the representativeness only counties with more than 99
respondents are used. All variables used in this table are described in Table B.4.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
business cycle and the effect of outside media on the demand for traditional daily
newspapers. Market fixed effects control for time invariant factors in every market.
As the examined period is quite short, sociodemographic factors are included in
market fixed effects. As a robustness check, we also included sociodemographic
variables and a number of other controls in equation 2.2. The results of this
regression are reported in Table B.6. 12
The coefficient β1 is consistently estimated as long as the entry and penetration of
free papers is exogenous. This assumption is hard to justify as there are potentially
unobservable market characteristics that influence both paid-for newspaper reader-
ship and free newspaper entry. In order to mitigate these endogeneity concerns, we
use a special feature of commuter newspapers. As noted before, the transportation
system plays an important role for the distribution of free commuter newspapers.
This may influence both entry and penetration.
Suppose there are two markets A and B, one with and the other one without free
newspapers. We argue that free newspapers may actually affect market structure
in both markets, although they are physically distributed in only one of them.
12Moreover, as a robustness check we also use a random effects model. We do not report the results of
the random effects model here as a robust Hausman test indicates that the random effects model is not
appropriate.
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This argument is correct as long as there are at least some people who commute
from B to A reading free newspapers.13 In that sense, market entry at least in
market B can be seen as exogenous. This holds true as long as the publisher which
distributes its free papers in the transportation system of market A does not care
where the people are coming from.
As this is a rather strong assumption, we investigate the impact of the free com-
muter papers using various different empirical strategies which are robust to a
variety of endogeneity concerns. In one robustness check, we exclude the counties
in which free commuter papers were physically distributed from the estimation.
The results of this estimation can be seen in Table B.7 and are similar to those of
our main specification.
Nevertheless, there are still endogeneity concerns because demand for both free
and traditional newspapers might be influenced by an unobservable demand for
information. In this case, our estimates are biased towards zero and it is not
possible to consistently estimate the examined effect without valid instruments.
Therefore, we need some factors that affect the readership of free dailies without
influencing the readership of traditional dailies. The ideal instrument would be
the length of all public transport lines and / or the number of public transport
stops in cities with free commuter newspapers, since this is definitely orthogonal
to demand for paid-for dailies, but influences both the supply and the demand of
free commuter newspapers. Unfortunately, we do not have such data. Instead, we
construct the following instrument on the market level:
We aggregate all people commuting on public transport to counties with free dailies
and divide them by the total number of commuters using public transport. These
commuters have easier access to free newspapers than the rest of the population of
public transport commuters and are therefore more likely to read this new product.
However, the question remains whether this characteristic has an impact on being a
reader of paid-for newspapers or not. In other words, is there any difference between
public transport commuters commuting to counties with free dailies and those who
commute somewhere else with respect to their attitudes to paid-for newspapers?
We argue that there is no significant difference between these two groups as long
13This example exactly resembles the situation in Switzerland where free commuter newspapers have
physically entered only the seven largest markets (counties) but have changed the newspaper consumption
of people in more than 130 markets.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Readership
Intensive paid-for Extensive paid-for
readership readership
FE IV FE IV
Intensive free paper -0.089*** -0.164** 0.011 -0.055**
readership (0.032) (0.069) (0.025) (0.027)
2000 year dummy -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 0.000
(0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
2001 year dummy -0.021* -0.016 -0.013** -0.008
(0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
2002 year dummy 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
2003 year dummy 0.021 0.029** 0.009 0.017**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
2004 year dummy -0.008 0.004 -0.007 0.003
(0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
2005 year dummy -0.032** -0.017 -0.042*** -0.030**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
2006 year dummy -0.064*** -0.042* -0.043*** -0.024**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010)
2007 year dummy -0.090*** -0.061** -0.064*** -0.039***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012)
2008 year dummy -0.103*** -0.066** -0.069*** -0.038**
(0.020) (0.033) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 1.003*** 0.713***
(0.010) (0.006)
Fixed effects County County County County
Counties 940 930 940 930
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level.
To assure the representativeness only counties with more than 99 respondents are used. All
variables used in this table are described in Table B.4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
as we condition on market and time fixed effects in our main specification (see
Table 2.4) and/or on market and time fixed effects along with sociodemographic
characteristics and interest variables in the robustness section (see Table B.6).
Table 2.4 reports the estimates of equation 2.2. The dependent variable in the first
two columns is the average number of paid-for newspapers read by one person and
the dependent variable in the next two columns is the share of people reading at
least one paid-for newspaper. As noted above, the first variable contains informa-
tion about multihomers. The results suggest that a weak substitution is going on.
However, by comparing the first two with the second two columns we can see that
not considering multihomers leads to an underestimation of the substitution effect.
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So, it seems that people do substitute their second newspaper rather than their
first one.
How large is the effect of free newspapers on the consumption of traditional daily
newspapers? In 2008, the intensive free paper readership was 0 in the fifth per-
centile market and 0.8 in the ninety-fifth percentile market. Using our estimates,
the difference of 0.8 free paper penetration across counties translates into a differ-
ence of 0.131 fewer paid-for newspapers read. The average of paid-for newspaper
readership amounts to 0.957. Thus, the difference in free newspaper penetration
among the fifth and ninety-fifth percentile markets implies that paid-for newspaper
readership is about 13% lower.
Our coefficient can be interpreted in a more direct way. The coefficient of -0.164
means that on average six additional readers of free commuter newspapers would
decrease the readership of paid-for newspapers by one. Moreover, by using some
computation we can reinterpret these findings in terms of the number of copies. To
do this, we construct data about the number of readers per copy by taking reader-
ship data and dividing them by circulation data. While a copy of free newspapers
is read by 2.44 readers, 3 people share a copy of paid-for newspapers. By incor-
porating the later number into the substitution ratio computed above we get that
18 additional readers of free newspapers would decrease the number of copies of
paid-for dailies by one. If we use now the information about number of readers per
copy on free newspaper side, we get the following substitution ratio: 15 additional
copies of free newspapers would lead to a reduction of paid-for newspaper copies
by two. To check this result, we re-estimate this relationship by using circulation
data of paid-for newspapers on the municipal level. The results are provided in
Table B.8 and indicate a similar substitution pattern.
So far we have argued that people substitute their second or third newspaper
rather than their first newspaper. To test this statement we re-estimate equation
2.2 with the share of singlehomers and share of heavy readers as dependent vari-
able.14 Heavy readers are defined as readers of six consecutive issues of a particular
daily paid-for newspaper. Thus, this variable may serve as a good proxy for sub-
scriptions. The results are reported in Table 2.5. We find in the second column
no effect of free newspapers on the number of singlehomers: however, the fourth
14Moreover, we directly compare the coefficients of Table 2.4 using stacking of both datasets and testing
whether the interaction term is statistically different from zero. The results are provided in Table B.9
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column suggests a negative but not statistically significant impact on subscription
readers. If we combine these findings with the results of Table 2.4 and our descrip-
tive statistics we arrive at the following conclusion: Free newspaper penetration
leads to a small reduction of consumption of the traditional daily press, at least
for some people. This effect can be decomposed into the effect on singlehomers
and multihomers, where the impact on multihoming usage seems to be more pro-
nounced. Furthermore, there is weak evidence for that number of subscription
readers going down.
Table 2.5: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Singlehomers, Heavy readers and
New readers
Singlehomers Heavy readers New readers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IV FE IV FE FE
Intensive free paper 0.081*** 0.033 -0.059* -0.095 0.234***
readership (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.064) (0.018)
Free paper entry 0.047***
dummy (0.009)
2000 year dummy 0.003 0.005 0.062*** 0.066*** -0.005 -0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
2001 year dummy -0.002 0.001 0.061*** 0.063*** -0.011* -0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
2002 year dummy -0.003 0.004 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007)
2003 year dummy 0.001 0.006 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.013** 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
2004 year dummy -0.002 0.005 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.003 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
2005 year dummy -0.028* -0.021 0.038** 0.047*** -0.029** -0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
2006 year dummy -0.013 0.001 -0.001 0.013 -0.023*** 0.001
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008)
2007 year dummy -0.028** -0.010 -0.030 -0.015 -0.039*** 0.005**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.009) (0.008)
2008 year dummy -0.022 -0.000 -0.044** -0.023 -0.045*** 0.021
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.011) (0.009)
Constant 0.424*** 0.848*** 0.713*** 0.713***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Fixed effects County County County County County County
Counties 940 930 940 930 940 940
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level. To assure the
representativeness only counties with more than 99 respondents are used. All variables used in this table
are described in Table B.4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Can we therefore conclude that the free commuter press does not constitute any
threat to the traditional print press? To answer this question, we have to consider
the two-sidedness of the newspaper market. Our results imply that there is no
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large effect on the extensive margin. However, we do not have a good idea for
what happens on the intensive margin, in terms of how much time people spend
reading the traditional press. It may be the case that people have just a fixed time
period for media consumption and therefore reading a free newspaper might reduce
the time spent with the paid-for press. This in turn may weaken the bargaining
position of the publisher in the negotiating process with advertisers. Consequently,
the competition on this side of the market may be very hard. Examining the ad-
vertiser’s side of the market can help us fully understand the competition between
the paid-for and free daily press. Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary data
and therefore have to leave this question for future research.
Do free newspapers create new readers for the print media? In other words, does
this new product lead to an expansion of the market? The answer to this question is
positive and can be found in the fifth column of Table 2.5. In this column we regress
the union of paid-for and free newspaper readers on the free newspaper readers.
Econometrically, this regression has the problem that the dependent variable is
a function of the independent variable. Therefore, there may be a mechanical
relationship between our dependent and independent variables. However, if the
free newspaper penetration does not lead to market expansion, we should not
see any positive coefficient. Moreover, to support this argument, we reestimate
this relationship with a dummy variable for the occurrence of free newspapers in
the market. The coefficient remains positive and highly significant (see the sixth
column of Table 2.5). Finally, simple descriptive statistics (see Figure B.7) also
support this statement.
2.4.2 Impact on high and low quality paid-for newspapers
Moreover, as noted above, there are some concerns that free papers crowd out high-
quality papers and thereby the aggregate quality of articles will decrease (Ahrens
(1999); Haas (2005); Price (2003)). To examine this, we first divide the traditional
newspapers into two groups: high-quality papers and low-quality papers. We de-
fine a high-quality paper as a newspaper which is supra-regional (i.e. distributed
in many cantons) and is supposed to have more in-depth content.15 Such a division
15Newspapers NZZ, Tages Anzeiger, Le Temps and LaRegione Ticino belong to the high-quality papers.
From the low-quality newspapers, we exclude Blick and 24Heures as these are supra-regional boulevard
newspapers. We specifically look at this group in the robustness section (see Table B.10.
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was created by communication scientists around Heinz Bonfadelli at the Univer-
sity of Zurich. We are aware that such a classification is always subjective and
never precise. Therefore, we use regular prices as well as subscription prices as
an additional measure for quality. We compute the means of subscription as well
as regular prices over the examined period and rank the publications in descend-
ing order according to these measures. If a newspaper is then among the top ten
newspapers according to both measures we consider it as high-quality newspaper.
Table 2.6: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on High and Low Quality Newspaper
Quality: region based Quality: price based
high low high low
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
Intensive free 0.011 -0.010 -0.056** -0.090* 0.003 -0.022 -0.092*** -0.153**
paper readership (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.054) (0.009) (0.023) (0.029) (0.064)
2000 year -0.010** -0.009** 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.013 -0.009
dummy (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
2001 year -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.011 -0.008 -0.013* -0.012 -0.009 -0.005
dummy (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
2002 year -0.011*** -0.010** 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.010 -0.002 0.002
dummy (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
2003 year -0.008** -0.007 0.014 0.019 0.011 0.014* 0.009 0.016
dummy (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
2004 year -0.011** -0.008* -0.010 -0.004 0.005 0.009 -0.013 -0.003
dummy (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
2005 year -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.027** -0.019 -0.003 0.001 -0.032** -0.020
dummy (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
2006 year -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.048*** -0.037* -0.002 0.004 -0.065*** -0.046**
dummy (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.020) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.022)
2007 year -0.038*** -0.030*** -0.055*** -0.041* -0.011 -0.002 -0.081*** -0.058**
dummy (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.022) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.026)
2008 year -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.062*** -0.044 -0.013* -0.001 -0.092*** -0.063**
dummy (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.028) (0.008) (0.013) (0.020) (0.031)
Constant 0.175*** 0.644*** 0.246*** 0.766***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
Counties 940 930 940 930 940 930 940 930
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level. To assure the representativeness only
counties with more than 99 respondents are used. All variables used in this table are described in Table B.4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We re-estimate equation 2.2 for these two groups and Table 2.6 reports the re-
sults of this estimation. Free newspaper penetration has no significant effect on
high-quality papers and a strong negative effect on local tabloids. These findings
are in line with predictions of theoretical models on vertical differentiation (e.g.
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980)). We can observe this effect whether or not we use
a region-based or price-based quality measure. The difference in point estimates
between these two measures is caused by the fact that the low-quality group based
on price includes two national boulevard newspapers, Blick and 24Heures, while
the region-based group not. Thus, the overall effect is largely driven by the re-
duction of readership of local low-quality tabloids. The results suggest that while
the number of readers of high-quality newspapers does not change, many readers
51
Free commuter newspapers and the market for paid-for daily newspapers
of local tabloids switch to the new product. Moreover, results in Table B.10 in-
dicate that the national yellow press also loses its readers due to free newspaper
penetration.
2.4.3 The change in audience of paid-for daily newspapers
The previous results indicate that the free newspapers take some readers away
from paid-for dailies. However, it is possible that free penetration reduces paid-for
readership among its target audience (e.g. young readers, ...), while increasing paid-
for readership among non-targeted consumers. As noted in George and Waldfogel
(2006) and George (2008), we can identify the effect of free paper expansion from
the changing gap between the tendency for targeted and non-targeted readers to
purchase traditional daily press. This strategy is valid under the condition that
the endogenous change in paid press correlated with free papers growth is the same
for both groups. Unlike George and Waldfogel (2006) and George (2008), we are
able to estimate the impact on the gap in readership between different groups in a
direct way due to the available information about group-specific readership. Thus,
we estimate the following two equations:
PP 1mt
Pop1mt
= β10 + β11
FPmt
Popmt
+ φ1t + µ1m + ε1mt (2.3)
PP 2mt
Pop2mt
= β20 + β21
FPmt
Popmt
+ φ2t + µ2m + ε2mt (2.4)
where the dependent variables are per-capita paid-for newspaper readership in the
market m among target (i.e. group 1) and non-target (i.e. group 2) readers at time
t, respectively. The constants show baseline traditional newspaper coverage for
each group and the coefficients β11 and β21 reflect the effect of free paper penetration
on traditional paper readership by group. Direct comparison of these coefficients
reveals differences in the examined effect.
Table 2.7 presents estimates of equations for the eight categories of readers. The
top row of the table identifies the examined group. The coefficients of our interest
are in line with what we expected. The paid-for newspaper readership is decreasing
more slowly in groups with lower free paper penetration relative to groups with
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higher free newspaper penetration.
Table 2.7: The Effect of Free Paper Penetration on Audience of Paid-for Newspaper
young old highly educ less educ high inc less inc commuters no commuters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Intensive free -0.137** 0.057 0.031 -0.095* -0.015 -0.039 -0.106** -0.050
paper readership (0.062) (0.075) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.039) (0.043) (0.059)
2000 year -0.036* -0.024 0.023 -0.022 0.007 -0.025* -0.000 0.006
dummy (0.021) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
2001 year -0.048** 0.016 -0.074** -0.013 -0.044* -0.013 -0.040** -0.018
dummy (0.020) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022)
2002 year 0.014 0.041 0.024 -0.003 0.005 -0.015 0.014 0.029
dummy (0.024) (0.035) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025)
2003 year -0.011 0.030 0.037 0.008 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.037
dummy (0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025)
2004 year -0.042 0.040 0.002 -0.034 0.017 -0.026 -0.023 -0.011
dummy (0.026) (0.036) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
2005 year -0.057** 0.029 -0.021 -0.038 -0.045** -0.031* -0.049** -0.021
dummy (0.026) (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024)
2006 year -0.137*** 0.001 -0.083** -0.052* -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.095*** -0.054**
dummy (0.031) (0.036) (0.038) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026)
2007 year -0.168*** -0.034 -0.087** -0.087** -0.110*** -0.102*** -0.117*** -0.108***
dummy (0.032) (0.044) (0.038) (0.035) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
2008 year -0.168*** -0.016 -0.104** -0.080** -0.132*** -0.111*** -0.135*** -0.122***
dummy (0.035) (0.053) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant 0.890*** 0.793*** 0.854*** 0.826*** 1.094*** 0.898*** 1.035*** 0.957***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
Counties 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level. Note that commuters in this table are defined as
people living and working in different counties. This may be a reason why we don’t see any significant difference between commuters and
no commuters. To assure the representativeness only counties with more than 99 respondents are used. All variables used in this table are
described in Table B.4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
To examine whether these point estimates are significantly different from each
other, we follow two different approaches. First, we use seemingly unrelated es-
timation. This allows us to use the Chow test to directly compare coefficients.
The appropriate test statistics can be found in Table 2.8. Second, we can stack
the specific group datasets and construct interaction terms (group x free paper
penetration). The coefficient of this interaction term is the coefficient of interest.
We report these results in the appendix section in Table B.11.
Table 2.8: Comparison of Group-specific Effects
young vs. old highly vs. less higher vs. lower commuters vs.
educated HH income no commuters
χ2 3.83 4.45 0.27 0.66
p-Value 0.0502 0.0348 0.6053 0.4149
Notes: H0: Group-specific coefficients are statistically not different.
We can see that the coefficient estimates for groups more likely to read free com-
muter newspapers (young, less educated and commuters) are virtually all negative,
suggesting that increases in free paper penetration in a market reduce newspaper
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readership among these groups relative to the general population. Similarly, the
coefficient estimates for the groups less likely to substitute to free newspapers
(highly educated or old) tend to be slightly positive but not significant, suggesting
that increase in the penetration of commuter papers in a market has no impact on
newspaper coverage among these groups. Moreover, as Table 2.8 suggests, there
is a significant difference between the young and old and the highly educated and
less educated group, respectively. This finding implies that the quality of the tra-
ditional papers is likely not to decline. If the quality decreased, we would probably
observe a reduction of the highly educated readership and old readership.16 Fur-
thermore, there is no impact on the readership gap between the high income and
low income group, indicating other reasons for substitution besides prices. To sum
up, the substitution pattern observed in the first part of this section is largely
driven by young and less educated people. In the last step we examine whether
Table 2.9: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on New Readership by Group
young old highly educ less educ high inc less inc commuters no commuters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
intensive free 0.408*** 0.181*** 0.158*** 0.281*** 0.231*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 0.207***
paper readership (0.028) (0.051) (0.035) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
2000 year -0.007 -0.005 0.018 -0.001 -0.010 -0.020*** 0.004 -0.007
dummy (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
2001 year -0.023** 0.005 -0.032 -0.008 -0.026** -0.019** -0.019** -0.012
dummy (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
2002 year 0.013 0.001 0.018 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 0.007 -0.010
dummy (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
2003 year -0.003 0.028 0.014 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.009 0.005
dummy (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
2004 year -0.003 0.026 -0.011 -0.012 -0.007 -0.017* -0.004 -0.006
dummy (0.012) (0.024) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
2005 year -0.026* -0.031 -0.037* -0.023 -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.029** -0.011
dummy (0.015) (0.030) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
2006 year -0.041*** -0.010 -0.030 -0.027* -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.024* -0.035**
dummy (0.013) (0.026) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
2007 year -0.065*** -0.008 -0.046** -0.037** -0.065*** -0.048*** -0.041*** -0.046***
dummy (0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
2008 year -0.081*** -0.030 -0.031 -0.038** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.043*** -0.042***
dummy (0.018) (0.037) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 0.660*** 0.734*** 0.752*** 0.643*** 0.776*** 0.682*** 0.731*** 0.714***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
Counties 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level. Note that commuters in this table are defined as
people living and working in different counties. To assure the representativeness only counties with more than 99 respondents are used. All
variables used in this table are described in Table B.4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
the market expansion effect found in Section 2.4.1 differs across sociodemographic
groups. To this end, we regress the union of paid-for and free readership on the
16This speculation is in line with communication science literature (Haas (2005)) that goes even further,
arguing that traditional newspapers differentiate more from the commuter newspapers by increasing their
quality.
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intensive free paper readership. The results are provided in Table 2.9. The results
indicate that free commuter newspapers are successful in bringing new readers to
the daily print press across all groups. If we compare coefficients (see Table 2.10)
we find that free commuter newspapers are able to create new readers along the
whole population, although the impact on the young, less educated and commuter
groups is more pronounced. We find again no significant difference between both
income groups.
Table 2.10: Comparison of Group-specific Effects on New Readership
young vs. old highly vs. less higher vs. lower commuters vs.
educated HH income no commuters
χ2 16.14 10.56 0.70 3.02
p-Value 0.0001 0.0012 0.4021 0.0822
Notes: H0: Group-specific coefficients are statistically not different.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the impact of penetration of free commuter newspapers
on the readership and circulation of the paid-for daily press using panel data tech-
niques and instrumental variable. We find that free daily newspapers are weak
substitutes for the traditional daily press, although one has to differentiate among
the quality of paid-for newspapers. In particular, commuter newspapers take read-
ership away from low quality newspapers, such as local and national tabloids. The
demand for high quality newspapers does not seem to be affected. Moreover, our
results suggest that this pattern is amplified through the behavior of multihomers.
Further, it is shown that free commuter newspapers differentially draw younger
and less educated individuals away from daily newspapers. As a result, the au-
dience for traditional newspapers has changed. Older individuals and individuals
with higher education form an even a larger fraction of the traditional newspaper
market. Finally, we find that free newspaper penetration creates new readers of
daily print press. This effect is more pronounced among young and less educated
readers.
We cannot conclusively tell if total welfare increased due to the introduction of
free papers as we are unable to quantify the external benefits and costs. Pri-
vately - by revealed preferences - readers who are switching to the free newspapers
55
Free commuter newspapers and the market for paid-for daily newspapers
increase their surplus. The effect on consumers who do not switch depends on
the competitive reaction of the traditional paid-for newspapers: For example, a
repositioning of the paid-for newspaper’s content might benefit or harm existing
readers. The results here suggest that not much repositioning was done in terms
of quality, however we cannot provide accurate evidence due to a lack of data. To
properly examine the repositioning issue, data about newspapers’ contents would
be needed. One could then use simple regression models to look at content changes
as a response to free paper penetration.
This chapter does not examine the external effect on the advertising markets, which
should be considered to fully examine the welfare implications of free newspaper
penetration. Free papers might intensify the competition in the advertising market
and thus drive down prices paid-for newspaper can demand for their advertising
space. In addition, it is possible that the time spent by reading traditional daily
newspapers decreases with the entry of free newspapers. As this variable is im-
portant for the willingness-to-pay considerations of advertisers this might further
weaken the demand for the advertisements in paid-for papers. Further research is
necessary to consider this external effect of the introduction of free newspapers.
Another interesting aspect of this chapter is that a larger fraction of the population
is informed. This is particularly important from a political point of view as more
information might increase the participation in the elections and therefore lead
to a more representative political landscape and a more participatory democracy.
However, to quantify the effect of free newspaper on election participation and its
outcome is beyond the scope of this chapter, so we leave this questions for further
research.
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Chapter 3
Efficiency and the Ownership of
Czech Firms
3.1 Introduction
The economic reforms of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were
aimed at creating competitive market economies and more efficient enterprises by
firm restructuring, privatization, and supporting institutional reforms (Aussenegg
and Jelic, 2007). The privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the former
command economies in the CEE region has been at the center of a debate among
economists and policy makers since the late 1980s. The SOEs were originally
established to ensure a better provision of public goods as well as political control of
production in centrally planned economies. However, they were unable to keep up
with technical and innovative progress. For this reason both economists and policy
makers expected SOEs’ efficiency to increase after privatization under new owners
and management, but institutional, legal, and accounting deficiencies hampered
performance in many privatized firms (Jandik and Rennie (2008)). Moreover, an
efficiency increase was expected as a result of hardening of budget constraints
(Frydman et al., 2000). Finally, newly established firms were expected to exhibit
high performance as they were established by new owners with a focus on core
competence and profits. In this respect, it became evident that the ownership type
is a key determinant of corporate performance and, therefore, received particular
attention in the design of the reform process (Estrin et al., 2009).
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However to date, there has been a lack of reliable empirical evidence on medium-
term firm efficiency and the determinants of efficiency in post-transition economies
in the CEE region (Hanousek et al., 2007a). We fill this gap in the literature by
analyzing the efficiency of Czech firms (privatized former SOEs and newly estab-
lished firms) and how this efficiency is determined by ownership structures. We
employ a stochastic production frontier model and use unique firm-level panel data
of more than 190,000 firm/years for the period 1998-2007.
Our results are in line with theoretical predictions that companies with a majority
or controlling owner are more efficient than firms with dispersed ownership (Hill and
Snell, 1989; Blomström et al., 2001). In addition, foreign ownership is positively
related to firm efficiency in our data. The effects appear to be larger in the high
technology sector and in the low-technology sector than in the medium-technology
sector. Furthermore, using our method, we are able to trace the effect over time.
We find that the effect of ownership increases over time and the performance of all
owners converges at the end of our sample.
This chapter is related to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature examining the effects of ownership structure on firm performance in transi-
tion countries (see Boycko et al., 1996 for a theoretical treatment and Djankov and
Murell, 2002; Morck et al., 2005; and Estrin et al., 2009 for empirical surveys). The
current literature almost uniformly suggests that privatization to foreign owners
greatly increases efficiency. The effect of domestic ownership is largely also positive
but not as much as the effect of foreign ownership. This is the case only for Central
European economies. In CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries the
effect of domestic ownership is insignificant or slightly negative (Brown et al., 2006;
Estrin et al., 2009). In addition, these efficiency differences between domestic- and
foreign-owned firms do not seem to diminish over time (see e.g., Blomström, 1988;
Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; and Arnold and Javorcik,
2009).1
Furthermore, several studies examine the concentration of ownership and find that
it plays an important role, with majority private ownership having mostly positive
effects on productivity (Pivovarsky, 2003). The overall positive effect is again
1Some of these studies do not control for possible selection effects when foreign owners purchase
only the most productive firms. However, even after controlling for such effects, the difference between
domestic- and foreign-owned firms remains large and persistent (Estrin et al., 2009).
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driven primarily by foreign-owned firms. Finally, some studies suggest that de
novo firms are more productive than or at least as productive as SOEs privatized
to domestic owners (Sabrianova et al., 2005). In contrast to the above review, the
literature on firm efficiency in CEE countries is rather limited. Little is known
about the technical efficiency of firms that underwent restructuring during the
transformation process toward a market economy.
Second, this chapter is related to the literature estimating technical efficiency.
We employ the stochastic production possibility frontier approach introduced by
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and further adapted
for panel data and time-varying technical efficiency by Khumbhakar (1990) and
Battese and Coelli (1995). Although this methodology is well established in the
empirical literature, there is still a lack of reliable empirical evidence on firm tech-
nical efficiency in post-transition economies.
A few authors analyze this agenda for the pre-transition years, finding that there is
substantial variation between highly efficient firms and firms that can still achieve
considerable efficiency gains. For instance, Brada and King (1994) analyze the
efficiency of firms in Poland. Brada et al. (1997) estimate the efficiency of
Czechoslovak and Hungarian firms in the early 1990s using frontier production
functions. They compute the average efficiency level for different sectors and find
that this level varies between 40-80%.2 Furthermore, the authors test whether firm
characteristics affect technical efficiency. As a result firm size and profitability is
found to be positively related to efficiency, whereas ownership has no significant
effect. Methodologically, Brada et al. (1997) stress that technical efficiency can
be measured independently of firms’ profit (or output) maximization objectives
and measures of technical efficiency facilitate comparison across economic systems.
Therefore, measuring allocative efficiency, which is based on selecting the mix of
inputs that generates the least-cost production, remains problematic given the pe-
riods of macroeconomic instability prevalent in most of the post-transformation
economies.3
Funke and Rahn (2002) examine the efficiency gap between East and West German
2Indeed, most of the authors using the stochastic production possibility frontier approach compute
average efficiencies across sectors. This approach was mainly used in agricultural economics (see Coelli,
1995 for a survey).
3Cullmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008) estimate both technical and allocative efficiency for 32 Polish
electricity distribution companies between 1997 and 2002. They find that technical efficiency increased
while allocative efficiency decreased during the transition period.
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firms using firm-level data over the period 1994-1998. Their estimates indicate that
this gap decreased over the examined period. Nevertheless, East German firms were
still significantly less efficient than their counterparts in West Germany. Further,
Konings and Repkin (1998) estimated the efficiency of firms in Bulgaria (1993-1995)
and Romania (1994-1995) using firm-level data. They used firm size (market share)
and profitability (profit margin) to explain firm efficiency in the two countries. The
technical efficiency of firms was found to vary significantly both within and across
industrial sectors in each country. The findings also suggest that in the course
of transition, firm behavior becomes more diverse, which results in an increase
in the variation of firms’ efficiency levels within industrial branches. The results
also support the hypothesis of Ickes and Ryterman (1993) that in a Soviet-type
economy dominated by large heavy-industrial enterprises, efficiency levels would
be high due to increased control and the assignment of better managers.
Studies targeting the early stage of the transformation frequently use small and of-
ten unrepresentative samples of firms, often combine data from different accounting
systems, and only have access to limited data on firm ownership. As a result, they
often treat ownership as a relatively simple categorical concept (e.g., private ver-
sus state or state versus foreign, domestic private outsider versus domestic private
insider), and they are often unable to distinguish the exact extent of ownership by
individual owners or even relatively homogeneous groups of owners. These short-
comings prevent many studies from providing accurate evidence on the effects of
various ownership categories on technical efficiency.
In this chapter we advance the literature by systematically addressing issues related
to the efficiency effects of ownership and by eliminating the earlier shortcomings.
First, we use panel data on a large sample of medium-sized and large firms in the
Czech Republic that were privatized as well as those established as new firms; they
constitute the bulk of the country’s economy.4 Second, we have access to a more
4A massive privatization program was administered in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s
under three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization, and large-scale privatization. The
first two schemes began in 1990 and were important during the early years of the transition. Large-
scale privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 1991, was completed in early 1995, and
allowed for various privatization techniques (auctions, tenders, direct sales). Most large-size and many
medium-size firms were transformed into joint-stock companies and their shares were distributed through
voucher privatization (almost one-half of the total number of all of the shares of all joint stock companies
were privatized in the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred
to municipalities. The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process. Two waves of
voucher privatization took place, in 1992-93 and 1993-94. Both waves were administered in the same
manner and there were no differences in their set-up.
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detailed measure of ownership than any prior study and so we are able to develop a
more systematic analytical framework for evaluating the efficiency effect of domes-
tic versus foreign ownership, as well as the effect of various degrees of ownership
concentration. Third, we cover a period when accounting rules conforming to the
international standard (IAP) were already in place. This prevents measurement
errors since we - just as the majority of studies examining productivity - make use
of balance sheet data which is sensitive to a change in the accounting rules.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we present our methodological
approach. The data is described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents our empirical
results and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Modeling Strategy
3.2.1 Theoretical background
In our analysis we employ the stochastic production possibility frontier approach
introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and
further adapted for panel data by Khumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli
(1995). The method measures technical efficiency under single-output production.
More importantly, the methodology helps us to explain firm-level differences in
efficiency as a function of the number of explanatory variables. As pointed out in
Sinani et al. (2007) , efficiency is a very useful concept to utilize, especially in the
context of a transition economy.
The estimation strategy consists of two parts. First, we define a production func-
tion of firm i in time t, which gives us the technological link between inputs (x)
and the resulting output (y) under the assumption that production is conducted
in an efficient manner:
yit = f(xit; β)
Due to some degree of inefficiency, a particular firm potentially produces less than
this theoretical maximum. Moreover, the firm’s output is also subject to various
random shocks that encompass anything from bad weather to unexpected good
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luck. Thus, the production function is further expanded to
yit = f(xit; β) · TEit · exp(vit), (3.1)
where vit denotes a random shock, which is i.i.d. and drawn from a N(0, σ2v)
distribution. The firm’s technical efficiency TEit represents the ratio of observed
output to maximum feasible output and lies within the interval of zero and one
(i.e. zero and one hundred percent). If TEit = 1 then the firm employs all inputs
efficiently and achieves an optimal output. If TEit is smaller than one then the
firm experiences some degree of inefficiency in its production. As the inefficiency
of a particular firm is not ex-ante observable, we treat efficiency as a stochastic
variable with a distribution common to all firms. So, the technical efficiency can
be written as TEit = exp(−uit), where uit is non-negative. Moreover, uit is i.i.d.-
distributed according to a truncated-normal distribution that is truncated at zero
with mean µit and variance σ2u(uit ∼ N+(µit, σ2u)). After inserting this expression
into equation 3.1 and after taking the natural log of both sides we obtain
ln yit = ln f(xit; β) + vit − uit (3.2)
However, technical efficiency scores obtained from the estimation of the equation
above are of little use for policy implications if we do not examine the sources of
inefficiency. Therefore, the second part of our strategy considers potential deter-
minants of efficiency on firm level. The relationship between firm inefficiency and
its determinants is given by:
uit = zitδ + wit, (3.3)
where zit is a vector of variables expected to affect firm level efficiency, δ is a vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated, and wit is an unobservable random shock,
drawn from a truncated normal distribution with mean zero and unknown variance
σ2u.
There exist at least two approaches to estimate equation (3.2) and equation (3.3).
The first approach is a two-stage procedure which is based on a successive estima-
tion of both equations. However, as noted by Battese and Coelli (1995), there is a
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serious problem with this approach. In the first stage the inefficiencies are assumed
to be i.i.d., while in the second stage they are assumed to be a function of different
factors. Thus, the assumption in the second stage contradicts the assumption in
the first stage. The second approach directly deals with this problem estimating
the equations 3.2 and 3.3 simultaneously using maximum likelihood. We apply this
approach in this chapter.
3.2.2 Empirical approach - Efficiency estimation
In order to parameterize the first part of our model, we employ a Cobb-Douglas
production technology. The Cobb-Douglas production function is a convenient and
frequently used tool in the literature (e.g. Brada et al., 1997; Brown et al., 2006
and Hájková and Hurník, 2007; Brown et al., 2006).
Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas technology assumes that the returns to scale are fixed,
and that the elasticity of substitution is equal to one. These assumptions may be
too restrictive if we examine the production functions of firms from different sectors.
Indeed, there is evidence that industries within a one-digit NACE division differ
with respect to capital intensity, labor intensity, or technology intensity (Laafia,
2002; Bjørnskov et al., 2009). Therefore, we interact the parameters of the Cobb-
Douglas production function with indicators for the two-digit NACE industries. As
a result, in the specification below we consider different parameters of the Cobb-
Douglas function for each two-digit NACE sector and so account for unobserved
industry heterogeneity.
Estimating a separate set of coefficients for every industry in equation 3.4 has an
additional advantage since it accounts for industry specific ownership structures
(see e.g., Demsetz, 1983 and Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 for theoretical evidence
and Thomsen and Pedersen, 1998 for empirical evidence). Therefore, the specific
effects of various sectors do not interfere with the ownership effects determined by
equation 3.5. Formally, our model of the efficiency frontier of I firms (i = 1, . . . , I)
in J two-digit NACE sectors (j = 1, . . . , J) over T time periods (t = 1, . . . , t) is
specified as follows:
ln yit = β0j + β1j ln cit + β2j ln lit + εi + φt + vit − uit (3.4)
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In equation 3.4, ln yit is the natural log of the value of the production of firm i
at time t, measured as firm sales. ln cit is the natural log of the capital of each
firm measured as working capital, and ln lit is the natural log of the firm’s labor
measured by the number of employees.5 We also include firm (εi) and year (φt)
fixed-effects to account for firm specific heterogeneity as well as for time-specific
effects (country-wide economic development and business cycle). Finally, vit and
uit are defined as in the previous subsection.
Some scholars have noted that the estimation of equation 3.4 is not robust towards
endogeneity concerns since the transmitted firm-specific productivity shock might
be correlated with the input factors (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) (hereafter LP) and Olley and Pakes (1996) (hereafter OP) pro-
pose a solution for this problem by using materials and investment as proxies for
unobserved productivity to separate the effect of observed technology on input
allocation. The main insight of these models is that the labor demand or invest-
ment is an invertible function of unobserved productivity and thus can be used to
substitute productivity.
However, the proposed solutions have also weaknesses, e.g., the nonparametric
approximations. Van Biesebroeck (2008) argue that a major problem of these
approaches is “that the inverted functions are complicated mappings from states
to actions, which must hold for all firms regardless of their size or competitive
position.” (see Van Biesebroeck (2008), p. 316). Moreover, Van Biesebroeck (2008)
compares five different productivity measures and comes to the conclusion that the
choice of method is of less importance if the main interest is in the residual. Finally,
the LP and OP approaches are more data intensive as they require data on the
material cost and investment, respectively. Thus, the use of these semi-parametric
approaches would extremely reduce our dataset and lessen the advantage we have
through the information on firm’s ownership structure.
The stochastic frontier approach allows efficiency to be influenced by factors outside
5In order to show that our results are robust to the use of different input proxies we estimate the
Cobb-Douglas function with fixed assets, and total capital as proxies for capital and staff costs as a
proxy for labor. Note that staff costs and number of employees are close measures of labor intensity
since within a given industrial sector we can expect a relatively stable wage distribution as shown by
Krueger and Summers (1988) as well as Crinò (2005) specifically for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. Additional definitions and relationships between financial variables used can be found at: http:
//amadeus.bvdep.com/amadeus/help/HelpAmadeus/AFAccRat.htm. Our results were not substantially
different. All alternative results are readily available upon request.
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the firm’s control. We can distinguish random shocks that affect the production
frontier (machinery breakdown, new policies affecting access to or utilization of
inputs, etc.) from factors over which the firm has some control (workforce size,
skill and effort, capital utilization, etc). The specification itself is estimated as a
panel with fixed effects to alleviate the potential problem of unobserved (fixed)
firm heterogeneity, including the endogeneity of firm ownership with respect to
efficiency.
3.2.3 Empirical approach - Determinants of efficiency
The ownership structure of companies has been identified in numerous studies as a
key determinant of firm performance (see Estrin et al., 2009 for a general overview
and Hanousek et al., 2007a, 2009 for specific results related to Czech firms). There-
fore, we are particularly interested in how firm efficiency uit is determined by its
ownership structure. Specifically, we aim to answer the questions, formulated as
hypotheses, that appear below.
The literature examining the agency problem arising from the separation of own-
ership and control often argues that managers might pursue other goals than the
owners would like. Because of this, a concentrated ownership structure might lead
to higher firm efficiency since it results in the superior monitoring of managers (Hill
and Snell, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, we expect that there will
be a positive relationship between ownership concentration and efficiency. We are
able to identify all owners with ownership stakes of at least 10 percent; sometimes,
but definitely not as a rule, we are able to identify dispersed ownership of less than
10%. Therefore, we are able to test whether the baseline relationship between
ownership concentration and efficiency holds and formulate the following baseline
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 A majority owner reduces a firm’s inefficiency.
The findings of the agency theory indicate that control is a very good mechanism
to make sure that managers work in the interest of the owners. So, the only issue
that matters is not majority ownership per-se but the possibility to control the
firm’s management. In other words, dispersed and/or minority ownership should
not improve a firm’s efficiency as control is very likely to be missing in such an
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ownership structure. However, in the presence of dispersed ownership, even a
minority owner with a sufficiently high stake is able to control a firm. For example,
La Porta et al. (1999) employ 20% as a threshold for control of a company. Control
can then be exerted even by minority owners to ensure that managers fulfil their
duties. Our data allows us to test the link between control and efficiency as we
are able to identify controlling minority ownership. Based on this reasoning we
formulate the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Minority controlling ownership reduces a firm’s inefficiency.
Furthermore, in the trade literature it has been argued that foreign owners have
better access to superior technology, meaning that owned by foreigners should be
more efficient (Blomström et al., 2001; Temouri et al., 2008). Hence, the existence
of the technological gap between foreign and domestic owners has become a styl-
ized fact in the applied trade literature. Especially in the context of a transition
economy, it is likely that foreign owners have more experience with market-oriented
environment and international markets. This can also result in increased efficiency.
Based on this we formulate the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 A foreign owner reduces a firm’s inefficiency.
Another explanation of the productivity gap between foreign- and domestic-
owned firms could be the differential access to external credit (Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer, 2010). This is especially important in a transition economy context
where many firms have to carry out high investment rates to substitute the old
obsolete capital for new advanced technology. This reason is largely absent in the
case of the Czech Republic, though. Access to external financing was relatively easy
before banks were fully privatized and banking privatization was achieved by 2001
(Hanousek et al., 2007b). After EU accession in 2004 the frictions on the lending
market were largely absent as the country complied with acquis communautaire.
We aim to test the above hypotheses by employing a model that links firm efficiency
with its ownership structure plus some other key firm characteristics. The model
for each year (period t) is specified as follows:
uit = δ0+δ1Sizeit+δ2Debtit+δ3Ageit+
J∑
j=4
δjOWN
j
it+wit ∀i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T
(3.5)
66
Efficiency and the Ownership of Czech Firms
In specification 3.5 uit is the inefficiency level of firm i in time t. uit can also be
interpreted as the distance from the efficiency frontier. Therefore, larger uit’s are
assigned to less efficient companies. Ownership structure (OWN jit) is defined in
year t for each firm i to account for a specific ownership category j. We distinguish
the domestic or foreign ownership of firms based on the exact knowledge of the
owner’s origin. If information on the owner’s domicile is missing, we introduce a
special category of an “unknown” domicile. Therefore, we consider the categories
of domestic, foreign, and unknown domicile owners. From our data we can also
distinguish the extent of the ownership concentration along with the extent of con-
trol over a firm. Following the country- and legal-specific approach of Hanousek et
al. (2007b), we construct ownership categories to distinguish majority, monitored
majority, controlling minority, and combined controlling minority ownership. We
elaborate on the exact rules for the assignment of the different ownership categories
in the next section.
Additionally, we include several controls that represent major firm characteristics.
The variable Size is measured as ln (Total Assets) and captures the effect of firm
size on its inefficiency. The variable Debt, defined as Total liabilities/Total Assets
(in percent), accounts for the effect of the firm capital structure on its efficiency.
Finally, the variable Age is defined as number of years from a firm’s incorporation
and measures the effect of firm’s age on its efficiency.
As noted above, specifications 3.4 and 3.5 are estimated within the "one-stage
procedure" designed by Battese and Coelli (1995) by using maximum likelihood
approach. Based on the estimates obtained from 3.5, we are able to test our
hypotheses that link firm (in)efficiency with firm ownership.
3.3 Data
We employ firm-level unbalanced panel data for the Czech Republic for the period
1998-2007 from the Amadeus database. Our data set is constructed from several
editions of the Amadeus database and, for this reason, we can also include in our
data firms that exited the market and consequently might have disappeared from
more recent editions. In this way we minimize selection and survival biases. De-
pending on the specific year, we have firm-level balance-sheet data (sales, working
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capital, and number of employees) for 4,240 to 34,642 firms. We further combine
the balance-sheet data with ownership data obtained from the Amadeus, Aspekt,
and Čekia databases. Combining these three data sources provides us with com-
prehensive information about the firms’ ownership structure. Altogether we work
with a unique firm-level panel data of more than 190,000 firm/year observations
for the period 1998-2007.
As most firms in our sample are multiproduct companies, we are unable to obtain
exact information about the input- and output-quantities connected with the pro-
duction process of each product of a firm. To circumvent this problem, we follow
the standard approach in the literature and use the variables recorded in the firms’
balance sheets to approximate a firm’s output, labor, and capital input (see Coelli
et al., 2005 for an overview). We use sales to measure the production of each firm
and as inputs we employ working capital (which is a major part of current assets,
represented by stocks+debts-credits) and number of employees. The variables are
in natural logs as shown in specification 3.4 to minimize the effect of different firm
size.
The descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 3.1. The number of
firms increases dramatically from 1998 on, confirming our argument in Section 3.1
that early studies relying on unrepresentative samples could not deliver accurate
results. The mean values of our economic variables are in absolute values to provide
a perspective on the scope of operation. In our sample the mean of working capital
as well as the number of employees decreases as more and more of the smaller firms
enter our dataset as time progresses. This is in accord with the values for sales,
which becomes smaller with time as well.
As firm efficiency might be industry-specific, we estimate a different set of coef-
ficients for every two-digit NACE category (Pavitt, 1984). In order to capture
different effects across subsectors, we follow the approach of Laafía (2002), who
divides industries according to their technology and knowledge intensity. This ap-
proach is based on the Eurostat official industrial-sector aggregations. In manufac-
turing industries we have four groups: high technology, medium-high technology,
medium-low technology, and low technology. In service industries we distinguish
five groups: knowledge-intensive services (KIS), high-tech KIS, market KIS (ex-
cluding financial intermediation and high-tech services), less-knowledge-intensive
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Table 3.1: Simple descriptive statistics
Year Sales Working capital Number of Number ofemployees firms
1998 13 505 503 59 467 242.2 4 240
1999 10 446 056 47 631 213.0 5 036
2000 10 549 254 51 124 195.5 6 015
2001 10 709 491 49 929 174.1 6 926
2002 7 044 422 29 000 96.3 13 350
2003 6 506 458 22 325 75.1 19 700
2004 6 080 603 18 470 61.0 29 523
2005 5 616 113 16 950 52.1 33 470
2006 5 590 190 16 331 42.3 38 255
2007 7 821 798 20 173 44.8 34 642
services (LKIS), and market LKIS.6
The ownership variables are defined according to country-specific legal rules as
argued in Gugler (2003) and are described in Table C.1. As shown in Hanousek
et al. (2007b) owners have under Czech law different opportunities to influence
corporate governance. In particular, majority ownership (more than 50% of shares)
grants the owner the right to staff management and supervisory boards, alter and
transfer a firms’ assets and make crucial strategic decisions at general shareholder
meetings. Through management and supervisory boards, majority ownership also
facilitates more direct executive control of the company. Moreover, minority owners
with a block ownership of at least 10% of shares are potentially important because
the law entitles the holder of this stake to call general shareholder meetings and
obstruct decisions by delaying implementation through lengthy court proceedings.
These minority shareholders (including the state) may thus use their ownership
position to delay or completely block the implementation of decisions by stronger
shareholder(s).
Majority ownership represents a high degree of concentrated ownership, while mi-
nority ownership can be viewed as a form of moderately dispersed ownership.7
Based on the above distinction of ownership concentration, we define several spe-
cific ownership categories. Rather than using exact percentage stakes, we opt for
dummy variables that differentiate various ownership categories and allow us to
6An overview of examined industries is provided in tables C.2 and C.3.
7Highly dispersed ownership arises when the stake of the largest holder does not reach the legal (10
percent) minority.
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provide more comprehensive results than previous studies. All ownership cate-
gories are exclusively defined and are further subdivided for domestic and foreign
owners, as well as those with an unknown domicile.
Majority ownership is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when an owner holds more
than a 50% stake in a firm and otherwise there is only dispersed ownership; it is
coded 0 otherwise. Thus, this category provides the majority owner with effective
control over the company.
Monitored majority ownership is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when there is
majority ownership in a firm, but at the same time there exists at least one minority
owner with a stake higher than 10%; it is coded 0 otherwise. This ownership
category reflects the situation in firms where the majority owner is confronted
with at least one non-marginal owner pursuing its own interest.
There are two minority-category variables. First, controlling minority ownership
is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when an owner holds a stake in a firm that is
greater than 10%, and this stake is greater than the sum of all the remaining stakes
that can be identified, e.g. the remaining stakes of all the listed companies. It is
coded 0 otherwise. This is an extreme case of control provided through a minority
stake in a company with highly dispersed ownership. It is a realistic category, as in
numerous companies dispersed ownership prevents the emergence of larger stakes.
This category has two implications relevant to our analysis. First, at general
shareholder meetings dispersed owners would have to act in concert to override
the decision of the single controlling minority owner. Second, according to the
law, shareholders have to disclose their identities in order to execute commonly
shareholder rights by agreement. In this case, their identities would be revealed
and listed in the commercial registry, and the database would contain the ownership
identities of highly dispersed owners.
Combined controlling minority ownership is the second minority category. It is
coded as 1 if there are two owners whose combined stake exceeds 50% and is
coded as 0 otherwise. These two owners cannot individually control the firm or act
against each other as individually they do not have enough voting power. However,
they may or may not coordinate their steps and control the company via combined
voting rights that give them a majority.
As noted earlier, we are able to distinguish domestic and foreign owners for many
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of the firms in our data set. However, for all the categories defined above there are
firms in the sample for which we are not able to determine domicile of their own-
ers. Either an owner is listed in the database without a country code identifying
its domicile, or a firm has a legal structure that prevents distinguishing between
domestic and foreign owners; e.g., a firm with unregistered stocks. Therefore, for
the first two categories (i.e. majority and monitored majority ownership) we in-
troduce an additional dummy variable for unknown ownership. Finally, a constant
contains all the categories not captured by our dummies (i.e. mainly minority un-
known ownership). In this case the firm either exhibits highly dispersed ownership
or does not report on its ownership.
3.4 Empirical Results
First, we estimate equation 3.4 to determine how capital and labor influence pro-
duction across different sectors. We employ a likelihood ratio test to test formally
for the efficiency frontier model. The results are presented in Table 3.2.8 The con-
tribution of capital and labor to firm production differs as the coefficient associated
with labor is uniformly larger than that of capital. This finding indicates that firms
are on average more labor-intensive. Furthermore, we also formally test whether
the sum of the coefficients associated with both inputs is statistically different
from unity; this would indicate constant-returns-to-scale production. The results
of these tests show that the sum of the coefficients is smaller than one (about 0.8
on average), a level indicating decreasing returns-to-scale (DRS). These results,
although at first glance surprising, are typical for transition economies that are
characterized by outdated, labor intensive technology as well as by the excessive
use of inputs in the production process.
With the help of these estimates we can back out for every firm a level of inefficiency
which we decompose in the next step.
8The results for each industry are provided in tables C.4 and C.5.
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Table 3.2: First step - Efficiency frontiers
NACE Grouping Constant Log Working Log Numberterm Capital of Employees
Manufacturing industries:
High-technology 11.424 0.294 0.550
Medium-high-technology 11.697 0.297 0.491
Medium-low-technology 11.856 0.277 0.494
Low-technology 11.818 0.274 0.493
Service industries:
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 12.107 0.215 0.563
High-tech KIS 12.035 0.222 0.571
Market KIS* 12.091 0.221 0.559
Less Knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 11.978 0.292 0.510
Market services less KIS 11.971 0.294 0.510
Notes: We use industry classification according to OECD-Eurostat (Laafia 2002). It is also available at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf. In the table we present
the weighted averages of the estimated coefficients; weights correspond to the number of observations.
* Market KIS excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services.
3.4.1 Ownership effects
In Table 3.3 we report the results from of specification 3.5 where we quantify the
effect of the different ownership types on inefficiency level for every year in our
sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is the inefficiency of a particular
firm and the explanatory variables are dummies for the various ownership types,
firm age, the debt ratio, and the logarithm of total assets for each firm. The own-
ership variables are divided according to the ownership concentration as described
in Section 3.3.
The reported coefficients should be interpreted in the following manner. A fully ef-
ficient firm would have a distance from the efficiency frontier equal to zero. Hence,
the positive value of a statistically significant coefficient associated with an own-
ership category indicates that this ownership type moves a firm away from the
efficiency frontier. This means that the specific ownership category is associated
with a lower contribution to firm efficiency. Conversely, a negative and statistically
significant coefficient associated with a specific category indicates that the category
helps to move a firm closer to the efficiency frontier and the firm becomes more
efficient.
The results in the first and the third row of Table 3.3 confirm our hypotheses that a
majority owner as well as a controlling minority owner reduces a firm’s inefficiency,
although the coefficients of majority ownership are not significant for some years
(at the beginning of the examined period). Moreover, the coefficient of controlling
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minority ownership seem to be even smaller than the coefficient of pure majority,
indicating that not the concentrated ownership per se but the possibility to control
a firm is consistently beneficial to firm efficiency. Note, however, that the impact
of controlling minority ownership is not significantly different from the impact of
majority ownership. This can be seen in Figure C.1.
Several empirical works show that majority owners can change their attitude when
a strong minority owner is present in the firm, for example, in the case of dividend
payments (Gugler, 2003). Therefore, we also investigate the effect of this specific
ownership type (i.e. monitored majority) on the efficiency. The results in the
second row of Table 3.3 indicate no impact on firm’s efficiency compared to the
base category as the coefficients are, most of the time, not significantly different
from zero. This suggests that a positive disciplining effect on firm efficiency when a
majority owner must account for the presence of an influential minority shareholder
does not materialize.
Minority owners whose combined shares provide them with a majority of the voting
rights -combined controlling minority ownership- are a special ownership category
but deliver rather similar result as the controlling minority ownership, at least
for the second part of the examined time period. In this category two minority
owners face a situation where neither of them can fully control the company and
only coordinated steps would enable them to control jointly the company. The
inability to control fully a firm by one of the two minority owners resembles a
"Mexican standoff". This slang term defines a stalemate or a confrontation that
neither of the parties can win. To come out of the deadlock the parties must resolve
the situation by negotiation, surrender, or attack. The estimated coefficients are
almost zero in the beginning of our data and turn negative from 2003 onwards,
hinting at a peaceful use of power between the two minority shareholders. In other
words, this category is positively related with firm’s efficiency from 2003 onwards.
Finally, using our method, we are able to trace the ownership effect over time.
We find that this effect increases over time, meaning that the effect of all four
ownership categories on efficiency is improving. In addition, the performance of
all owners converges at the end of our sample. This is certainly a positive feature,
hinting at improved management and corporate governance in Czech firms.
In order to shed more light on the results from Table 3.3, we additionally divide each
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ownership category according to the owner’s origin. The results of this estimation
are reported in Table 3.4. In order to improve the accessibility of our results, we
also present our findings in a graphical form in Figure C.2, where we plot coefficient
values along with 95% confidence intervals.
The coefficient of Majority foreign ownership, our first category, is negative and
significantly different from zero at least on the 5% level for all years. Further-
more, the estimated coefficients associated with foreign majority owners decrease
over time (coefficient range -0.020 to -0.069). These results may be interpreted
in the following way. At the start of the period we might still see some selec-
tion effect: for example, companies which were bought by foreign firms after the
transition to capitalism might be a positive selection of Czech firms. However, if
foreign owned firms become more efficient over time this might indicate a positive
effect of foreign owners. Thus, foreign-majority-owned firms are connected with
improving efficiency. In the case of domestic-majority-controlled firms, coefficients
are positive and their values decrease over time (coefficient range from 0.104 to
0.019). This finding indicates that domestic majority owners are less conducive
to firms’ efficiency but their impact improves over time. Hence, foreign owners
contribute to a firm’s efficiency considerably more than domestic owners. Figure
C.2 suggests that domestic majority owners improve the efficiency of their firms
faster than foreign majority owners, which might point to a future convergence in
efficiency levels. This convergence may be explained by technology spillovers from
the foreign owners to the domestic owners.
In firms where a foreign majority owner is confronted with the presence of a minor-
ity owner (or owners) the ownership structure is conducive to the firm’s efficiency
in general. The estimated coefficients are positive in the beginning of our data and
turn negative from 2003 onwards. In terms of the domestic owners, the lack of
statistically significant coefficients indicates no impact on firm’s efficiency, albeit
the majority of the coefficients is negative. Furthermore, the monitored majority
category does not correlate with firm efficiency at a better level than a simple ma-
jority. This confirms our previous finding from Table 3.3 that there is no positive
disciplining effect on firm efficiency when a majority owner is confronted with at
least one non-marginal shareholder.
Minority owners whose stakes are still larger than the combined stakes of the rest
of the known owners also contribute to firm efficiency, but the effect of control-
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ling minority ownership is less conclusive for foreign owners due to statistically
insignificant coefficients. In addition, domestic minority owners’ impact increases
firm efficiency (coefficient range -0.018 to -0.071). These coefficients do not statis-
tically differ from those of majority ownership. This interesting result implies that
domestic minority owners are not only effective in controlling firms but also in im-
proving their corporate governance. In other words, not ownership concentration
per se but the possibility to control is important to improve firm efficiency.
The last category to be examined is combined controlling minority ownership. As
we noted above, in this category two minority owners face a situation where neither
of them can fully control the company and only coordinated steps would enable
them to control jointly the company.
How does this arrangement work for firm efficiency? Foreign owners record positive
and statistically significant coefficients for about the first half of the researched
period while domestic owners record negative significant coefficients for the second
half. Hence, foreign owners seem to struggle and are unable to cooperate to improve
firm efficiency. The consistently negative coefficients in the case of domestic owners
indicate that this ownership category is conducive to firm efficiency. Moreover, the
negative coefficients associated with domestic owners hint at a peaceful use of power
between the two minority shareholders and a contributing effect of this ownership
arrangement with respect to firm efficiency. Alternatively, firms can be established
from the beginning as having cooperating co-owners, so a deadlock is averted.9
3.4.2 Effects of economic sectors
As a next step, we estimate how firm efficiency is affected when we distinguish
between different economic sectors in which firms operate (manufacturing and ser-
vices) and the different technology intensity the firms exhibit. Our additional
analysis serves also as a robustness check. In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we report results
that distinguish between the manufacturing (Table 3.5) and the service sectors
(Table 3.6).10 Within these broad sectors we further distinguish firms on different
9Indeed, we can see in our data that many domestic firms in this category are owned by relatives.
10We estimate specification 3.5 for the manufacturing and the service sectors without considering the
origin of the owner. The results can be found in Tables C.6 and C.7 for the manufacturing and the service
sectors, respectively. The results suggest that all defined categories significantly increase firm’s efficiency
compared to the dispersed ownership. The only exception constitutes the monitored majority ownership
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technology levels. As mentioned in Section 3.3, this division strictly adheres to the
methodology of Eurostat.
According to Table 3.5, ownership matters most for firms belonging to high-
Table 3.5: Detailed ownership effects in manufacturing industries; all years
Ownership category
Technology
High Medium-high Medium-low Low
Majority foreign -0.093*** -0.064*** -0.029*** -0.088***(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Majority domestic 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.013**(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Majority unknown -0.013* -0.018* -0.009 0.005(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Monitored majority foreign -0.049*** -0.027** -0.016 -0.073***(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Monitored majority domestic -0.063*** 0.053** 0.032 -0.027(0.023) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026)
Monitored majority unknown -0.010 -0.021 -0.019 -0.001(0.012) (0.023) (0.029) (0.015)
Controlling minority -0.020 0.028 -0.043** 0.038***
foreign (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013)
Controlling minority -0.107*** -0.041*** -0.104*** -0.106***
domestic (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Combined controlling 0.036 -0.005 0.161*** 0.131***
minority foreign (0.023) (0.035) (0.037) (0.028)
Combined controlling -0.080*** 0.023** -0.061*** -0.063***
minority domestic (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
log(Total assets) 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.037***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt ratio (percent) 0.006*** -0.002 0.001*** 0.003***(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Age of the firm -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.004***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.404 *** -0.214*** -0.365*** -0.189***(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011)
R-squared 0.259 0.208 0.205 0.168
N 1352 7415 8122 14968
Note: The dependent variable is the firm-level inefficiency obtained from the estimation of equation
3.4. The explanatory variables are dummy variables for the various ownership types, firm age, the
debt ratio, and the logarithm of total assets for each firm. The definition of each explanatory variable
can be found in Table C.1.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
and low-technology sectors, and less for firms in the medium-high and medium-low
technology sectors. In these sectors, especially foreign owners tend to be associated
with the highest efficiency. This result can be explained by the following reasoning.
First, foreigners have a better access to the technology. Therefore, their impact
on a firm’s performance is more pronounced in high-tech sectors where technology
in the services, which is negative but not significant.
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plays an important role. Second, foreigners have more experience with competi-
tion markets and therefore may push firms towards the efficiency frontier. As a
consequence, the impact of foreign owners is also large in low-tech industries that
are characterized by larger innovation pressure.11 Very similar result can be found
in Haddad and Harrison (1993).
Table 3.6: Detailed ownership effects in service sectors; all years
Ownership category
Knowledge- High-tech Market KIS Less Knowledge- Market
intensive KIS intensive services LKIS
services (KIS) (LKIS)
Majority foreign -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.071*** -0.045*** -0.039***(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Majority domestic 0.024*** 0.007 0.020** 0.026*** 0.026***(0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Majority unknown -0.009 -0.047*** -0.006 -0.011*** -0.011***(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Monitored majority -0.069** -0.054 -0.086** -0.047** -0.024
foreign (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.020) (0.019)
Monitored majority -0.041*** -0.083*** -0.034*** 0.026*** 0.029***
domestic (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Monitored majority 0.051*** 0.017 0.055*** -0.004 -0.007
unknown (0.011) (0.026) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Controlling minority -0.008 0.006 -0.048*** -0.012 0.002
foreign (0.013) (0.028) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Controlling minority -0.101*** -0.134*** -0.095*** -0.087*** -0.084***
domestic (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Combined controlling -0.137*** -0.070 -0.158*** 0.087*** 0.074***
minority foreign (0.025) (0.060) (0.029) (0.018) (0.017)
Combined controlling -0.032*** -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.004 -0.002
minority domestic (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
log (Total assets) 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.062***(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt ratio (percent) 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of the firm -0.007*** -0.001* -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005***(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.420*** -0.420*** -0.434*** -0.483*** -0.480***(0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
R squared 0.237 0.231 0.239 0.244 0.247
N 39670 5327 30085 81496 81067
Note: The dependent variable is the firm-level inefficiency obtained from the estimation of equation 3.4. The
explanatory variables are dummy variables for the various ownership types, firm age, the debt ratio, and the
logarithm of total assets for each firm. The definition of each explanatory variable can be found in Table C.1.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
It is also interesting to note that minority domestic owners who are able to exert
control over firms because the rest of the ownership is dysfunctionally dispersed,
11Indeed, the innovation process in new EU economies is dominated by foreign multinationals. Uza-
galieva et al. (2011) show that local firms in the new EU markets experience efficiency gains if they
supply industries with a higher share of foreign firms or if foreign firms sell to them.
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exhibit a comparably high degree of efficiency, confirming our previous result that
not concentration per se but the possibility to control matters.
The results for firms operating in services are presented in Table 3.5. On average,
ownership matters more for firms belonging to the sectors of knowledge-intensive
services (KIS) than for firms from less knowledge-intensive sectors. They do quite
well with foreign majority and monitored majority owners, driving the best effi-
ciency results.
Yet another pattern emerges when we compare specific foreign and domestic own-
ership. The efficiency differences between these two groups appear to be smaller
for firms operating in the service than in the manufacturing sector. This can be
explained by a more important role of technology in manufacturing sectors. A
similar pattern can be detected for firms controlled by combined-controlling mi-
nority owners. On the other hand, differences in contribution to efficiency between
foreign and domestic owners are smaller in firms controlled by monitored majority
and controlling minority owners operating in manufacturing sectors. Hence, when
we put the above results into perspective with those reported in Table 3.4, control-
ling minority domestic owners operating firms in manufacturing sectors represent
the group of owners that is most conducive to improving efficiency in Czech firms.
3.5 Conclusion
We analyze the evolution of efficiency in Czech firms from 1998 to 2007 and how
efficiency is affected by firm ownership structure. We provide evidence that the
ownership structure matters.
Our key result is that not the concentrated ownership per se but the possibility to
control a firm is consistently beneficial to firm efficiency. This finding is in favor of
the agency theory and in line with the general key results summarized by Estrin
et al. (2009). Moreover, we show that minority domestic owners are conducive
to firm efficiency at a slightly higher level than a pure majority. Finally, minority
owners who share the control in a firm may end up rivaling each other, which is not
conducive to efficiency. However, our evidence highlights that domestic minority
owners do cooperate and improve the efficiency of their firms, while we do not see
this evidence for the foreign owned firms.
80
Efficiency and the Ownership of Czech Firms
In the second part of our analysis, we estimate how the efficiency effects change with
the sector the firm operates in and with the technology intensity. We show that
firms belonging into the high- and low-technology sectors are most sensitive to the
ownership effect. Moreover, we show that differences in impact on firm efficiency
between foreign and domestic owners are less pronounced for owners operating in
services than in manufacturing. As services are more aimed at the local market, the
domestic controlled firms may benefit from better knowledge of the latter. This
knowledge and less export-orientation might contribute to eliminate differences
among domestic and foreign owners in firms operating in services.
Overall, we find evidence of improving efficiency among the firms in our sample.
This is certainly a positive feature hinting at improved management and corporate
governance in Czech firms.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Distribution Systems
The following graphs represent the four different possible distribution systems.
Figure A.1: Distribution Systems
(i) (ii)
(iii) (iv)
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A.2 Equilibrium Values
To avoid very long expressions, we redefine some polynomials in the following way:
A(K, d) ≡ 2K + d2 − 1,
B(K, d) ≡ Kd2 − 2K − d2 + 1,
C(K, d) ≡ −d2K + 2dK + 4K + d3 + 2d2 − d− 2,
D(K, d) ≡ −5d2K + 8K − d4 + 5d2 − 4,
E(K, d) ≡ 3dK + 4K + d3 + 2d2 − d− 2,
F (K, d) ≡ 8− 8d2 − 16K + 8d2K − d4K,
G(K, d) ≡ d4K − 6d2K + 8K + 4d2 − 4,
H(K, d) ≡ d3K − 2d2K − 4dK + 8K + 4d2 − 4,
I(K, d) ≡ d3K + 2d2K − 4dK − 8K − 4d2 + 4,
J(K, d) ≡ 2d3K + 5d2K − 2dK − 8K − 4d2 + 4,
L(K, d) = d6K2 − 11d4K2 + 40d2K2 − 48K2 + 10d4K − 50d2K + 40K − 8d4 + 16d2 − 8
Table A.1: Equilibrium values
(N/N) (E/N) (E/E)
w1
1−d
2−d
(1−d)C(.)
D(.)
(1−d)I(.)
(2−d)J(.)
w2
1−d
2−d
(1−d)E(.)
D(.)
(1−d)I(.)
(2−d)J(.)
p1
1−d
2−d
(1−d)(A(.)+K)C(.)
A(.)D(.)
2(d−1)L(.)
(d−2)H(.)J(.)
p2
1−d
2−d
(1−d)E(.)
D(.)
2(d−1)L(.)
(d−2)H(.)J(.)
q1
1
(2−d)(1+d)
KC(.)
(1+d)A(.)D(.) −
(d+2)KG(.)
(d+1)H(.)J(.)
q2
1
(2−d)(1+d) −
E(.)B(.)
(d+1)A(.)D(.) −
(d+2)KG(.)
(d+1)H(.)J(.)
θ1 0 (1−d)C(.)A(.)D(.)
4(d−1)G(.)
(2−d)H(.)J(.)
θ2 0 0 4(d−1)G(.)(2−d)H(.)J(.)
πR1 0 (1−d)K[C(.)]
2
2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2
(d−1)KF (.)[G(.)]2
(d−2)2(d+1)[H(.)]2[J(.)]2
πR2 0 0 (d−1)KF (.)[G(.)]
2
(d−2)2(d+1)[H(.)]2[J(.)]2
πM1
1−d
(2−d)2(1+d)
(1−d)K[C(.)]2
(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2
(1−d)(d+2)KI(.)G(.)
(d−2)(d+1)H(.)[J(.)]2
πM2
1−d
(2−d)2(1+d)
(d−1)B(.)[E(.)]2
(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2
(1−d)(d+2)KI(.)G(.)
(d−2)(d+1)H(.)[J(.)]2
Moreover, from the second order conditions and non-negativity constraints we know
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that B(.) < 0. This implies A(.) > 0, C(.) > 0, D(.) > 0, E(.) > 0, F (.) < 0, I(.) <
0, and J(.) < 0. Using all SOCs and non-negativity conditions, we restrict the
parameter space to K > (4−4d2)/8−4d−2d2+d3, so that the model is well defined. This
implies G(.), H(.) > 0.
A.3 Framework
The effects for the case when only one manufacturer adopts ER are defined as
described in Section 1.3. The definition of the effects for the case when both
manufacturers adopt ER are given by:
1. Double Markup Effect
The exact formal definition of the double markup effect for the case when
both firms adopt ER (N/N → E/E) is slightly different from the case when
only one firm adopts ER (N/N → E/N). The reason herefore is that the
respective outcome is not only influenced by one manufacturer’s exclusivity
decision, but by both manufacturers’ exclusivity decisions.
Hence, the definition of the double markup effect now includes one additional
element capturing the second brand’s double markup and is given by fi(E/E |
w−i = wN/N−i , p−i = p
N/N
−i , θi = θ−i = 0)+fi(E/E | wi = w
N/N
i , pi = p
N/N
i , θi =
θ−i = 0)−fi(N/N) ≡ fi(E/E | wi = w−i = wDM , pi = p−i = pDM , θi = θ−i =
0). wDM and pDM represent wholesale resp. retail prices resulting from the
double markup effect. Moreover, note that for some values (e.g. all prices),
the second element of this expression equals zero. Hence, for these values the
double markup effect is given by the same definition as for (N/N → E/N).
2. Competition Softening Effect
The effect is given by:
fi(E/E | θi = θj = 0)− fi(E/E | wi = wj = wDM , pi = pj = pDM , θi = θj =
0).
3. Investment Effect
The effect is given by fi(E/E)− fi(E/E | θi = θj = 0).
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The following two tables show the signs of the three different effects on the equi-
librium values.
Table A.2: Composition of the Total Effect: N/N==>E/N
N/N==>E/N Double Markup Competition Softening Investment Total
w1 0 + + +
w2 0 + + +
p1 + + + +
p2 0 + + +
θ1 0 0 + +
θ2 0 0 0 0
πR1 + + + +
πR2 0 0 0 0
πM1 - + + + / -
πM2 + + + +
CS - - + +/-
PS +/- + + +/-
Welfare - - + +/-
Table A.3: Composition of the Total Effect: N/N==>E/E
N/N==>E/E Double Markup Competition Softening Investment Total
w1 0 + + +
w2 0 + + +
p1 + + + +
p2 + + + +
θ1 0 0 + +
θ2 0 0 + +
πR1 + +/- + +
πR2 + +/- + +
πM1 - +/- + +/-
πM2 - +/- + +/-
CS - - + +/-
PS +/- +/- + +/-
Welfare - - + +/-
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A.4 Proofs
We start by referring to Sturm’s theorem which provides the basis of most of the
following proofs:1 Given equation
f(x) = a0xn + a1xn−1 + · · ·+ an−1x+ an, (A.1)
where the coefficients ai are real numbers and a0 6= 0, let N(x) be the number of
sign changes (disregarding vanishing terms) in the sequence of functions:
f0 = f(x) = g0(x)f1(x) − f2(x) f1 = f ′(x) = g1(x)f2(x) − f3(x) f2 =
g2(x)f3(x)− f4(x) . . . ,
where for i > 1 each fi(x) is (−1) times the remainder obtained on dividing fi−2(x)
by fi−1(x) and fn(x) 6= 0 is a constant. Then the number of real roots of eq. A.1
located between two real numbers a and b (b > a) excluding the own roots of eq.
A.1 is equal to N(a)−N(b).
Sturm’s theorem provides a simple algorithm to determine for each real polynomial
the number of real roots in any given interval (a, b). Thus, if a real polynomial has
no real roots in interval (a, b), it will be sufficient to evaluate this polynomial at
an arbitrary number from this interval, in order to determine its sign.2
We can use a simple example to explain how Sturm’s theorem works: Assume, we
are looking for the sign of 8−6d−2d3 +d4 for dε (0, 1). Thus, the chain of Sturm’s
functions is: f0 = 8− 6d− 2d3 + d4, f1 = −6− 6d2 + 4d3, f2 = −29 + 18d + 3d2,
f3 = 111− 82d and f4 = −1. Now, we can examine the changes of the signs:
d f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 N(d)
0 + - - + - 3
1 + - - + - 3
The examined expression has zero roots. Hence, the expression is positive.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1.
In order to prove proposition 1 we make use of some information stated above:
K > K = 4−4d
2
8−4d−2d2+d3 , d ∈ (0, 1), A(.) > 0, B(.) < 0, C(.) > 0 D(.) > 0, H(.) > 0, J(.) < 0
1In the description of Sturm’s theorem we follow Korn and Korn (1968).
2Sturm’s theorem was firstly announced in 1829 (Sturm, 1829). The proof can be found in Khovanskii
and Burda (2008).
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• Retail prices:
– pN/Ei − p
N/N
i =
2(1−d)d(d+1)K
(2−d)D(.) > 0
– pN/Ei − p
E/N
i =
(1−d)K(3d2K−4K+d4−3d2+2)
A(.)D(.) ⇒ sgn(p
N/E
i − p
E/N
i ) = sgn(3d
2K − 4K + d4 − 3d2 + 2).
This polynomial is decreasing in K:
3d2K − 4K + d4 − 3d2 + 2|K=K =
(−1+d)d(1+d)(8−6d2−2d3+d4)
(−2+d)2(2+d) < 0 ⇒ 3d
2K − 4K + d4 − 3d2 + 2 < 0 ⇒
p
N/E
i − p
E/N
i < 0
– pE/Ei − p
E/N
i =
(1−d)(2L(.)A(.)·D(.)−(2−d)(A(.)+K)C(.)H(.)J(.))
(2−d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.) =
(d−1)dKΛ(.)
A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.)
The difference is larger than zero if and only if Λ(.) > 0.
∂3Λ(.)
∂K3
=
(
1− d2
) (
768
(
1− d2
)
+ 1536 + 432d4 + 6d5
)
+ (1− d)
(
288d
(
1− d2
)
+ 96d
)
+ 36d8 + 66d5 +
384d4 > 0
∂2Λ(.)
∂K2
|K=K = 2(d− 1)
[
(32 + 96d)
(
d2 − 1
)
+ (d− 1)
(
12d
(
1− d2
)
+ 20d+ 2d6
)
− 32d4 − 21d5 − d6
]
(d+
1)(d+ 2) > 0⇒ ∂
2Λ(.)
∂K2
> 0
∂Λ(.)
∂K
|K=K = −
(d−1)2d(d+1)2[(d2−1)(192−48d2+10d4+d5)+(d−1)(24d(1−d2)+40d)−22d4−23d5]
(d−2)2 > 0 ⇒
∂Λ(.)
∂K
>
0
Λ(.)|K=K = − 4(d−4)(d−1)
4d2(d+1)3(d2−2d−4)(d3+2d2−4)
(d−2)4(d+2) > 0⇒ Λ(.) > 0⇒ p
E/E
i − p
E/N
i > 0
Q.E.D.
• Wholesale prices:
– wE/Ni − w
N/N
i =
(1−d)d2(d+1)K
(2−d)D(.) > 0
– wN/Ei − w
E/N
i =
(1−d)d(d+1)K
D(.) > 0
– wE/Ei − w
N/E
i =
(1−d)d2(1+d)K(4−2d−5d2+2d3+d4−4K+d2K)
(2−d)D(.)J(.)
⇒ wE/Ei − w
N/E
i > 0⇔ d
2K − 4K + d4 + 2d3 − 5d2 − 2d+ 4 < 0⇔ K > d
4+2d3−5d2−2d+4
4−d2 .
Q.E.D.
• Investment:
– θN/Ei − θ
N/N
i = 0
– θE/Ni − θ
N/N
i = θ
E/N
i =
(1−d)C(.)
A(.)D(.) > 0
– θE/Ei − θ
E/N
i =
(1−d)(−4G(.)A(.)D(.)−(2−d)C(.)H(.)J(.))
(2−d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.) =
(1−d)dKΘ(.)
(d−2)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.)
⇒ θE/Ei − θ
E/N
i > 0⇔ Θ(.) > 0
∂2Θ(.)
∂K2
=
(
1− d2
) (
64
(
1− d3
)
+ 128d (1− d) + 192 + 48d4 + 14d5
)
+ 4d8 + 18d5 + 32d4 > 0
∂Θ(.)
∂K
|K=K =
(d−1)d(d+1)(d2−2d−4)[8(1−d2)+(1−d)(40−20d2)+d4+2d5]
(2−d) > 0⇒
∂Θ(.)
∂K
> 0
Θ|K=K = 4(4−d)(d−1)
3d2(d+1)2(d2−2d−4)(d3+2d2−4)
(d−2)3(d+2) > 0⇒ Θ(.) > 0θ
E/E
i − θ
E/N
i > 0.
Q.E.D.
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• Retail profits:
– πN/ER − π
N/N
R = 0
– πE/NR − π
N/N
R =
(1−d)K[C(.)]2
2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2 > 0
– πE/ER −π
E/N
R =
(1−d)K(−2A(.)[D(.)]2F (.)[G(.)]2−(2−d)2[C(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2)
2(2−d)2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2 =
(d−1)dK2Σ(.)
2(2−d)2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2
⇒ πE/ER − π
E/N
R > 0⇔ Σ(.) < 0
∂5Σ(.)
∂K5
= 480d17 − 3360d16 − 17640d15 + 82560d14 + 249600d13 − 873600d12 − 1856640d11 + 5191680d10
+8087040d9 − 18923520d8 − 21288960d7 + 43253760 + 33177600d5 − 60456960d4 − 28016640d3
+47185920d2 + 9830400d− 15728640
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
∂4Σ(.)
∂K4
|K=K = −48(d− 2)2(d− 1)d(d+ 1)(d+ 2)2[(d− 1)[(1− d2)(3456− 2336d2) + 422d4(1− d) + 248d4]
+(d2 − 1)[(1− d2)(2432− 1696d2 + 626d4) + 606d4 + 33d8 + 4d9]− 41d8 − 43d9] < 0
⇒
∂4Σ(.)
∂K4
< 0
∂3Σ(.)
∂K3
|K=K = −6(d− 1)2d2(d+ 1)2(d+ 2){(1− d)[(1− d)(1148d6(1− d)(1− d2)(41435 + 46476d+ 549d6)
+(1− d3)(5460 + 4d6) + 419d+ 2587d4 + 16950d5 + 2620d6 + 20d10) + 4044] + 261} < 0
⇒
∂3Σ(.)
∂K3
< 0
∂2Σ(.)
∂K2
|K=K =
4(1− d)3d3(d+ 1)3
(2− d)2
{(d− 1){(1− d)[(1− d2)(50295 + 28382d− 15410d3 + 2028d5 + 541d6)
+(1− d)(3948d+ d11) + 12611d4 + 728d5 + 1511d6 + 72d9 + 29d10 + d11] + 1844} − 45} < 0
⇒
∂2Σ(.)
∂K2
< 0
∂Σ(.)
∂K
|K=K =
16(d− 4)(d− 1)5d4(d+ 1)4(−4 + 2d2 + d3){(1− d)(160− 76d2)
(d− 2)4(d+ 2)
+
(1− d2)(224− 140d2 + 15d4) + 3d4(1− d3) + 14d4 + d8}
(d− 2)4(d+ 2)
< 0⇒
∂Σ(.)
∂K
< 0.
Σ(.)|K=K = −
32(d− 4)2(d− 1)7d5(d+ 1)5(d2 − 2d− 4)(d3 + 2d2 − 4)2
(d− 2)6(d+ 2)2
< 0⇒ Σ(.) < 0.
⇒ πE/ER − π
E/N
R > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.1.
In order to prove this proposition it is sufficient to show that there exist param-
eters d and K satisfying equilibrium conditions.
(i) Both manufacturers do not adopt exclusive retailing.
π
N/N
Mi /πE/NMi > 1 & π
N/E
Mi /πE/EMi > 1
The later condition assures that the type (i) equilibrium is unique. Suppose d =
0.85 and K = 1.8. As can be easily shown, these values satisfy the conditions
above. Hence, the N/N distribution system constitutes an unique equilibrium.
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M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.110, 0.110 0.060, 0.122
Non-exclusivity 0.122, 0.060 0.061, 0.061
(ii) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other manufacturer does
not adopt exclusive retailing.
π
E/N
Mi /πN/NMi > 1 & π
N/E
Mi /πE/EMi > 1
The later condition assures that the second manufacturer is not willing to adopt
exclusivity if the first one has done so. Suppose that d = 0.85 and K = 1.2. As
can be easily shown, these values satisfy the conditions above. Hence, there are
two identical asymmetric equilibria of type E/N given the values for d and K.
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.125, 0.125 0.065, 0.126
Non-exclusivity 0.126, 0.065 0.061, 0.061
(iii) Both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing.
π
E/E
Mi /πN/EMi > 1 & π
E/N
Mi /πN/NMi > 1
The later condition assures that the type (iii) equilibrium is unique. Suppose that
d = 0.85 and K = 0.6. As can be easily shown, these values satisfy the conditions
above. Hence, the E/E distribution system constitutes an unique equilibrium.
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.202, 0.202 0.086, 0.143
Non-exclusivity 0.143, 0.086 0.061, 0.061
It remains to be shown that for some parameter combinations there exist multiple
equilibria of type (i) and (iii).
Thus,πN/NMi /πE/NMi > 1 & π
E/E
Mi /πN/EMi > 1
Suppose d = 0.5 and K = 1. As can be easily shown, these values satisfy the
conditions above:
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.237, 0.237 0.142, 0.226
Non-exclusivity 0.226, 0.142 0.148, 0.148
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1.5.1.
The proof consists of two steps:
(i) The N/N-equilibrium occurs if and only if both firms have no incentive to
adopt exclusivity if their competitor has not done so. The profits in the N/N
regime remain the same as in the symmetric case as no investment occurs and
so, investment costs are irrelevant for the manufacturers’ profits. Moreover, the
profits in the E/N regime (i.e. the more efficient firm adopts exclusivity) do not
change either as only the more efficient firm invests and its investment costs remain
equal to the symmetric case. Thus, the incentive of the more efficient firm not
to adopt exclusivity if its competitor has not done so, remain unchanged. In
addition, the profits in the N/E regime (i.e. less efficient firm adopts exclusivity)
are due to a smaller investment effect (i.e. higher investment cost) lower than in
the E/N regime. Therefore, if it is not profitable for the more efficient firm to
adopt exclusivity, neither it is efficient for the less efficient manufacturer. Hence,
the situation is equal to the symmetric case. Q.E.D.
(ii) The E/N- equilibrium occurs when the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. Manufacturer 1 has an incentive to adopt exclusivity when its competitor has
not adopted it yet.
2. Manufacturer 2 has incentives not to adopt exclusivity when its competitor
has adopted it.
We have seen in (i) that the first incentive is the same in both the symmetric and
the asymmetric case. Thus, we have to show that the incentive in 2. is larger in
the asymmetric than in symmetric case. Hence, it is sufficient to show that πE/EM2 is
lower in the asymmetric than in the symmetric case. Note that the double markup
effect as well as the competition softening effect are equal in both cases. The
investment effect is smaller, the larger the investment costs are. As manufacturer
2 has larger investment cost in the asymmetric case, its profit is smaller in this
case than in the symmetric case.
The argument follows in algebraic form:
Let the investment costs of retailer 1 and retailer 2 beK(θ
2
11
2 +
θ212
2 )and (K+∆)(
θ211
2 +
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θ212
2 ), respectively. We want to show that π
E/E
M2 is a decreasing in ∆:
π
E/E
M2 =
(2 + d)G(K, d)M(K,∆, d)[P (K,∆, d)]2
(2− d)(1 + d)Q(K,∆, d)[R(K,∆, d)]2
We already know that G(K, d) > 0 ∀d ∈ (0, 1) ∧K > 4−4d28−4d−2d2+d3
⇒ sgn(
∂π
E/E
M2 (K,∆, d)
∂∆
) = sgn(
∂(M(K,∆, d)[P (K,∆, d)]2/Q(K,∆, d)[R(K,∆, d)]2)
∂∆
)
Therefore, we have to determine the sign of
∂
[
M(K,∆, d)[P (K,∆, d)]2
]
∂∆
Q(K,∆, d)[R(K,∆, d)]2 −
∂
[
Q(K,∆, d)[R(K,∆, d)]2
]
∂∆
M(K,∆, d)[P (K,∆, d)]2.
If this term is negative, the profit of the second manufacturer decreases when ∆
increases. We can rewrite this term as: 8(−1 + d)2(1 + d)P (.)R(.)Z(K,∆, d)
First, we examine the sign of P (d,K,∆):
∂P (.)
∂∆ = 32− 48d
2 + 4d3 + 16d4 − 4d5 +K[(−4 + d2)2(−4− d+ 2d2)]⇒ ∂P (.)
∂∆∂K = (−4 + d
2)2(−4− d+ 2d2) < 0
∂P (.)
∂∆ |K=K = −4(−1 + d)d(1 + d)(−6− d+ 3d
2) < 0⇒ ∂P (.)
∂∆ < 0 ∀∆
P (.)|∆=0 = −16 + 32d2 − 16d4 + 64K + 8dK − 92d2K − 4d3K + 28d4K − 4d5K − 64K2 − 16dK2 + 64d2K2 + 8d3K2 −
20d4K2 − d5K2 + 2d6K2
∂P2(.)|∆=0
∂K2
= 2(−2 + d)2(2 + d)2(−4− d+ 2d2) < 0
∂P (.)|∆=0
∂K
|K=K= −4(−1 + d)d(1 + d)(−10− d+ 5d2) < 0⇒ ∂P (.)|∆=0∂K < 0
[P (.)|∆=0]|K=K =
32(−1+d)3d2(1+d)2
(−2+d)2(2+d) < 0⇒ P (.)|∆=0 < 0⇒ P (.) < 0 for any d, K, ∆ from our domain of definition.
Second, we examine the sign of R(d,K,∆).
∂R(.)
∂∆ = 32− 52d
2 + 20d4 +K[(−2 + d)(2 + d)(−4− d+ 2d2)(−4 + d+ 2d2)]
⇒ ∂R(.)
∂∆∂K = (−2 + d)(2 + d)(−4− d+ 2d
2)(−4 + d+ 2d2) < 0
∂R(.)
∂∆ |K=K = −
4(−1+d)2d(1+d)(−8−d+4d2)
−2+d < 0⇒
∂R(.)
∂∆ < 0 ∀∆
R(.)|∆=0 = (−4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K)J(.)
⇒ sgn[R(d,K,∆)|∆=K ] = −sgn[−4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K]
∂(−4+4d2+8K−2dK−5d2K+2d3K)
∂K
= 8 − 2d − 5d2 + 2d3 > 0 ∧ (−4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K)|K=K =
− 4(−1+d)
2d(1+d)
(−2+d)(2+d) > 0
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⇒ −4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K > 0⇒ R(.) < 0 for any d, K, ∆ from our domain of definition.
In order to complete the proof, we have to show that Z(d,K,∆) is always negative:
∂2Z(.)
∂∆ = 2(d− 2)X(d, k)
∂3X(.)
∂K3
= 6(−2 + d)3(2 + d)4(−4− d+ 2d2)(16− 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) > 0
∂2X(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −4(−2 + d)(−1 + d)[−21d4 − 3(1− d)d4 + (1− d2)(−224 + 72d+ 80d2 − 37d3 − 4d4)]d(1 + d)(2 + d)3 >
0⇒ ∂
2X(.)
∂K2
> 0
∂X(.)
∂K
|K=K = 16(−1+d)
2d2(1+d)2(2+d)(−128+42d+181d2−52d3−72d4+16d5+7d6)
−2+d > 0⇒
∂X(.)
∂K
> 0
X(.)|K=K = − 32(−1+d)
4d3(1+d)3(48+10d−45d2−3d3+10d4)
(−2+d)3 > 0⇒ X(.) > 0⇒
∂2Z(.)
∂∆ < 0 for any ∆
∂Z(.)
∂∆ |∆=0 = 2(−4 + 4d
2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K)Ξ(K, d)
We have already shown that (−4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K) > 0.
Thus, sgn[∂Z(d,K,∆)∂∆ |∆=K ] = sgn[Ξ(K, d)]
∂3Ξ(.)
∂K3
= 6(−2 + d)3(2 + d)4(16− 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) < 0
∂2Ξ(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −4(−2 + d)(−1 + d)d(1 + d)(2 + d)2(128− 2d− 127d2 + 2d3 + 28d4 + 2d5) < 0⇒ ∂
2Ξ(.)
∂K2
< 0
∂Ξ(.)
∂K
|K=K = 4(−1+d)
2d2(1+d)2(2+d)(156−80d−129d2+51d3+16d4)
−2+d < 0⇒
∂Ξ(.)
∂K
< 0
Ξ(.)|K=K = − 48(−1+d)
4d3(1+d)3(−10−d+5d2)
(−2+d)3 < 0⇒ Ξ(.) < 0⇒
∂Z(.)
∂∆ |∆=0 < 0⇒
∂Z(.)
∂∆ < 0
Z(.)|∆=0 = Ω(d,K)I(d,K)(−4 + 4d2 + 8K − 2dK − 5d2K + 2d3K)
We have already shown that I(.) < 0 and −4+4d2 +8K−2dK−5d2K+2d3K > 0.
Therefore, sgn[Z(d,K,∆)|∆=0] = −sgn[Ω(d,K)]
∂3Ω(.)
∂K3
= 6(−2 + d)2(2 + d)2(16− 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) > 0
∂2Ω(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −4(−1 + d)d(1 + d)(2 + d)(48− 28d− 33d2 + 18d3 + 2d4) > 0⇒ ∂
2Ω(.)
∂K2
> 0
∂Ω(.)
∂K
|K=K = 48(−1+d)
3d2(1+d)2(−3+d+d2)
(−2+d)2 > 0⇒
∂Ω(.)
∂K
> 0
Ω(.)|K=K = − 96(−1+d)
5d3(1+d)3
(−2+d)4(2+d) > 0⇒ Ω(.) > 0⇒ Z(.)|∆=0 < 0⇒ Z(.) < 0
⇒
∂π
E/E
M2
∂∆ < 0 for any d, K, ∆ from our domain of definition.
Q.E.D
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Proof of Proposition 1.6.1.
This proof consists of three parts:
1. We show that under K < K̃ = 4(3+d)−2d
2(5+d)+2(1+d)
√
4(3+d)−2d2(5+d)+2(1+d)
(4−d2)2
consumer surplus in E/E is larger than in N/N.
2. We show that under this condition consumer surplus in E/E is always larger
than in E/N.
3. We show that under this condition there exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
ad 1. Note that both E/E and E/N are symmetric. Thus, the consumer surplus
in the E/E regime is larger than in the N/N regime if the quantity under E/E is
larger than under N/N. This is the case if the following condition holds:
(−1+d)(16+16d−16d2−16d3−48K−40dK+32d2K+28d3K+4d4K+32K2+16dK2−16d2K2−8d3K2+2d4K2+d5K2)
(−2+d)(1+d)H(.)J(.) > 0
⇔ K2(32 + 16d− 16d2 − 8d3 + 2d4 + d5) +K(−48− 40d+ 32d2 + 28d3 + 4d4) + 16 + 16d− 16d2 − 16d3 < 0
under consideration of SOC (K > K) by solving this inequality we get: K < K̃.
Q.E.D.
ad 2. Note that the investment effect on consumer surplus is stronger in E/E
than in E/N. This can be explained by reciprocal investment in marketing of both
brands. Moreover, the effect of K on consumer surplus is stronger in E/E case
than in E/N case since in E/N case only exclusive retailer invests and therefore
K directly affects the quantity of the exclusive brand but indirectly the quantity
of the non-exclusive brand (via product differentiation). In the E/E regime both
quantities are affected directly. In other words, the difference between consumer
surplus in these two regimes is increasing in K. We can show this statement using
some simple algebra:
∂(CSE/E(d,K)−CSE/N (d,K))
∂K
= − (1−d)χ(d,K)[A(d,K)]3[D(d,K)]3[H(d,K)]3[J(d,K)]3
⇒ ∂(CS
E/E(d,K)−CSE/N (d,K))
∂K
< 0⇔ χ(.) < 0
∂χ10(.)
∂K10
= −9747 + 8559d+
(
1− d2
)
(−5130 + (1− d) (−62703 + (1− d) (−145710d7 − 57577d10 − 20831d11 + 8494d12
+1260d13 − 520d14 − 166202
(
1− d5
)
+
(
1− d2
) (
−145797d2 − 194182d3 + 88872d5 − 114319d6 − 142582d7
)
+ (1− d)
(
−18362− 382381d3 + 360000d5 − 103273d7
)
))) < 0
∂9χ(.)
∂K9
|K=K = 362880 (−1 + d) (2 + d)4 (1048576 + 7864320d− 10158080d2 − 11206656d3 + 18980864d4 − 20746240d5
−3653632d6 + 64204800d7 − 24083200d8 − 67990528d9 + 31040832d10 + 38386848d11 − 18019808d12
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−12651200d13 + 5740476d14 + 2509294d15 − 1033931d16 − 320648d17 + 105389d18 + 31118d19 − 6804d20
−1944d21 + 384d22)
Sturm’s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂9χ(.)
∂K9
< 0
∂8χ(.)
∂K8
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)2
120960(−1 + d)2d(1 + d)(2 + d)3(−7340032− 30146560d+ 57016320d2 + 42270720d3
−76464128d4 + 35938304d5 − 32413696d6 − 112777216d7 + 148110336d8 + 98087168d9
−137400192d10 − 44632320d11 + 63497024d12 + 12731248d13 − 16717568d14 − 2679720d15
+2717456d16 + 442294d17 − 302807d18 − 48374d19 + 21419d20 + 2998d21 − 564d22 − 216d23
+32d24)
Sturm’s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂8χ(.)
∂K8
< 0
∂7χ(.)
∂K7
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)4
5040(−1 + d)3d2(1 + d)2(2 + d)2(208666624 + 523239424d− 1431044096d2
−649723904d3 + 1702133760d4 − 2441216d5 + 567300096d6 + 97677312d7 − 2405477376d8
+223821312d9 + 1969144832d10 − 206317312d11 − 826604608d12 + 54924128d13 + 211237872d14
−3415200d15 − 35656848d16 − 421884d17 + 3995722d18 + 152135d19 − 291579d20 − 26497d21
+16876d22 + 345d23 − 154d24 − 68d25 + 8d26)
Sturm’s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂7χ(.)
∂K7
< 0
∂6χ(.)
∂K6
|K=K = −
1
(−2 + d)6
720(−1 + d)4d3(1 + d)3(2 + d)(1148190720 + 1623719936d− 6943670272d2 − 1522401280d3
+8220934144d4 + 2014773248d5 − 774782976d6 − 5065863168d7 − 4622747648d8 + 5247410176d9
+4049376256d10 − 2562309888d11 − 1816873216d12 + 678837248d13 + 503555264d14 − 110289440d15
−86226880d16 + 11722352d17 + 9880928d18 − 858008d19 − 795262d20 + 56696d21 + 32777d22
+1211d23 − 1726d24 + 100d25 + 8d26)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂6χ(.)
∂K6
< 0
∂5χ(.)
∂K5
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)8
1440(−1 + d)5d4(1 + d)4(332922880 + 199491584d− 1760821248d2 − 36962304d3
+2259894272d4 + 627998720d5 − 1291350016d6 − 1559681024d7 + 308211712d8 + 1385933824d9
+129782016d10 − 645355392d11 − 145858112d12 + 179201344d13 + 52903040d14 − 30329632d15
−10084800d16 + 3458848d17 + 1137880d18 − 285658d19 − 81390d20 + 16299d21 + 4552d22
−1041d23 − 26d24 + 12d25)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂5χ(.)
∂K5
< 0
∂4χ(.)
∂K4
|K=K = −
1
(−2 + d)10(2 + d)
192(−1 + d)6d5(1 + d)5(1132986368− 16515072d− 5268635648d2
+867237888d3 + 7730397184d4 + 1038114816d5 − 6994022400d6 − 3360485376d7
+4043362304d8 + 3117941248d9 − 1270275584d10 − 1575115008d11 + 145991296d12
+462831872d13 + 29444576d14 − 81874432d15 − 11125552d16 + 9191840d17 + 1427988d18
−720396d19 − 73314d20 + 35772d21 + 578d22 − 869d23 + 78d24 − 8d25 + d26)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
⇒
∂4χ(.)
∂K4
< 0
∂3χ(.)
∂K3
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)12(2 + d)2
192(−1 + d)7d6(1 + d)6(418643968− 196476928d− 1758494720d2
+647462912d3 + 2949898240d4 − 332296192d5 − 3090866176d6 − 306096128d7
+1992954368d8 + 565802240d9 − 791036288d10 − 362372608d11 + 180364800d12
+123434784d13 − 20026032d14 − 23989320d15 + 364488d16 + 2810316d17 + 119628d18
−186354d19 − 17010d20 + 8591d21 + 172d22 + 56d23 − 63d24 + 6d25)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
⇒
∂3χ(.)
∂K3
< 0
∂2χ(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −
1
(−2 + d)14(2 + d)3
768(−4 + d)(−1 + d)9d7(1 + d)8(−4− 2d+ d2)(−4 + 2d2 + d3)
(507904− 532480d− 933888d2 + 761344d3 + 909312d4 − 431360d5 − 495936d6
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+82240d7 + 150576d8 + 5712d9 − 21104d10 − 4340d11 + 2044d12 + 242d13
−13d14 − 32d15 + 4d16)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂2χ(.)
∂K2
< 0
∂χ(.)
∂K
|K=K =
512(−4 + d)2(−1 + d)11d8(1 + d)9(−4− 2d+ d2)2(−4 + 2d2 + d3)2
(−2 + d)16(2 + d)4
[53d4 + 12d5 + 10d8 + (1− d)(1728− 584d2) + 41d4(1− d3)
+(1− d2)(1472− 1224d2 + 90d4)] < 0⇒
∂χ(.)
∂K
< 0
χ(.)|K=K = −
6144(−4 + d)3(−1 + d)13d9(1 + d)10(−4− 2d+ d2)3(−4 + 2d2 + d3)3
(−2 + d)18(2 + d)5
< 0
⇒ χ(.) < 0
⇒ ∂(CS
E/E(d,K)−CSE/N (d,K))
∂K
< 0 for any d, K from our domain of definition.
Using these results, we can prove the original statement: If consumer surplus under
E/E is larger than under N/N, the same logic also applies to size of the consumer
surplus under E/N. We know that the consumer surplus is larger under E/E than
under N/N if K is sufficiently small (see the condition above). In addition, we
divide our parameter space into two subspaces:
i. 0 < d < 0.5
ii. 0.5 ≤ d < 1
ad i. Suppose that K = 1 + d/2. Moreover, note that:
K̃ < 1 + d2 ⇔ 0 < 32d
2 + 48d3 + 24d4 − 20d5 − 8d6 − 2d7 − d8 + d9 + d
10
4 for d ∈ (0, 0.5)
(CSE/E − CSE/N )|K=1+d/2 = −
(−1 + d)d2
8(1 + d)(1 + d+ d2)2(−4− 2d+ d2 + 2d3)2(8 + d4)2(−8− 12d+ 9d3 + 2d4)2
(32768 + 262144d+ 843776d2 + 1236992d3 + 65536d4 − 2930688d5 − 5085184d6
−3376128d7 + 1018880d8 + 3631872d9 + 2476224d10 − 12800d11 − 1026432d12
−530624d13 + 75048d14 + 176824d15 + 50584d16 − 18520d17 − 16249d18
−3812d19 + 32d20 + 144d21 + 16d22))
Sturm′s Theorem
> 0
Remember that this difference is decreasing in K. Thus, CSE/E > CSE/N
for d between 0 and 1/2 and K < 1 + d/2.
ad ii. Suppose now that K = 3/2− d/2. Moreover, note:
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K̃ < 32 −
d
2 ⇔ 0
Sturm’s Theorem
< 128− 320d+ 96d2 + 240d3 − 76d4 − 96d5 + 22d6 + 20d7 − 15d
8
4 −
3d9
2 +
d10
4
(CSE/E − CSE/N )|K=3/2−d/2 =
(1− d)
8
(−2 + d)−2(1 + d)−1(2− d+ d2)−2(−8− 3d+ 3d2 + 2d3)−2
(−16 + 20d− 6d2 − 5d3 + d4)−2(−16 + 8d+ 5d2 − 5d3 + 2d4)−2
(−29360128 + 103809024d− 50135040d2 − 166428672d3
+177827840d4 + 95567872d5 − 206496768d6 + 7089664d7 + 143738048d8 − 62955392d9
−56805760d10 + 56995824d11 + 2648800d12 − 25435624d13 + 9554739d14 + 4915108d15
−4818244d16 + 417792d17 + 992954d18 − 407896d19 − 41316d20 + 68536d21 − 14853d22
−2044d23 + 1552d24 − 272d25 + 16d26)
Sturm′s Theorem
> 0
Remember that this difference is decreasing in K. Thus, CSE/E > CSE/N
for d between 1/2 and 1 and K < 3/2− d/2. Q.E.D
ad 3. We have already shown that if the above mentioned condition is binding,
the consumer surplus under N/N is larger than under E/N. Now, we show
that there exists no asymmetric equilibrium under this condition.
First, consider the incentives of a manufacturer to adopt exclusivity if the
competing manufacturer one has not adopted exclusivity. These incentives
are the stronger the smaller K is. In order to see that, note that K does
not affect the profit in the N/N regime. However, it negatively influences
the profit in the E/N regime. Thus, the difference between profits in both
regimes is decreasing in K. Second, consider the incentives of a manufacturer
to adopt exclusivity if the competing manufacturer has adopted exclusivity.
These incentives are stronger the smaller K is as the impact of K on profits
under E/E is direct as well as indirect while in E/N regime only indirect.
Thus, the difference between the manufacturer profit of the non-exclusive
brand in E/N and the manufacturer profit under E/E is increasing in K. The
algebraic proof is given here:
∂(πE/N1 −π
N/N
1 )
∂K
= (−1+d)
2C(.)
[A(.)]2[D(.)]3 (−8−4d+18d
2+9d3−12d4−6d5+2d6+d7+32K+16dK−46d2K−17d3K+17d4K+d5K−3d6K−
32K2−16dK2+20d2K2−2d3K2−9d4K2)
Consider now the second derivative of the last term in the product above with
respect to K:
−64− 32d+ 40d2 − 4d3 − 18d4 < 0
By evaluating of first derivative at K’s lower bound we get:
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− (−1+d)d(1+d)(−128−80d+32d
2−24d4−7d5+3d6)
(−2+d)2(2+d) < 0
Thus, the first derivative is negative for allK’s. In other words, the expression
is decreasing in K. We evaluate this expression at the lower bound of K:
(−1+d)2d2(1+d)2(−128−96d−48d2+4d4−4d5−2d6+d7)
(−2+d)4(2+d)2 < 0
Thus, the incentives to adopt exclusivity, if the competitor has not adopted
exclusivity, is decreasing in K.
The impact of K on the incentives not to adopt exclusivity when the other
one has adopted it is given by:
∂(πE/N2 −π
E/E
2 )
∂K
= (1−d)
2$(d,K)
(2−d)[A(d,K)]2[D(d,K)]3[H(d,K)]3J(d,K)]3 ⇒
∂(πE/N2 −π
E/E
2 )
∂K
> 0⇔ $(.) < 0
∂8$(.)
∂K8
= 40320(−2 + d)2(2 + d)4(−131072 + 98304d+ 311296d2 − 307200d3 − 227328d4 + 403456d5
−23552d6 − 292288d7 + 125632d8 + 128384d9 − 75968d10 − 34584d11 + 21200d12 + 5165d13
−2914d14 − 292d15 + 168d16)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
∂7$(.)
∂K7
|K=K = 5040(−1 + d)d(1 + d)(2 + d)3(2490368− 2228224d− 4980736d2 + 5406720d3 + 2267136d4
−5056512d5 + 2019328d6 + 2285568d7 − 2754176d8 − 545088d9 + 1315264d10 + 101360d11
−315416d12 − 26708d13 + 40218d14 + 5127d15 − 3190d16 − 428d17 + 152d18)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
⇒
∂7$(.)
∂K7
< 0
∂6$(.)
∂K6
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)2
720(−1 + d)2d2(1 + d)2(2 + d)2(−20185088 + 20643840d+ 34832384d2 − 38346752d3
−12771328d4 + 21049344d5 − 12476416d6 + 1000960d7 + 14889216d8 − 4535936d9 − 7092288d10
+1371344d11 + 1910096d12 − 113332d13 − 300544d14 − 4376d15 + 27280d16 + 1855d17 − 1334d18
−204d19 + 56d20)
Sturm′s Theorem
> 0⇒
∂6$(.)
∂K6
> 0
∂5$(.)
∂K5
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)4
120(−1 + d)3d3(1 + d)3(2 + d)(92274688− 104857600d− 145457152d2 + 154927104d3
+76447744d4 − 42135552d5 − 5560320d6 − 44448768d7 − 18159616d8 + 36814848d9 + 14847104d10
−11526656d11 − 5530688d12 + 1817520d13 + 1038472d14 − 148612d15 − 116292d16 + 5176d17 + 7974d18
−51d19 − 210d20 − 36d21 + 8d22)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂5$(.)
∂K5
< 0
∂4$(.)
∂K4
|K=K = −
1
(−2 + d)6
96(−1 + d)4d4(1 + d)4(65536000− 81166336d− 102531072d2 + 108441600d3
+86843392d4 − 30713856d5 − 55618560d6 − 25549824d7 + 19732992d8 + 24935744d9
−1266560d10 − 9296064d11 − 1178128d12 + 1773000d13 + 370332d14 − 208484d15 − 49628d16
+15309d17 + 3837d18 − 641d19 − 216d20 + 36d21)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂4$(.)
∂K4
< 0
∂3$(.)
∂K3
|K=K =
1
(−2 + d)8(2 + d)
24(−1 + d)5d5(1 + d)5(119013376− 158990336d− 198967296d2
+229949440d3 + 221495296d4 − 126754816d5 − 170844160d6 + 9434112d7 + 79060992d8
+25422080d9 − 20823424d10 − 13156992d11 + 2726944d12 + 3030064d13 − 199664d14
−388688d15 + 6936d16 + 33292d17 − 1294d18 − 1649d19 + 200d20 + 2d21)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
⇒
∂3$(.)
∂K3
< 0
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∂2$(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −
1
(−2 + d)10(2 + d)2
32(−1 + d)6d6(1 + d)6(33816576− 48726016d− 62046208d2 + 85196800d3
+73228288d4 − 68294656d5 − 56822784d6 + 25639680d7 + 29120256d8 − 2739648d9 − 9091136d10
−1166048d11 + 1740272d12 + 395040d13 − 217696d14 − 52732d15 + 21940d16 + 1758d17 − 1031d18
+37d19 + 8d20)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0⇒
∂2$(.)
∂K2
< 0
∂$(.)
∂K
|K=K =
384(−4 + d)2(−1 + d)8d7(1 + d)7(−4− 2d+ d2)(−4 + 2d2 + d3)2
(−2 + d)12(2 + d)3
(896− 512d
−960d2 + 256d3 + 392d4 − 28d5 − 24d6 − 7d7 + 2d8) < 0⇒
∂$(.)
∂K
< 0
$(.)|K=K = −
1536(−4 + d)3(−1 + d)10d8(1 + d)8(−4− 2d+ d2)2(−4 + 2d2 + d3)3
(−2 + d)14(2 + d)4)
< 0
⇒ $(.) < 0for any d, K from our domain of definition.
Therefore, the difference between the profit of the non-exclusive manufacturer
in the E/N regime and the profit of the manufacturer in the E/E regime is
increasing in K.
In order to complete the non-existence proof we divide our parameter space into
three subspaces:
• Consider the case where d is smaller than 0.5. In addition, suppose that
K = 1.
1 < K̃ ⇔ 0 < −(−2 + d)2d(2 + d)(−8 + 4d2 + 6d3 + d4)
The incentive of manufacturer 1 to adopt exclusivity if its competitor has
not done so is given by:
(−1 + d)d2(8− 8d− d2 − 2d3 − 7d4 + 2d5 + d8)
(−2 + d)2(1 + d)(−2 + d2)2(1 + d2)(2 + d2)2
< 0
From the previous analysis we know that this difference is decreasing in K.
Therefore, for d < 0.5 and K > 1 there exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
Consider now the incentives not to adopt exclusivity if competitor has done
so:
(−1+d)d2
(−2+d)(1+d)(−2+d2)2(1+d2)(2+d2)2(4−4d+2d2+d3)(−4−2d+d2+2d3)2 (−128 − 320d − 32d
2 + 464d3 + 592d4 + 64d5 −
436d6 − 536d7 −
228d8 + 160d9 + 232d10 + 92d11 − 15d12 − 32d13 − 13d14 + d16)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
Thus, no positive incentive to adopt ER exists. From the previous analysis
we know that this difference is increasing in K. Therefore, for d < 0.5 and
K < 1 there exists no asymmetric equilibrium. In other words, if d is smaller
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than 0.5, there is no asymmetric equilibrium.
• Consider now the second subsection, where 0.5 ≤ d < 0.75. In addition,
suppose that K = 1 + d/10
1+
d
10
< K̃ ⇔ 0
Sturm′s Theorem
< −
1
100
(−2+d)2d(2+d)(−640−48d+416d2+704d3+172d4+22d5+d6)∀d ∈ [0.5, 0.75)
The incentive of manufacturer 1 to adopt exclusivity if its competitor has
not done so is given by:
(−1 + d)d(1600 + 8640d− 4736d2 − 4360d3 − 6596d4 − 7406d5 + 674d6 + 748d7 + 1119d8 + 1000d9)
2(−2 + d)2(1 + d)(5 + d+ 5d2)(−40− 8d+ 5d3 + 10d4)2
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
From the previous analysis we know that this difference is decreasing in K.
Therefore, for 0.5 ≤ d < 0.75 and K > 1 + d/10 there exists no asymmetric
equilibrium.
Consider now the incentives not to adopt exclusivity if competitor has adopted
ER:
(−1+d)d
2(−2+d)(1+d)(5+d+5d2)(40−32d+16d2+8d3+d4)(−40−28d+8d2+25d3+2d4)2(−40−8d+5d3+10d4)2
(51200000−304640000d2−334080000d3 +274764800d4 +899090944d5 +540852224d6−453013376d7−1044911360d8
− 673223392d9 + 121484528d10 + 486807040d11 + 306455472d12 + 21145876d13 − 81353138d14 − 48840906d15 −
6462016d16
+ 3835231d17 + 1490522d18 + 221176d19 + 15240d20 + 400d21)
Sturm′s Theorem
< 0
From the previous analysis we know that this difference is increasing in K.
Therefore, for d between 0.5 and 0.75 and K < 1 + d/10 there exists no
asymmetric equilibrium.
In sum there exists no asymmetric equilibrium if d is smaller than 0.75.
• Finally, consider the last subsection, where 0.75 ≤ d < 1. In addition, suppose
that K = 1408/1000− 408d/1000.
176
125 −
51d
125 > K̃ ⇒
1
15625 (−2 + d)
2(2 + d)(185232− 402848d+ 9384d2 + 243040d3 + 73452d4 − 51236d5 − 12750d6 +
2601d7)
Sturm′s Theorem
> 0
Consider now the incentives to not adopt exclusivity if competitor has adopted
it:
− −1+d(−2+d)(1+d)(227−102d+125d2)(−908+1112d−352d2−278d3+51d4)(908−56d−482d2−97d3+102d4)2(−908+408d+255d2−255d3+125d4)2
(15738720504451584−31026772800625920d−16508458186889600d2 +57675869217678016d3 +823226689552768d4−
48456960603325984d5 + 16259005070184112d6 + 14133753170213392d7 − 16350914893485352d8 +
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6309091534897108d9+5541810617834892d10−5959840533879032d11+409043007808180d12+1641500886532907d13−
911172926276052d14 − 41892114047363d15 + 352649497192055d16 − 105007538527782d17 − 75443462220731d18 +
35466154432341d19 + 4900095065961d20 − 3980342487375d21 + 422825062500d22)
Sturm T.
< 0
From the previous analysis we know that this difference is increasing in K.
Therefore, for d between 0.75 and 1 and K < 1408/1000 − 408d/1000 there
exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
Thus, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium for K < K̃. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 1.6.2.
This proof consists of four parts:
1. We show that social welfare in E/N as well as in E/E is a decreasing function
of K
2. We determine a condition under which welfare increases with exclusivity
3. We show that there exist both E/E and E/N equilibria under this condition.
4. We show that for exclusive retailing to be welfare enhancing, retail investment
must be more cost efficient the weaker the competition is.
ad 1. The intuition behind this proof is simple. Consider that only the investment
effect depends on the cost of investment. Moreover, the investment effect has
always a positive impact on welfare. Since this effect is stronger the smaller K is,
welfare under both regimes is decreasing in K. This can also be shown algebraicly:
First, consider welfare in the E/N regime: We have already shown that consumer
surplus as well as profits of the exclusive manufacturer are decreasing in K. Note,
that the profit of the exclusive retailer is also decreasing in K. Thus, we only have
to show that the profit of the non-exclusive manufacturer is decreasing in K:
∂π
E/N
M2
∂K
= (1−d)
2dE(.)υ(.)
[A(.)]2[D(.)]3 with
∂2υ(.)
∂K2
= 64 + 32d− 48d2 − 8d3 + 14d4 > 0
∂υ(.)
∂K
|K=K =
2(−1+d)d(1+d)(−4−2d+d2)(16−4d−6d2+d3+2d4)
(−2+d)2(2+d) > 0⇒
∂υ(.)
∂K
> 0
υ(.)|K=K =
(−1+d)2d2(1+d)2G(.)(128−112d2−16d3+64d4+12d5−12d6−2d7+d8)
(−2+d)4(2+d)2 > 0⇒ υ(.) > 0 for any d, K from our domain
of definition.
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Thus, the profit of the non-exclusive manufacturer is decreasing in K and so the
welfare is decreasing in K under E/N.
Now consider welfare in the E/E regime. We have already shown that consumer
surplus as well as manufacturer profits are decreasing in K.
Therefore, it remains to be shown that the retailer profit also decreases in K:
∂π
E/E
R
∂K
= − 8(1−d)
2(1+d)G(.)τ(.)
[G(.)]3[J(.)]3 with
∂3τ(.)
∂K3
= −3072 + 2304d+ 3840d2 − 2496d3 − 2112d4 + 1008d5 + 624d6 − 180d7 − 96d8 + 12d9 + 6d10 < 0
∂2τ(.)
∂K2
|K=K = −8(−2 + d)(−1 + d)d(2 + d)2(14− 5d− 17d2 + 4d3 + 5d4) < 0⇒ ∂
2τ(.)
∂K2
< 0
∂τ(.)
∂K
|K=K =
16(−1+d)3d2(1+d)(2+d)(−11+2d+7d2)
−2+d < 0⇒
∂τ(.)
∂K
< 0
τ(.)|K=K = − 192(−1+d)
5d3(1+d)2
(−2+d)3 < 0⇒ τ(.) < 0 for any d, K from our domain of definition.
Thus, the profit of the retailer is decreasing in K and so the welfare in E/E is
decreasing in K.
ad 2. Consider the difference between welfare in E/N and N/N:
TSE/N − TSN/N = (d−1)S(d,K)2(2−d)2(1+d)[A(.)]2[D(.)]2 > 0⇔ S(d,K) < 0 with
S(.) = 48+32d−200d2−112d3+331d4+146d5−275d6−86d7+119d8+22d9−25d10−2d11+2d12−336K−176dK+1104d2K+
468d3K − 1371d4K − 426d5K + 787d6K + 152d7K − 195d8K − 18d9K + 9d10K + 2d12K + 848K2 + 288dK2− 2068d2K2−
492d3K2 +1736d4K2 +234d5K2−534d6K2−26d7K2 +d8K2−4d9K2 +17d10K2−896K3−64dK3 +1472d2K3−56d3K3−
644d4K3 + 82d5K3−39d6K3−22d7K3 + 47d8K3 + 320K4−128dK4−304d2K4 + 128d3K4−20d4K4−40d5K4 + 45d6K4
The implicit function S(d,K) is the threshold between the meshed and the non-
meshed region in Figure 1.5. We have to show that under this condition welfare is
increasing with exclusivity when both manufacturers adopt exclusivity. Consider
therefore the difference between welfare in E/E and N/N:
TSE/E − TSN/N = (d−1)T (d,K)(2−d)2(1+d)[H(.)]2[J(.)]2 > 0⇔ T (d,K) < 0 with
T (.) = 768+256d−2816d2−768d3 +3840d4 +768d5−2304d6−256d7 +512d8−5376K−1280dK+16896d2K+3328d3K−
19200d4K − 3072d5K + 9216d6K + 1280d7K − 1536d8K − 256d9K + 13568K2 + 1280dK2 − 36288d2K2 − 3072d3K2 +
34816d4K2 +3456d5K2−14384d6K2−2096d7K2 +2352d8K2 +432d9K2−64d10K2−14336K3 +2048dK3 +32256d2K3−
3200d3K3 − 27008d4K3 + 448d5K3 + 10784d6K3 + 760d7K3 − 2064d8K3 − 304d9K3 + 152d10K3 + 32d11K3 + 5120K4 −
3072dK4 − 9472d2K4 + 4352d3K4 + 7296d4K4 − 2432d5K4 − 2976d6K4 + 672d7K4 + 676d8K4 − 92d9K4 − 81d10K4 +
5d11K4 + 4d12K4
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In order to show that the first condition is stronger than the second, it is sufficient
to find such K for which the following condition is satisfied:
∀d ∈ (0, 1) : S(.) > 0 ∧ T (.) < 0
Hence, we divide our parameter space into the following 7 subspaces, in each of
which we find a K satisfying the above-mentioned conditions. The subspaces with
the corresponding K’s can be found below.
1. d ∈ (0, 0.5) K = 910 +
√
21
10 +
117d
20 −
√
21d
2. d ∈ (0.5, 0.8) K = 13 +
10d
3
3. d ∈ (0.8, 0.9) K = − 575 + 18d
4. d ∈ (0.9, 0.95) K = −40 + 50d
5. d ∈ (0.95, 0.98) K = − 7853 +
850d
3
6. d ∈ (098, 0.99) K = −1158 + 1200d
7. d ∈ (0.99, 1) K = 981125− 1981000d+ 1000000d2
By inserting the values for K into T (.) and S(.) and by means of Sturm’s theorem,
we can show that T (.) < 0 and S(.) > 0.3 This implies that welfare is increasing
with exclusivity if investment is sufficiently efficient, i.e. S(d,K) < 0
ad 3. Welfare is increasing with exclusivity if and only if one or both manufacturers
are willing to adopt exclusivity. In order to prove this statement, it is sufficient to
find parameters d and K satisfying the equilibrium conditions.
(i) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other manufacturer does
not adopt exclusive retailing. πE/NMi /πN/NMi > 1 & π
N/E
Mi /πE/EMi > 1
Suppose that d = 0.85 and K = 1.2. As can be easily shown these values satisfy
the conditions above:
π
E/N
Mi /πN/NMi
.= 1.06
π
N/E
Mi /πE/EMi
.= 1.01
S(d,K) −149.11
3Note that these conditions are also satisfied for the endpoints of the intervals. The step-by-step proof
can be provided upon request.
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(ii) Both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing. πE/EMi /πN/EMi > 1 & π
E/N
Mi /πN/NMi > 1
Suppose that d = 0.85 and K = 0.6. As can be easily shown these values satisfy
the conditions above:
π
E/E
Mi /πN/EMi
.= 1.42
π
E/N
Mi /πN/NMi
.= 1.40
S(d,K) .= −14.44
ad 4. We have already shown that welfare under E/N is equal to welfare under E/E
if and only if S(.) = 0. By using the implicit function theorem we can determine
K ′(d):
K ′(d) = −
∂S(.)
∂d
∂S(.)
∂K
= U(d,K)V (d,K)
First, note that there is no K smaller than 1.1 satisfying S(.) = 0. Thus:
∂4U(.)
∂K4
= 3072 + 14592d− 9216d2 + 1920d3 + 4800d4 − 6480d5 > 0
∂3U(.)
∂K3
|K=1.1 = − 125
(
−1568 + 672d+ 3804d2 − 7320d3 − 1175d4 + 2385d5 − 385d6 + 940d7
) Sturm′s T.
> 0 ⇒ ∂
3U(.)
∂K3
>
0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
∂2U(.)
∂K2
|K=1.1 = − 225
(
−21312 + 29128d+ 18936d2 − 53440d3 + 26775d4 − 50400d5 − 17255d6 + 31220d7 − 900d8 + 4250d9
)
Sturm′s T.
> 0
⇒ ∂
2U(.)
∂K2
> 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
∂U(.)
∂K
|K=1.1 = 1250 (114048−139632d+102156d
2−4000d3−216875d4+434685d5−26145d6+44380d7+60300d8−116000d9
− 6000d11)
⇒ ∂U(.)
∂K
|K=1.1 > 0⇒ ∂U(.)∂K > 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
U(.)|K=1.1 = 428544−262656d+1194768d
2−740280d3−277950d4+1243935d5−716030d6+1269320d7+118800d8−273500d9+110000d10−252000d11
5000
⇒ U(.)|K=1.1 > 0⇒ U(.) > 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
Second, examine the sign of V (d,K) at the place where S(d,K) = 0:
V (.)|S(.)=0 > 0⇔ S(.)−
V (.)K
4 ≡W (.) < 0
∂3W (.)
∂K3
= −1344− 96d+ 2208d2 − 84d3 − 966d4 + 123d5 − 117d
6
2 − 33d
7 + 141d
8
2 < 0
∂2W (.)
∂K2
|K=1.1 = 120 (1+d)
(
−12608 + 16256d− 9040d2 − 2648d3 + 16116d4 − 8730d5 − 3237d6 + 1991d7 − 420d8 + 340d9
)
<
0
⇒ ∂
2W (.)
∂K2
< 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
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∂W (.)
∂K
|K=1.1 = 1+d400 (−52928 + 103616d − 148000d
2 + 51592d3 + 67176d4 − 62250d5 + 49233d6 − 23059d7 − 17940d8 +
10780d9 − 600d10 + 600d11)⇒ ∂W (.)
∂K
< 0⇒ ∂W (.)
∂K
< 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
W (.)|K=1.1 = (1+d)(−57216+216192d−418320d
2+249544d3−105888d4−40490d5+193401d6−128003d7+25480d8−6560d9−22600d10+14600d11)
4000
⇒W (.)|K=1.1
Sturm′s T.
< 0⇒W (.) < 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1
⇒ V (.) > 0 ∀K ≥ 1.1⇒ K ′(d) > 0
Q.E.D.
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B.1 Free commuter newspaper expansion
The following two tables illustrate the successive expansion of free commuter news-
papers worldwide and in Switzerland, respectively.
Table B.1: Free Paper Circulation, 1995 - 2008
World free daily circulation (x1000) World free dailies, countries
Year Europe Americas Rest Total Europe Americas Rest Total
1995 231 231 2 2
1996 249 249 2 2
1997 558 558 4 4
1998 918 918 6 6
1999 2711 180 2891 10 3 13
2000 5292 1779 495 7566 14 6 4 24
2001 7371 1907 765 10043 17 7 5 29
2002 8345 2212 2008 12565 16 8 8 32
2003 8778 3097 2922 14797 16 8 8 32
2004 11010 3384 3770 18164 19 8 10 43
2005 15375 5028 4407 24810 24 9 10 43
2006 24267 6204 5853 36324 29 10 12 51
2007 26890 6832 8097 41819 31 10 15 56
2008 25272 7128 9270 41670 33 10 17 60
2009 21354 6712 8915 36981 33 10 17 60
Source:Newspaper Innovation 2009 - Own Construction
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Table B.2: Expansion and Free Paper Readership Growth, 1999-2008
Readership Readership Counties Counties
growth (x1000) growth (x1000) added entry added entry
Regions 99-04 05-08 99-04 05-08
Ostmittelland 453 493 36 0
Westmittelland 368 377 34 7
Alpen und Voralpen 126 309 15 13
Suisse romande 3 1071 3 25
Liechtenstein 0 2 0 1
Svizzera italiana 0 0 0 0
Source: WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2 - Own Computation
B.2 Additional descriptive statistics
The following table depicts the descriptive statistics of sociodemographic variables
on the county level.
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics - Sociodemographics: county level
County year n mean sd p5 p25 median p75 p95
demographics
fraction at least
A-level
2002 94 0.235 0.067 0.120 0.192 0.241 0.273 0.357
2005 94 0.274 0.073 0.161 0.222 0.270 0.322 0.414
2008 94 0.304 0.076 0.188 0.256 0.295 0.345 0.438
all 940 0.259 0.079 0.133 0.205 0.256 0.312 0.394
fraction
HH-Income over
8000 SFR
2002 94 0.330 0.085 0.176 0.280 0.333 0.393 0.480
2005 94 0.324 0.075 0.180 0.274 0.323 0.367 0.444
2008 94 0.367 0.071 0.243 0.333 0.369 0.414 0.500
all 940 0.324 0.080 0.185 0.269 0.326 0.379 0.455
fraction
HH-Income under
6000 SFR
2002 94 0.438 0.079 0.311 0.377 0.435 0.488 0.583
2005 94 0.443 0.068 0.330 0.400 0.439 0.481 0.558
2008 94 0.393 0.073 0.286 0.347 0.386 0.429 0.545
all 940 0.440 0.080 0.311 0.385 0.438 0.491 0.577
fraction age 14-29
2002 94 0.286 0.050 0.209 0.252 0.280 0.311 0.379
2005 94 0.234 0.034 0.183 0.208 0.231 0.259 0.294
2008 94 0.237 0.039 0.172 0.214 0.236 0.259 0.308
all 940 0.256 0.048 0.181 0.225 0.256 0.286 0.333
fraction age 60+
2002 94 0.207 0.049 0.120 0.178 0.207 0.237 0.286
2005 94 0.218 0.044 0.139 0.185 0.224 0.255 0.280
2008 94 0.214 0.046 0.133 0.185 0.218 0.245 0.283
all 940 0.213 0.049 0.129 0.180 0.213 0.246 0.291
fraction commuter
2002 94 0.454 0.094 0.300 0.400 0.462 0.509 0.607
2005 94 0.458 0.090 0.276 0.400 0.462 0.531 0.583
2008 94 0.473 0.083 0.348 0.423 0.477 0.533 0.593
all 940 0.455 0.090 0.286 0.405 0.465 0.519 0.583
Source:WEMF MACH Basic 00-09/2
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Table B.4: Variables Description
Variable Description
Readership data
Extensive paid-for readership The share of people reading at least one paid-for news-
paper
Intensive paid-for readership The average number of paid-for newspapers read by
one person
Intensive free readership The average number of free newspapers read by one
person
Singlehomers 2 * extensive paid-for readership - intensive paid-for
readership
Heavy readers The share of people reading six consecutive issues of
a particular daily paid-for newspaper
New readers The union of set of paid-for newspaper readers with
the set of free newspaper readers
Circulation The number of newspapers distributed on an average
day
Sociodemographic data
Fraction young The share of people aged between 14 and 29
Fraction old The share of people 60 and older
Fraction highly educated The share of people with at least A-level
Fraction less educated The share of people with education less than A-level
Fraction high income The share of people with the household income larger
than 8000 SFR
Fraction low income The share of people with the household income smaller
than 4000 SFR
Fraction commuters The share of people living and working in the different
counties
Fraction no commuters The share of people living and working in the same
county
Instrumental variable People using the public transport system commuting
to counties with free newspapers divided by the sum
of all commuters using the public transport system
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B.3 Additional results (Robustness Section)
Table B.5 provides the results of the following estimated equation:
PPm
Popm
= β0 + β1
FPc
Popc
+ β2Xm + εm,
where PPmPopm is per capita paid-for newspaper circulation in a municipality,
FPc
Popc
is
free paper readership in a county and Xm are the sociodemographic fractions in
a municipal. The coefficient β2 may be interpreted as a sociodemographic group-
readership gradient across municipalities.
Table B.5: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Circulation by year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002 2002 2006 2006
Fraction age -0.228* -0.247 -0.268** -0.223
14-29 (0.135) (0.169) (0.108) (0.154)
Fraction age -0.006 -0.113 -0.071 -0.247*
60+ (0.085) (0.133) (0.115) (0.145)
Fraction high 0.367*** 0.257*** 0.237*** 0.244**
education (0.052) (0.087) (0.061) (0.097)
Intensive free paper 0.070 0.054
readership (0.073) (0.081)
Constant 0.319*** 0.370*** 0.390*** 0.396***
(0.078) (0.098) (0.068) (0.101)
Fixed effects Counties Counties
Counties 94 94 94 94
Municipals 2559 2559 2277 2277
Notes: Dependent variable is aggregate per capita paid-for newspaper circulation in each
municipal. Standard errors in parentheses. Constants in fixed-effects regression represent
the average value of the fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by County.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.6 provides the results of estimation of equation 2.2 after including addi-
tional controls for different sociodemographic groups and different interests on the
county level. The coefficient of main interest barely changes. The results addition-
ally indicate that paid-for readership is negatively correlated with the fraction of
young people as well as the fraction of people with smaller income on the one hand
and positively correlated with the share of people with interest in local news on
the other.1
1Please, note that there is not enough variation across markets as well as over time to properly estimate
the relationship between our controls and paid-for newspaper readership.
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Table B.6: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Readership (with controls)
Intensive paid-for Extensive paid-for
readership readership
FE IV FE IV
Intensive free paper -0.109*** -0.174*** 0.003 -0.065**
readership (0.031) (0.066) (0.024) (0.026)
Fraction young -0.063 -0.050 -0.083** -0.077*
(0.095) (0.097) (0.041) (0.042)
Fraction old 0.129* 0.147** 0.050 0.054
(0.075) (0.074) (0.047) (0.047)
Fraction highly 0.094 0.102 0.023 0.035
educated (0.074) (0.075) (0.053) (0.054)
Fraction HH -0.305*** -0.317*** -0.148*** -0.152***
income < 6000 SFR (0.074) (0.075) (0.041) (0.042)
Fraction of people with interests in:
local news 0.188** 0.205** 0.143*** 0.155***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.045) (0.045)
national news 0.130 0.148 -0.030 -0.022
(0.105) (0.105) (0.062) (0.062)
business 0.074 0.060 0.096 0.094
(0.120) (0.121) (0.069) (0.071)
real estate 0.038 0.084 -0.003 0.016
(0.160) (0.156) (0.094) (0.095)
computer 0.151 0.155 -0.098 -0.096
(0.129) (0.129) (0.060) (0.059)
art 0.006 0.012 0.045 0.046
(0.130) (0.129) (0.072) (0.072)
literature 0.033 0.065 0.048 0.069
(0.138) (0.137) (0.072) (0.074)
sport 0.092 0.122* 0.048 0.068*
(0.076) (0.072) (0.041) (0.040)
job announcements -0.017 0.013 0.010 0.026
(0.095) (0.098) (0.056) (0.058)
Constant 0.987*** 0.732***
(0.061) (0.035)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects county county county county
Counties 940 930 940 930
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: Standard errors are clustered on the county level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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In Table B.7 we examine the relationship between free newspapers and paid-for
newspapers in counties where there are no boxes with free newspapers. The results
indicate an even larger substitution pattern than our main specification. This may
be caused by the fact that people from other counties spend more time commuting
and therefore they are more likely to use a free commuter newspaper. Moreover,
this finding is in line with stronger competition between local newspapers and free
newspapers found in Table 2.6.
Table B.7: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Readership in counties without free newspapers
Intensive paid-for Extensive paid-for
readership readership
FE IV FE IV
Intensive free paper -0.096*** -0.268*** 0.020 -0.066
readership (0.035) (0.100) (0.028) (0.046)
2000 year dummy -0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
2001 year dummy -0.020* -0.009 -0.013* -0.007
(0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
2002 year dummy 0.011 0.025* 0.001 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
2003 year dummy 0.020 0.039*** 0.008 0.018**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
2004 year dummy -0.008 0.016 -0.008 0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
2005 year dummy -0.031** -0.001 -0.044*** -0.030**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
2006 year dummy -0.058*** -0.012 -0.042*** -0.019
(0.017) (0.027) (0.010) (0.013)
2007 year dummy -0.082*** -0.020 -0.065*** -0.034**
(0.019) (0.033) (0.013) (0.016)
2008 year dummy -0.096*** -0.017 -0.070*** -0.031
(0.021) (0.043) (0.015) (0.021)
Constant 0.997*** 0.711***
(0.011) (0.006)
Fixed effects County County County County
Counties 940 930 940 930
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: Standard errors are clustered on the county level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.8 specifically looks at the impact of free commuter newspapers on paid-for
newspapers sales in order to check the robustness and plausibility of our results in
the main specification. The results indicate the same substitution ratio as Table
2.4.
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Table B.8: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Circulation
(1) (2)
FE IV
Intensive free paper -0.007 -0.054***
readership (0.008) (0.014)
year dummy 2000 0.010* 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005)
year dummy 2001 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
year dummy 2002 0.006 0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
year dummy 2003 0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.005)
year dummy 2004 0.010 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006)
year dummy 2006 0.006 0.021**
(0.006) (0.009)
year dummy 2007 0.004 0.023**
(0.006) (0.009)
year dummy 2008 0.001 0.024**
(0.006) (0.010)
Constant 0.299***
(0.004)
Fixed effects Municipality Municipality
Municipalities 19863 19557
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: Standard errors are clustered by county-year.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.9 provides an additional test for a statistical difference of coefficients in
regressions with and without considering multihoming. We are interested in the
coefficient of the interaction term. As we can see, this is always positive, meaning
that multihoming behavior plays an important role in the substitution activities
between paid-for and free daily newspapers.
Table B.9: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Singlehomers and Multihomers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE IV IV
singlehomers -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.242***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
intensive free paper -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.164** -0.164**
readership (0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.073)
free paper 0.100*** 0.100** 0.109** 0.109
x singlehomers (0.028) (0.042) (0.053) (0.076)
Constant 0.974*** 0.974*** 0.973*** 0.973***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
fixed effects (1)-(4): market, market x group, time, time x group
N 1880 1880 1880 1880
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level and on
county-group level in odd columns and even columns, respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In Table 2.6 we have seen that free commuter newspapers compete with local
tabloids rather than with national high-quality press. In the next step we look at
the relationship between the national yellow press and free commuter newspapers.
Table B.10 indicates that the Swiss national yellow press (i.e. Blick and 24Heures)
can be seen as a weak substitute for free newspapers. This competition pressure
was seen as one of the reasons why Ringier AG launched its own free commuter
newspaper “Blick am Abend” in 2008.
Tables B.11 and B.12 provide results for the estimations with stacked group specific
data. The results indicate the same substitution pattern as our main specification.
Young and less educated people are attracted more by free newspapers. Moreover,
table B.12 confirms our result that the expansion of free commuter newspaper the
informativness of people in the market since it brings new readers to the print daily
media.
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Table B.10: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on National Yellow Press
(1) (2)
FE IV
Intensive free paper -0.044*** -0.074***
readership (0.014) (0.017)
2000 year dummy -0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
2001 year dummy 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
2002 year dummy 0.008** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
2003 year dummy 0.014*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.005)
2004 year dummy 0.013** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.006)
2005 year dummy 0.013** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.007)
2006 year dummy 0.006 0.015*
(0.006) (0.008)
2007 year dummy -0.000 0.011
(0.008) (0.010)
2008 year dummy -0.005 0.009
(0.008) (0.011)
Constant 0.192***
(0.003)
Fixed effects County County
Counties 940 930
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: Standard errors are clustered by county.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.11: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on Aggregate Paid-for Newspaper
Readership by group
young vs. old highly vs. less educ high vs. low inc commuters vs. no comm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
intensive free 0.057 0.057 0.031 0.031 -0.015 -0.015 -0.106** -0.106**
paper readership (0.079) (0.079) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)
young -0.131*** -0.131***
(0.028) (0.033)
free paper -0.194* -0.194*
x young (0.105) (0.105)
less educated -0.243*** -0.243***
(0.029) (0.031)
free paper -0.126** -0.126
x less educated (0.063) (0.080)
low HH -0.214*** -0.214***
income (0.020) (0.023)
free paper -0.024 -0.024
x low income (0.050) (0.065)
no commuters -0.169*** -0.169***
(0.024) (0.019)
free paper 0.056 0.056
x no commuters (0.076) (0.072)
Constant 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.987*** 0.987*** 1.083*** 1.083*** 1.027*** 1.027***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
fixed effects (1)-(8): market, market x group, time, time x group
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level and on county-group level in odd columns
and even columns, respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.12: The Effect of Free Newspaper Penetration on new readers by group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
intensive free paper 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.248*** 0.248***
readership (0.054) (0.054) (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
young -0.161*** -0.161***
(0.016) (0.018)
free paper 0.227*** 0.227***
x young (0.060) (0.064)
less educated -0.173*** -0.173***
(0.014) (0.016)
free paper 0.123*** 0.123***
x less educated (0.040) (0.046)
low income -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.009) (0.010)
free paper 0.022 0.022
x low income (0.027) (0.032)
no commuters -0.069*** -0.069***
(0.011) (0.010)
free paper -0.041 -0.041
x no commuters (0.031) (0.025)
Constant 0.813*** 0.813*** 0.791*** 0.791*** 0.788*** 0.788*** 0.754*** 0.754***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
fixed effects (1)-(8): market, market x group, time, time x group
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the county level and on county-group level in odd columns
and even columns, respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.4 Figures
Figure B.1: Free Newspaper Readership in Switzerland, 1999-2008
Figure B.2: Paid-for Newspaper Circulation in Switzerland (x1000), 1999-2008
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Figure B.3: Traditional Newspaper Readership by Age, 1999-2008
Figure B.4: Traditional Newspaper Readership by Education, 1999-2008
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Figure B.5: Traditional Newspaper Readership by Commuter Status, 1999-2008
Figure B.6: Traditional Newspaper Readership by Income, 1999-2008
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Figure B.7: Readers of print media, 1999-2008
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C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Variables Description
Variable Measurement
Firm’s output (y) Sales
Labor Number of Employees
Capital Working Capital
Majority owner with more than 50 %
Monitored majority owner with more than 50% and at least one other share-
holder with more than 10%
Controlling minority owner with more than 10% and this stake is larger than
the sum of all identifiable stakes
Combined controlling
minority
two owners with a combined share of 50%
Size ln Total Assets
Debt Total Liabilities Total Assets (in percent)
Age Number of years from a firm’s incorporation
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Table C.2: Description and distribution of industries (manufacturing)
NACE Industry Obs. Share
Manufacturing: High-technology
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 327 0.16%
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1 255 0.63%
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1 487 0.75%
Total 3 069 1.54%
Manufacturing: Medium-high-technology
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1 709 0.86%
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5 748 2.89%
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 3 519 1.77%
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 924 0.47%
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 499 0.25%
Total 12 399 6.24%
Manufacturing: Medium-low-technology
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3 021 1.52%
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2 453 1.23%
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 022 0.51%
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and eqp. 9 166 4.61%
Total 15 662 7.88%
Manufacturing: Low-technology
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 4 605 2.32%
17 Manufacture of textiles 1 578 0.79%
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 1 041 0.52%
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 404 0.20%
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork,
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 2 802 1.41%
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 753 0.38%
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 2 634 1.33%
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 2 208 1.11%
37 Recycling 327 0.16%
Total 16 352 8.23%
Unasigned sectors
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 9 004 4.53%
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 890 0.45%
14 Other mining and quarrying 389 0.20%
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 984 0.50%
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 523 0.26%
45 Construction 16 392 8.25%
Total 28 182 14.19%
Total (manufacturing) 75 664 38.09%
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Table C.3: Description and distribution of industries (services)
NACE Industry Obs. Share
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS)
64 Post and telecommunications 587 0.30%
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 269 0.14%
70 Real estate activities 7 530 3.79%
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of
personal and household goods 1 096 0.55%
72 Computer and related activities 4 233 2.13%
73 Research and development 510 0.26%
74 Other business activities 21 495 10.82%
80 Education 963 0.48%
85 Health and social work 1 622 0.82%
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1 412 0.71%
Total 39 717 19.99%
High-tech KIS
64 Post and telecommunications 587 0.30%
72 Computer and related activities 4 233 2.13%
73 Research and development 510 0.26%
Market KIS (excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services)
70 Real estate activities 7 530 3.79%
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of
personal and household goods 1 096 0.55%
74 Other business activities 21 495 10.82%
Less Knowledge-intensive services (LKIS)
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
retail sale of automotive fuel 4 988 2.51%
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles 38 475 19.37%
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair
of personal and household goods 27 353 13.77%
55 Hotels and restaurants 4 890 2.46%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 3 829 1.92%
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of
travel agencies 1 651 0.83%
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 1 456 0.73%
93 Other service activities 624 0.31%
Total 83 266 41.92%
Market services less KIS
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
retail sale of automotive fuel 4 988 2.51%
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles 38 475 19.37%
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair
of personal and household goods 27 353 13.77%
55 Hotels and restaurants 4 890 2.46%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 3 829 1.92%
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of
travel agencies 1 651 0.83%
Total (services) 122 983 61.91%
Total (manufacturing+services) 198 647
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Table C.6: Ownership effects in manufacturing industries, all years
Ownership category
Technology
High Medium-high Medium-low Low
Majority -0.021** -0.036*** -0.047*** -0.021***(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Monitored majority -0.081*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.031***(0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Controlling minority -0.083*** -0.039*** -0.079*** -0.094***(0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Combined controlling minority -0.079*** -0.051** -0.057*** -0.047***(0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(Total assets) 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.063***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt ratio (percent) 0.037*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age of the firm 0.005*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004***(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.341 *** -0.402*** -0.527*** -0.566***(0.032) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
R-squared 0.159 0.169 0.236 0.258
N 1352 7415 8122 14968
Note: The dependent variable is the firm-level inefficiency obtained from the estimation of equation
3.4. The explanatory variables are dummy variables for the various ownership types, firm age, the
debt ratio, and the logarithm of total assets for each firm. The definition of each explanatory variable
can be found in Table C.1.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.7: Ownership effects in service sectors; all years
Ownership category Knowledge- High-tech Market KIS Less Knowledge- Market
intensive KIS intensive services LKIS
services (KIS) (LKIS)
Majority -0.017*** -0.019** -0.011* -0.022*** -0.018***(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Monitored majority -0.003 -0.016 -0.010 -0.009 -0.005(0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Controlling minority -0.052*** -0.075*** -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.059***(0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Combined controlling minority -0.020*** -0.041*** -0.021** -0.023*** -0.019***(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
log (Total assets) 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.068***(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt ratio (percent) 0.011*** 0.044*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.000***(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Age of the firm -0.007*** 0.003*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.003***(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.436*** -0.496*** -0.463*** -0.659*** -0.598***(0.013) (0.036) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
R squared 0.191 0.185 0.199 0.212 0.204
N 39670 5327 30085 81496 81067
Note: The dependent variable is the firm-level inefficiency obtained from the estimation of equation 3.4. The explanatory
variables are dummy variables for the various ownership types, firm age, the debt ratio, and the logarithm of total assets
for each firm. The definition of each explanatory variable can be found in Table C.1.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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C.2 Figures
Figure C.1: Ownership effects - Distance from efficiency frontier (majority vs. minority)
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